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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the role of attention in morality as presented by Iris Murdoch. 
The aim is to offer a clear and detailed understanding of Murdoch’s concept of 
attention, its metaphysical presuppositions and its implications for morality, and, if 
Murdoch’s view as developed here is found to be plausible, to suggest how attention 
can be considered to play an important role in morality. The moral concept of 
attention presented in this work involves particular epistemic attitudes and facult ies 
that are meant to enable the subject to apprehend moral reality and thus achieve 
correct moral understanding and moral responses. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part (Chapters 1 and 2), 
clarifies Murdoch’s metaphysical picture on which the idea of attention is grounded. 
The metaphysics involves a dual commitment to value as both existing in reality 
and as a transcendental condition. While the two ideas appear incompatible, I 
suggest a framework against which Murdoch's claim that an evaluat ive 
consciousness apprehends a value external to itself might be understood. The 
second part introduces Murdoch’s moral psychology, and explores how the 
faculties, attitudes and character traits related to attention are involved in moral 
understanding (Chapters 3 and 4). The two parts come together in Chapter 5, which 
focuses on how the exercise of attention can be understood as enabling moral 
perception. The last part (Chapters 6 and 7) continues the moral psychologica l 
exploration of attention, by focusing on the self, viewed both as interference and as 
indispensable means in attaining moral understanding. 
The analysis of Murdoch’s thought is conducted through close readings of 
her work, discussions of the secondary literature, as well as by clarifying and 
developing key points through readings of Simone Weil, from whom Murdoch 
derives the idea of attention.  
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Introduction 
This work is about the moral importance of what we see and know, and about our 
responsibility in seeing what we see and knowing what we know. Before we 
explicitly evaluate the facts at hand, before deliberating on the relative value of the 
different aspects of a problem, there are questions about how we establish what 
counts as a problem, what aspects of reality strike us, how and why we let them – 
or do not let them – strike us.  
More specifically, this work is about attention, understood as patient, hones t, 
unselfish and emotionally engaged receptivity to the value that is in reality, and to 
the demands that it makes on us.1  This conceptualisation of attention and the 
relative arguments for being more mindful of the importance of attention in 
morality and for the existence of a moral reality come from Iris Murdoch. This 
thesis is an examination and development of the idea of attention as found within 
her philosophy. 
The key idea that I develop from Murdoch is that being attentive is of central 
importance in morality, because it enables the individual to apprehend the moral 
relevance of what confronts her. In the most successful cases of attention, the result 
is a clear apprehension of moral reality, which includes the motivation to respond 
appropriately. While the exercise of attention makes the apprehension of moral 
reality possible, however, because of the complexity of individuals, the difficulty 
of fully attending, and factors outside one’s control, attention is not sufficient to 
ensure right moral understanding and right action. For these reasons, the 
                                                 
1The connection with patience and presence can make the exploration of attention particularly timely. 
As Bauman and Donskis (2014) have argued, the main reason why 21st Century society is, as they 
believe, moving towards ‘moral blindness’, is the loss of the ability to be present and appreciate the 
particularity of individuals, partly caused by the increasing use of certain kinds of technology. Two 
decades ago, Murdoch had similar complaints in relation to television: see MGM 110, 372 and 377, 
where she claims that television ‘impairs our power to perceive’ (MGM 377). As we shall see 
(Chapter 3), attending involves both striving towards clear vision and refraining from imposing  
interpretations, which can mean patiently waiting for our faculties to become attuned to the object 
and for its manifold aspects to reveal themselves. In the context of art – one of Murdoch’s favourite 
areas of comparisons with ethics – Roberts (2013) has recently called for the recuperation, in art 
students, but also in everyone, of precisely this sort  of attention, which she believes to be essential 
to be able to see what is in a painting (but also in reality more generally): ‘I would argue that these 
are the kind of practices that now most need to be actively engineered by faculty, because they 
simply are no longer available … It is commonly assumed that vision is immediate … But what 
students learn in a visceral way is that in any work of art there are details and orders and relationships 
that take time to perceive’ (Roberts 2013).  
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considerations and arguments put forward in this work do not attempt to draw an 
exhaustive picture of morality or to present a moral theory, which Murdoch does 
not offer, but rather aim to explore the role of attention in morality and to highlight 
its significance.  
If being attentive contributes to correct moral understanding, then attention 
is something that one ought to exercise. The exercise of attention has two main, 
often interconnected, manifestations. One is that there are things that we may wish 
to ignore, but that in order to be morally responsible we ought not to ignore. The 
other is that, while some things are within out field of vision, we may not fully 
engage with them, we may ‘look’ without ‘seeing’, and wilfully though perhaps not 
fully consciously ignore certain aspects, block our sympathy, avoid exercising the 
imagination, etc.2 Attention involves not just ‘knowledge’, but rather, with Cavell 
(1979), ‘acknowledgment’.3  
Attention stands at the opposite end of, and is meant to prevent or combat, 
moral blindness, and other forms of moral visual impairment (where vision is 
intended both metaphorically and literally). Thinking about the importance of 
attention involves recognising that sometimes we are too lazy, fearful, distracted, 
careless, hurried, committed to certain positions, to see clearly. And that, Murdoch 
argues, is where a lot of moral failures begin: not in deliberation, not in choice, but 
in knowledge and perception. As Raimond Gaita puts it, ‘much moral failing is not 
a failure to do something that falls under a rule or a principle: it is a failure to rise 
to what we are called to become – someone who is authentically present in speech 
and deed’ (Gaita 2004: 142). 
                                                 
2 For example: a plea to attend, which includes both aspects of attention just described, takes up a 
large part of J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals (1999). The main character, Elizabeth Costello, is 
giving a speech about how the ways in which we relate to non-human animals are defective because 
inattentive. First, she laments the fact that slaughterhouses are kept hidden and outside city centres, 
so that we can avoid knowing much about what happens there. Second, she urges her listeners to 
attend to animals, ‘not only intellectually but with their whole being’, in order to more fully  
understand what the animal is, what she is going through, and what life means to her. Poetry, the 
protagonist says, can help to achieve this kind of ‘presence’, but more often we should resor t to 
actual experience: ‘and if the poets do not move you, I urge you to walk, flank to flank, beside the 
beast that is prodded down the chute to his executioner’ (Coetzee 1999: 114). 
3 Cavell elaborates the idea of acknowledgement in the context of scepticism about other minds, 
claiming that what counters scepticism is not a kind of impossibly conclusive ‘knowledge’ about 
another person, but an acknowledgment, which shows in our responses to them. This view is inspired 
by Wittgenstein’s remarks on scepticism (for ex: ‘my attitude towards him is an attitude towards a 
soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul’ (PI, p.178), which will be relevant in Chapter 5).  
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The idea that the ways in which the individual approaches reality are of 
great moral importance is central to Murdoch’s moral philosophy, and it is also an 
idea that is enjoying a growing interest in contemporary moral philosophy more 
generally. The possibility of direct apprehension of value is being explored by 
intuitionist philosophers (McNaughton 1988, Audi 2004 and 2013, Huemer 2005, 
Dancy 2006), and Murdoch can be credited with being one of the first to rekindle 
interest in that view, by declaring, at the opening of the Sovereignty of Good (1970), 
that part of her project consists in a defence of Moore (1903) and his idea that good 
is an object of knowledge or ‘vision’ (SG 3-4). In a different area of contemporary 
thought, feminist ethics of care, most philosophers who support it have taken up 
Murdoch’s idea of attention as central to their theory, which also emphasises 
particularity, emotions, and the importance of the individual (see Ruddick 1989, 
Noddings 1984, Baier 1994). 
These are some of the reasons to return to Murdoch’s work and analyse the 
idea of attention as presented by her. Two further reasons relate more closely to 
Murdoch’s philosophy. One is the growing interest in Murdoch’s philosophica l 
work, after years of almost exclusive academic focus on her fiction. Several 
analyses of Murdoch’s philosophy have been published in recent years (among 
which are Laverty 2007, Altorf 2008, Antonaccio 2000 and 2012b); yet, on the one 
hand, there remain controversial interpretative difficulties relating to Murdoch’s 
thought more generally, and on the other, there is as yet no study which focuses on 
her concept of attention. The second reason for a fuller exploration of Murdoch’s 
philosophy in relation to her concept of attention is that Murdoch offers a complex 
and far reaching metaphysical and psychological picture, which functions as 
essential background to her ideas about the role of attention. 
Because of the extensive nature of Murdoch’s work, which spans 
metaphysics, meta-ethics, epistemology and moral psychology, the analysis of 
attention in Murdoch has been conducted as if through a prism, which refracts the 
idea of attention among its various aspects, its underpinnings and its implications. 
The underpinnings of the importance of attention are found in Murdoch’s 
metaphysics, so that is where my exploration begins (Chapter 1). There are two 
ideas which come together in Murdoch’s claim that ‘goodness is connected with 
knowledge’ (SG 38). On the one hand, the object of knowledge is, for Murdoch, a 
moral reality, which divides between the ideal Good and the value which is part of 
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the world. At the same time, for Murdoch, moral reality is not known impersona lly 
and passively, but through the active exercise of the individual’s faculties which 
are guided by value. The quote above reads in full:  
It is perfectly obvious that goodness is connected with knowledge: not with 
impersonal quasi-scientific knowledge of the ordinary world, but with a refined and 
honest perception of what is really the case, a patient and just discernment and 
exploration of what confronts one, which is the result not simply of opening one’s 
eyes but of a certainly perfectly familiar kind of moral discipline (SG 38). 
Value is, Murdoch claims, both a real constituent of the world and a transcendenta l 
condition of consciousness. Both claims justify the importance of attention: 
attention is what discovers value in reality, and it is itself a moral faculty/attitude. 
The two claims, however, appear incompatible: how can value be both a structure 
of the mind and part of reality? Chapter 2 attempts to delineate a framework which, 
consistently with Murdoch’s ideas, smooths out the tension between these two 
underpinnings of attention. 
While the first two chapters provide the background to attention, the 
remaining chapters are explorations of the concept of attention itself (Chapters 3 
and 4), how it operates in moral perception (Chapter 5) and what it requires of the 
self (Chapter 6 and 7). With the exception of Chapter 5, Chapters 3 to 7 are 
investigations in moral psychology, broadly understood. The importance of the 
individual’s evaluative states of minds, faculties and attitudes in apprehending 
reality, which connects with the second of the two underpinnings of attention 
indicated in the metaphysics (the evaluative nature of consciousness), is crucial to 
understanding attention, so Chapters 3 and 4 are dedicated to exploring this topic 
and to explaining how individual moral effort and character traits are required to 
perceive and understand reality clearly and correctly. If attention – as opposed to 
mere ‘looking’ – is what reveals moral reality, that is because moral reality (and 
reality more generally) is not simply and immediately available to anyone, but 
requires the correct application of concepts, the use of the imagination to disclose 
possibilities, and virtues such as honesty, humility, truthfulness, patience, and love. 
Murdoch’s epistemology and moral psychology are linked by this conception of 
perception and knowledge, whereby apprehension of reality (the main moral goal) 
is something to be achieved through moral effort.  
Chapter 5 unites the considerations about the moral nature of consciousness 
with the arguments about moral realism, in an exploration of attentive moral 
11 
 
perception, understood as morally laden perception of a moral reality, and of how 
that can result not only in moral understanding but also in moral motivation. The 
chapter concludes the explanation of how the importance of attention in morality 
can be justified within Murdoch’s philosophy. Questions remain, however, about 
how the individual can practise attention, given Murdoch’s individuation of the self 
as the main impediment to attention. Chapters 6 and 7 address these questions, 
exploring the role of the self, how it contributes to and how it interferes with correct 
apprehension of reality. 
What emerges is what may be called a contemplative and perfectionist ic 
view of the moral life. Contemplative, because the main burden of morality lies in 
perception and knowledge (for this reason, throughout the thesis, I have talked 
about the ‘moral subject’, instead of the ‘moral agent’).4 Perfectionistic, because 
goodness consists in a constantly perfectible apprehension of a perpetually receding 
reality. The moral life is considered by Murdoch as a sort of pilgrimage towards a 
very distant but real goal (the Good), the understanding of which changes as we 
move and learn and deepen our experience. This idea is one of many indications of 
Murdoch’s Platonic inheritance, which runs through her whole work, more often 
through brief references than systematic discussions (with the exception of FS). 
Many of the ideas presented in this thesis, therefore, have their origin in Murdoch’s 
reading of Plato; because my aim is to clarify Murdoch’s thought, however, I do 
not address the question of whether Murdoch’s reading of Plato is correct. The other 
pervasive influence on Murdoch’s thought is Simone Weil. The very idea of 
attention, as Murdoch acknowledges, is ‘borrowed’ from Weil, together with other 
related ideas. For this reason, Weil accompanies the entirety of the present work, 
as a minor key, whose own thought emerges mainly when Murdoch’s treatment of 
a problem could benefit with being illuminated by similar ideas more clearly and 
exhaustively expressed by Weil. 
In the next chapter, I start the exploration of attention in Murdoch by 
introducing Murdoch’s metaphysics and its key concepts. Before fully engaging 
with Murdoch’s philosophy, I present some considerations about her method, which 
is not standard in contemporary analytic philosophy, due to its reliance on ordinary 
experience and a broadening of what can be considered empirical and objective. 
                                                 
4 See Chapter 3§2.6, however, for some caveats about defining Murdoch’s view as ‘contemplativ e’. 
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Another philosophical ally, Ludwig Wittgenstein, will emerge in the discussion of 
Murdoch’s method. The same patient and honest observation of reality, which 
Murdoch recommends for the moral life in the form of attention, is found to be 
central to her philosophical method, in which she takes herself to be following 
Wittgenstein, with his exhortation: ‘don’t think, but look!’ (PI 66) – and it is in the 
practise of that looking that all the difficulties of philosophy and morality lie.  
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Chapter 1 
Iris Murdoch’s Method and Metaphysics 
Introduction 
This chapter and the following one constitute an introduction to, and a critique of, 
Murdoch’s moral metaphysics. While I offer an overall picture of the metaphysica l 
framework that Murdoch presents, the picture does not aim to be exhaustive. The 
aim of discussing Murdoch’s metaphysics is to provide a background upon which 
the concept of attention can be understood and justified. What is required for a 
moral philosophy in which attention is central is a metaphysics which accounts for 
i) the existence of a moral reality, which is revealed by attention; ii) the possibility 
for the mind to access moral reality; iii) the value of the enterprise of accessing 
moral reality. The second and third aspects, which are the kernel of the idea that 
attention is a central concept in morality, are also reflected and developed in 
Murdoch’s moral psychology, which I discuss in Chapters 3 and 4.  
In the present chapter I provide an overview of Murdoch’s moral 
philosophy, identifying its central elements and highlighting the tensions which 
arise. I discuss these concerns in Chapter 2. The main difficulty, it will emerge, is 
that of reconciling Murdoch’s transcendental ideas, whereby consciousness is 
inherently evaluative, with the realistic strain, or the idea that there exists an 
objective moral reality, which exists independent of the individual’s perception of 
it. In this chapter, the problem is presented, but not yet analysed, in relation to the 
idea of the Good, central to Murdoch’s metaphysics, whereby the Good appears 
both as a regulative ideal and as a real object.  
The discussion of Murdoch’s metaphysics requires some preliminary 
methodological considerations, which I discuss in §2, and which provide the 
background against which the whole analysis needs to be understood. Murdoch’s 
philosophy takes as its starting point the observation of human experience, 
including everyday moral intuitions and beliefs. Such observation is conducted not 
with a scientific method but with the same all-round sensitivity that she 
recommends in the moral life. What emerges, therefore, is that attention is not only 
a central concept within moral philosophy, but also and at the same time part of a 
sound philosophical method. 
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1 Murdoch’s Philosophy 
Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy constitutes a vast and complex system or structure 
that falls within a number of areas and positions in ethics.5 Murdoch’s work is a 
contribution to moral metaphysics, moral psychology and epistemology. As for its 
meta-ethical positions, Murdoch’s philosophy supports, broadly, a form of moral 
realism and moral cognitivism.6 Neither of these attributions is uncontroversial, and 
in this chapter and the one that follows I shall clarify the reasons for the 
controversies and for classifying Murdoch in this way.  
I shall defend, with qualifications and explanations, the position that 
Murdoch is a moral realist and a cognitivist, because she believes that the Good and 
value exist in reality, that moral concepts have correct and incorrect applications, 
and that moral reality can be apprehended. That is made possible by adopting a 
particular attitude which engages the whole person or by exercising a particular 
faculty which is a cluster of several other faculties. This faculty or attitude, which 
enables the subject to apprehend moral reality, is what Murdoch calls ‘attention’. 
The idea of attention is spelled out in a moral psychology that focuses on the way 
that self and desires can aid or hamper morality. The possibility of apprehending 
moral reality through attention, in turn, indicates that Murdoch supports moral 
perception, because apprehension of moral reality is not considered as occurring 
only through the intellect, but also and at the same time through the senses, and 
because she believes that perception itself – and all cognitive activity – is a form of 
evaluation. Therefore, in referring to attention as ‘moral perception’ (or, following 
Murdoch, ‘moral vision’7), I shall mean to include intellectual understanding as part 
of perception. Lastly, if moral reality can be perceived, this needs to happen in 
particular instances; this idea, coupled with the thought that the Good, though 
                                                 
5 By using the word ‘system’, I do not wish to suggest that Murdoch’s philosophy is a ‘systematic 
moral theory’ as defined, for example, by Chappell (2014: 1-4): if systematic moral theories aim at 
being exclusively true, and practise abstraction at the expense of experience and particularity, then 
Murdoch very emphatically does not offer such a theory (see §2 below). What I mean by ‘system’ 
is merely that Murdoch’s work contains coherent arguments with consistent strands that are 
developed in the course of her books. 
6 I write ‘broadly’ because Murdoch’s position is in many ways so idiosyncratic that placing her 
squarely within any existing school or theory would fail to do her justice. For an elaboration of 
Murdoch’s maverick position within moral philosophy, see Cora Diamond (2010, 2014). 
7 ‘Moral vision’ is to be understood more broadly than mere visual perception, although the choice 
of vision among the senses is not arbitrary. For a discussion of the role of vision in attention, see 
Ch.3§2.1. 
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unitary, is indefinable,8 and cannot therefore provide guidance as to the value of 
particular objects prior to experience, makes it plausible to see Murdoch as 
supporting a form of particularism: on her model, one has to look and see.9 
These views are developed around a number of key concepts and related 
problems, which recur under different aspects throughout Murdoch’s philosophica l 
work. These concepts are: the Good; unity and multiplicity; the individua l; 
consciousness; perception; transcendence; transcendental conditions; reality; truth; 
energy; love; attention; unselfing. Some of these concepts belong to metaphys ics, 
others to moral psychology, others to both, and there is a close-knit relationship 
among all of them, where the metaphysical concepts call for the psychological ones, 
and vice versa. Most of these concepts, moreover, have in Murdoch a non-standard 
meaning, which needs to be spelled out in order to grasp her overall view: for 
example, when Murdoch claims that morality is connected with knowledge of 
reality (SG 38), it is not only the much-contested notion of morality that she is 
providing a new view of, but ‘reality’ and ‘knowledge’ are also partially redefined, 
where ‘reality’ is something that is dependent on the human activity of 
conceptualising, and ‘knowledge’ is seen as both an endless task and a specifica l ly 
moral one. The way in which one engages with Murdoch’s philosophy, therefore, 
depends to a large extent on whether one accepts her use of key concepts. If those 
are accepted, the picture of morality that Murdoch suggests almost automatica l ly 
follows.  
The use of the concepts above, in their special meaning, also engenders in 
Murdoch’s metaphysics a series of tensions, which are characteristic of her 
philosophy. Sometimes the tension is fruitful, indicating a necessary difficulty in 
moral thinking that needs to be sustained, and it is misguided to seek a solution. At 
other times, the tension finds a solution in a blending of two apparent opposites, 
which turn out not to be incompatible. An instance of the first kind is the 
combination of the multiplicity, chaos, and lack of finality of the world, with the 
desire and indeed the need to find order and meaning in it, which in the context of 
morality finds expression precisely in Murdoch’s main philosophical goal, the 
possibility of having a metaphysical picture to guide morals, without making up the 
                                                 
8 This is one central point of agreement with G.E. Moore, which Murdoch declares at the outset of 
SG. 
9 See §3 below. 
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former or forcing the complexity of life into the mould of an unrealistic (i.e. not 
descriptive or illuminating of the world) metaphysics. At the same time – an 
instance of the second possibility – what is real and imperfect and what is ideal can 
also blend, by recognising intimations of the Good in objects which are good only 
to a degree. Murdoch’s overall philosophical endeavour is an attempt to 
accommodate the ‘two-way movement’ that she identifies in philosophy at the 
opening of SG, holding together metaphysics and empiricism, theories and simple 
facts, in a dualism that she sees as characterising most philosophy, but is rarely 
found within a single philosopher or theory.10  
In what follows, I provide an overview of Murdoch’s metaphysics in order 
to clarify some of the key concepts that I shall use throughout this work, and to 
being to spell out the background upon which a morality that centres upon attention 
can be understood. Before doing so, I shall briefly explore Murdoch’s philosophica l 
method, itself idiosyncratic, both in order to better understand the way in which 
Murdoch reaches her positions, and in order to present and justify a method which 
also informs the present work. 
2 Murdoch’s Philosophical Method 
Murdoch occupies a maverick place in moral philosophy, which constitutes one 
reason for the interpretative difficulties her readers face. This is so not only in terms 
of the contents of her theory, but also because of her particular philosophica l 
method. In fact, Murdoch’s method and content cannot be separated, both because 
the former determines the latter, and because they rely on similar cognit ive 
practises. The central kind of argument in Murdoch’s metaphysics, as well as moral 
psychology, relies on what she terms ‘empirical observation’. The object of such 
observation is most often the human mind, in its general tendencies (as in the 
observation that ‘human beings are naturally selfish’, SG 78), as well as through 
phenomenological remarks, regarding moral thinking and the experience of value 
in the world and of the Good.  
Regarding moral experience, Murdoch is interested in doing justice to the 
way that the ordinary person thinks about morality, including ‘the philosopher 
outside his study’ (MGM 160). That is her starting point: commonsens ica l 
                                                 
10  Antonaccio (2012a) rightly stresses the centrality of the two-way movement in Murdoch’s 
philosophy. 
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observations which are meant to capture how we, as human beings, tend to live our 
lives in relation to morality: ‘the appeal to evidence, to reports of experience … is 
in some regions of philosophy not only the last resort but the proper and best move’ 
(MGM 430). Of course, such observations are not meant to settle the question, but 
they are an ineliminable starting point. Instead of laying out a metaphysical theory 
and then judging experience on its basis, Murdoch starts with experience and 
constructs a metaphysics that can do justice to it. The very idea of the Good, 
Murdoch’s most abstract concept, depends on experience, is ‘suggested’ by it. For 
these reasons, Chappell (2014) considers Murdoch as inheriting what he considers 
Plato’s experiential approach, where the arguments are rooted in experience and 
not in a priori considerations (2014: 298-300, 312-2): ‘if a moral philosophy does 
not give a satisfactory or sufficiently rich account of what we unphilosophica l ly 
know to be goodness, then away with it’ (EM 215, quoted in Chappell 2014: 322). 
It can be said, then, that Murdoch’s approach to moral metaphysics is bottom up: 
from everyday experience, a metaphysical picture is derived.  
Murdoch is careful not to present her metaphysics as a closed and 
exhaustive system; what she claims to offer is ‘a metaphysical background’ (SG 
43) which can work to explain the moral life, but not to constrain its possibilities: a 
‘metaphysical position but no metaphysical form’ (SG 73). The reason lies in her 
conviction that any such system would not do justice to what it tries to capture and 
explain, and that systems should not take precedence over reality. Metaphysics is 
useful because, Murdoch holds, human understanding works by grasping the 
complexity of the world through some kind of form; the challenge, then, is to 
apprehend reality through it without distorting what is apprehended. Forms can be 
useful models for reality, but they should not pretend to contain all of it. That can 
be one reason why Murdoch’s metaphysical model is not fully spelled out, 
remaining an open unity – unlike the closed unity of most standard philosophica l 
theories. The image Murdoch favours is that of a broken circle, which hints at a 
form which contains a portion of reality, but does not close off other possibilit ies 
(MGM 88). This is an aspect of the general problem, which Murdoch identifies in 
philosophy as well as in life, of connecting multiplicity and chaos with form and 
order: there is the experience of life and the world as messy, chaotic, pointless and 
ungovernable, and at the same time there is the inescapable human need to order 
and make sense of it all. This tension is found in the oppositions of particularity and 
18 
 
generality, of the notion of unified self contrasted with our multifarious experience, 
of the formal unity of art, philosophy, religion, compared to the complex and 
inexhaustible life they try to capture; and in the contrast between metaphysics and 
morals (cf. MGM 146). 
I have spoken of a metaphysical picture as being derived from the 
experience of life with morality, which may sound more like ‘morals as a guide to 
metaphysics’ rather than the other way round, as the title of Murdoch’s last 
philosophical work presents it. I have also spoken, however, of such metaphysica l 
model as explaining and illuminating aspects of morality and being able to guide 
the individual in her thought and in her life. It then appears that the relation between 
metaphysics and morals is reciprocal or, as Murdoch suggests, circular. Such 
reciprocity or circularity also has another, deeper sense: experience and a general 
picture of the world are helpful to explain one another, but they are also related 
because metaphysics is itself not independent of morality. What we understand as 
metaphysics, the kind of metaphysical pictures we are prepared to accept and 
understand, are partly expressions of our moral thinking. For instance, the very idea 
that metaphysics must be prior to moral thought is, for Murdoch, a moral notion. 
This claim hinges on Murdoch’s general argument about fact and value, related to 
her idea of the ubiquity of value in consciousness (explained in §3 below). For the 
moment, what matters is that Murdoch’s metaphysical picture is not to be 
understood as a free-standing, logically irrefutable model, but as a picture that is i) 
suggested by human experience of morality and ii) not understood independently 
of moral thinking.  
Cora Diamond (2010, 2014) has offered an exhaustive and helpful 
commentary on Murdoch’s understanding of the nature and methods of moral 
philosophy. In (2014), Diamond lists a number of ways in which Murdoch 
challenges contemporary moral philosophy. Two elements are given particular 
relevance by Diamond: Murdoch’s broadening of both the scope and the ‘possible 
methods’ of moral philosophy, and her ‘anti-dictationism’. The latter refers to the 
refusal to let other branches of philosophy, such as epistemology, or indeed 
metaphysics, dictate what morality is and how it can operate. The reason, as 
mentioned above, is that moral thought is not a sub-category of thinking, but part 
and parcel of thought about the world: ‘ethics cannot be dictated to by epistemology 
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and metaphysics, but can rather tell them about the character of reality and what it 
is to know it’ (Diamond 2010: 61). 
Diamond’s interest in Murdoch’s reconfiguring of the scope of morality and 
moral philosophy chimes with her own philosophical project. The same 
considerations about the fundamentally moral character of all thinking support the 
observations about this point too. If thought about life, the particular concepts we 
use as well as the broader conceptual schemes through which we approach the 
world, are seen as expressive of, or determined by, moral attitudes, then moral 
philosophy is no longer only about propositions containing moral concepts; rather, 
its domain becomes impossible to delineate clearly. Thus Murdoch broadens the 
possibilities of moral philosophy in two ways: by opening up its subject matter, 
which is now seen as not specifiable in advance; and by including modes of 
reflection, independent of what reflection takes as its object: ‘the area of morals, 
and ergo of moral philosophy, can now be seen, not as a hole-and-corner matter of 
debts and promises, but as covering the whole of our mode of living and the quality 
of our relations with the world’ (SG 97). 
In the light of both anti-dictationism and of the broadening of the scope of 
moral philosophy, Murdoch’s preferred starting point – the observation of 
experience – also takes on a different meaning. First, it is important for moral 
philosophy to concern itself with experience, not only experience concerning 
explicitly moral situations, but more broadly having to do with ways of thinking of, 
and responding to, all kinds of situations, as well as life in general. Second, what 
experience is need not be determined by the empirical sciences. Diamond has 
helpful reflections on both points, but the latter is of most concern here because it 
can shed light on the way in which Murdoch’s claims about experience and 
psychology are to be understood, and it can help answer objections about their 
grounding.  
Murdoch’s main method, as I have sketched it, is called by Diamond 
‘Reflective Empiricism’ or ‘humanistic reflection on experience’ (Diamond 2014). 
The main objection to this method is that, unless claims about experience are 
grounded in empirical science (empirical psychology, for instance), they are not 
properly grounded at all. The claim that a proper account of experience must rely 
on empirical science, Diamond points out, depends in turn on certain assumptions 
about the nature of knowledge, namely the idea that objective knowledge is only 
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achieved by a kind of observation which is independent of morality. As we have 
seen, Murdoch challenges this assumption, asking us to consider examples from 
literary fiction: are the descriptions of inner life presented by, for instance, Henry 
James, less adequate than a scientific psychological report? That they are not is not 
a matter of logic, but of how we respond to life. Murdoch offers no irrefutab le 
argument for taking her kind of empiricism to be equally if not more illumina ting 
than that of natural science, but invites the reader to consider whether such accounts 
do shed light on experience and morality. Her view, she claims, ‘must be judged by 
its power to connect, to illuminate, to explain and to make new and fruitful places 
for moral reflection’ (SG 45).11 The appeal of Murdoch’s empirical observations is 
likely not to be universal, nor are her remarks meant to crystallise experience. 
Rather, as Diamond (2014) suggests, following Bernard Williams (2008: 171), 
statements about ‘what it is like for us’ are presented as an invitation, asking us, the 
readers, to consider what we do think, as well as what we may need to think about, 
as individuals, but also as human beings. 
From these observations we can notice an aspect of Murdoch’s moral 
philosophy which is particularly relevant for the present purposes, and which 
Diamond herself remarks on: the fact that Murdoch’s method relies on the same 
kind of attention, an inextricably moral and cognitive enterprise, which is at the 
heart of what she thinks the good person should practise. 12  The fact that 
philosophical method and normative theory converge is consistent with Murdoch’s 
arguments about the ubiquity of value. Like the moral agent – or, rather, as a moral 
agent – the philosopher’s task is to attend to the multifarious aspects of life, which 
involves resisting the temptation to force those aspects into a single theory, being 
open to conflicting observations, and bringing her imagination to bear on what she 
is observing; furthermore, in practising this kind of ‘careful and reflect ive’ 
‘humanistic’ attention (Diamond 2014), the philosopher needs to be exercising 
moral virtues: honesty, humility, the courage to see things as they are, the 
suppression of the ego’s demands, which may emerge as the desire to support a 
particular theory by overlooking some facts, etc.  
                                                 
11 Another strength of Murdoch’s account, as she herself points out, is that it is able to explain the 
attraction of the scientistic attitude, while empiricists cannot explain the appeal of Murdoch’s 
account (SG 45). 
12 Diamond (2014) comments that, on this view, the distinction between ethics and meta-ethics 
collapses. 
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Such description of the philosopher’s activity has close kinship with the 
views of another philosopher, whom Murdoch both admired and regarded with 
suspicion: Ludwig Wittgenstein. 13  Murdoch herself mentions Wittgenstein’s 
influence on her in a personal letter, saying that the influence mainly lies in her way 
of doing philosophy.14 Wittgenstein holds that philosophy proceeds through, first 
of all, paying careful attention to one’s subject matter and doing justice to the 
diversity of cases one is presented with, as opposed to being tempted to formula te 
a theory which provides rules to specify how things ‘must’ be in every single case. 
Philosophical progress, for Wittgenstein, comes about through ‘changing one’s way 
of looking at things’ (PI 144) (notice here too the metaphor of vision), and this 
change in one’s way of seeing requires not only the exercise of rationality, but also 
will, honesty and courage.15 These elements of Wittgenstein’s thought have led 
some of his readers to suggest that Wittgenstein’s whole philosophy carries a moral 
significance. 16  James Edwards has even noticed the similarity between 
Wittgenstein and Murdoch, comparing what he sees as Wittgenstein’s ethical vision 
of ‘sound human understanding’ and Murdoch’s ‘ethic of love’ (Edwards 1982: 
237). Both philosophers, Edwards writes, uphold a view of living and thinking in 
which ‘we must work to notice whatever is before our eyes. To give the attentive 
care worthy of a lover, to continue to focus one’s attention so as to bring depth, 
demand from us rich resources of the mind’ (Edwards 1982: 241).17  
                                                 
13  B.S. Heusel (1986) also remarks on the connection between Murdochian attention and 
Wittgenstein’s method introducing her Wittgensteinian interpretation of Murdoch’s A World Child; 
Sabina Lovibond notes the methodological connection in the idea of ‘looking’ between Wittgenstein 
and Simone Weil, who inspired Murdoch on this and other points (Lovibond 2011: 29).  
14 ‘[Wittgenstein] has influenced my philosophical style, in the widest sense of that word [;] that is, 
I have been affected (I hope) by his slow and meticulous methods of working’ (Murdoch, quoted in 
Heusel 1986: 82). 
15  Cf. for example these remarks, which chime perfectly with Murdoch’s understanding of 
knowledge and the role of character in acquiring it: ‘What makes a subject hard to understand – if 
it's something significant and important – is not that before you can understand it you need to be 
specially trained in abstruse matters, but the contrast between understanding the subject and what 
most people want to see. Because of this the very things which are most obvious may become the 
hardest of all to understand. What has to be overcome is a difficulty having to do with the will, rather 
than with the intellect’ (Wittgenstein 1980: 17e); and: ‘what I do think is essential is carrying out 
the work of clarification with COURAGE; otherwise it becomes just a clever game’ (1980: 19e).  
16 Cf. Edwards: ‘The fundamental intention of Wittgenstein’s thinking, in both its periods, is its 
attempt to incarnate a vision of the healthy human life; the transmission of a moral vision … is the 
true burden of all his philosophical work’ (Edwards 1982: 203). See also C. Diamond (2000), J. 
Conant (2002), S. Cavell (1979: Part 3), O. Kuusela (2008: Chapter 7), R. Read (2010).  
17 Cf. also Simone Weil for a very similar thought: ‘the proper method of philosophy consists in 
clearly conceiving insoluble problems in all their insolubility and then in simply contemplating them, 
fixedly and tirelessly, year after year, without any hope, pat iently waiting’ (FLN 335).  
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These fascinating parallels must remain, here, a mere hint, serving mainly 
to bring out how Murdoch’s notion of attention reaches so far as to include her 
philosophical method itself. Murdoch’s own preferred examples of attentive 
individuals are artists and writers: like the artist and the novelist, the philosopher is 
required to overcome the self and, first of all, to ‘just look’ – where ‘just’ does not 
refer to an ease in attention, but to a simplicity given by the removal of interference. 
Murdoch’s philosophical method and her prescriptive theory about the good person 
merge in the idea of attention. In the present work, I follow Murdoch in taking 
experience as primary in morality, where the meaning of ‘experience’ is both 
shifted and broadened along the lines just explored. Moreover, as in Murdoch’s 
work, the aim here is not to suggest an exhaustive model which fits all situations 
and individuals, or an infallible guide to the moral life; that would require 
occupying the very position from outside the human perspective which, as Murdoch 
notes, no philosopher can occupy. The upshot of the observations of experience, 
and of the theoretical discussions thence derived, will be, rather, to highlight and 
justify attention as one important and indeed crucial element of morality, without 
claiming that it exhausts morality nor that no other model can be helpful in moral 
thinking; without, in Murdoch’s words, closing the circle. 
3 Murdoch’s Metaphysics: An Overview 
The remarks on Murdoch’s method should be kept in mind when engaging with her 
metaphysics. This section sets out the main elements of Murdoch’s metaphysics, in 
order to provide a framework in which to understand the nature of the task of living 
a morally good life. Tensions will emerge, which I shall flag here, to be more 
thoroughly addressed in Chapters 2 and 5. 
The central problem of moral philosophy, according to Murdoch, is how to 
make oneself morally better. The process of moral improvement consists for 
Murdoch in ‘purifying one’s energy’, whereby ‘energy’ (i.e. the motivation and 
desires that depend on the background of one’s consciousness) is best guided and 
moved by the idea of something perfect. The one object which has traditiona lly 
been able to bring about this kind of purification is taken by Murdoch to be God, 
and prayer is seen as the process of such purification. The concepts of God and of 
prayer in Murdoch are also non-standard: prayer is defined (following Simone 
Weil, although unacknowledged; cf. WG 66) as ‘attention to God which is a form 
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of love’ (SG 55) and God (whom Murdoch does not believe in, and whom she 
thinks in the modern Western world is increasingly difficult to believe in) looks 
more akin to the God of the mystics, where what is central is the transcendent and 
transformative aspect, while omnipotence and omniscience are less relevant in her 
picture.18 Prayer to God is considered here as the activity par excellence which is 
able to purify the mind of the individual, through attention to an external ideal of 
perfection. Likewise, morality, Murdoch holds, is primarily to be conceived as 
centred around the purification of the consciousness of the individual – as opposed, 
for instance, to being focused on defining right action. Consciousness is for 
Murdoch the ‘locus’ of morality, because, as we shall see, morality is concerned 
with modes of awareness of reality, and also because action depends on one’s state 
of consciousness. As prayer to God is able to purify the consciousness of the 
believer, inspiring her with an ideal of perfection, Murdoch claims that there is a 
similar process and object that can purify the consciousness of the secular 
individual, by turning her mind to an ideal of perfection: the process is attention, 
and the object is the Good.19 
Central to Murdoch’s metaphysics is the idea of the Good, which she 
sometimes spells with a capital ‘G’20 to signal its unique status and its kinship with 
Plato’s Form of the Good. The Good is defined in SG as a ‘transcendent magnetic 
centre’ (SG 75) and discussed as ‘the idea of perfection’ and the ‘absolute’ in 
human life. In ‘On God and Good’ (SG) Murdoch argues that the central concept 
of moral philosophy, a morally purifying source and object of attention, possesses 
all the following characteristics traditionally attributed to God: ‘a single, perfect, 
transcendent, non-representable, necessarily real object of attention’ (SG 55). The 
list contains the keywords of Murdoch’s metaphysics of the Good. Let us then look 
                                                 
18 Bernard McGinn (1998) has defined mysticism as  ‘a special consciousness of the presence of God 
that by definition exceeds description and results in a transformation of the subject who receives it’ 
(McGinn 1998: 26), which fits exactly Murdoch’s description of attention to God. More generally, 
Murdoch’s discussion of religion and God has similarities with the negative way and with the 
mysticism associated with it, in particular that of St. John of the Cross, who takes ‘attentio n’ or 
‘loving attention’ to be the proper attitude in prayer, and who in turn influenced Simone Weil (See 
The Dark Night of the Soul I.10.4 and The Living Flame of Love III.33).  
19 In SG Murdoch writes that it is a ‘psychological fact’ that God is a powerful source of energy, 
and it is also a psychological fact that we receive moral help by focusing on valuable things (SG 56).  
20 Throughout the present work, I will use the capitalised ‘Good’ for consistency, unless otherwise 
stated, to refer to the ideal. I also keep to the capitalisation in order to maintain a clear difference 
between ‘Good’ as transcendent ideal and ‘good’ as the ordinary property of morally good things, 
actions and people in the world. This point is discussed in Ch.2§4 below. 
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at the elements of this definition, which will call up the remaining concepts central 
to Murdoch’s philosophy.  
Murdoch is explicit about the tension between unity and plurality in 
morality, a tension which is present within her own account of morality and of the 
Good. The dichotomy bears on one of the central questions of moral philosophy, 
whether the moral value of individual instances is to be assessed only case by case, 
or by applying a universal rule to the specific case, the question at the centre of the 
debate between generalists and particularists. On the one hand, the Good is a 
general and unitary ideal, which guides the individual in perception, and can 
therefore be understood as a principle. Therefore, i) if the perception of moral 
features can be guided by a principle which directs the mind to the discovery of 
moral reality, 21  and/or ii) if moral perception is understood as perception of 
universal features instanced in particulars, then the idea of the Good seems to place 
Murdoch’s view among the generalists. However, both criteria can be challenged : 
i) on the one hand, all that the Good does is to inspire the individual with the correct 
approach to reality which enables her to discover moral truths, but does not provide 
rules as to what counts as good;22 ii) on the other, the idea of the Good itself is 
formed through perception of particular goods, which makes particular goods 
primary and therefore not requiring the application of a principle in order to be 
identified. Whether we conclude that Murdoch is a particularist or not, my purpose 
at present is to set out the concept of the Good and highlight its complexity, 
containing both universalistic features (as a regulative ideal) and particularistic ones 
(as something that is discovered through particular moral properties). I do not 
attempt to settle the matter here, although my discussion of attention as moral 
perception, as will become clear, fits within a particularistic framework.23 
As we have seen, Murdoch claims in SG that like God, the Good must be 
unitary. Three reasons can be identified in SG for thinking of the Good as unitary. 
The first appeals to the Aristotelian notion of the unity of virtues: courage is not 
                                                 
21 As Clarke (2012) and Antonaccio (2000) hold. 
22 Clarke (2012) suggests that these considerations do not need to exclude the idea that Good is a 
principle, but that it needs to be regarded as a second-order principle. 
23 Among the defenders of Murdochian particularism are Elijah Millgram (2005) and L.A. Blum 
(1994), while Maria Antonaccio (2000) and Bridget Clarke (2012) see the Good as a principle 
guiding the individual to the truth, and therefore deny that Murdoch is a particularist. Julia Driver 
(2012) offers a third possibility, suggesting that Murdoch was a ‘methodological particularist’, but 
not a ‘substantive particularist’, i.e. a particularist about moral metaphysics. 
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such without temperance, love needs kindness, etc.… so that to excel in one virtue 
one needs to possess the others. This is true not only of virtues, but of moral 
concepts generally, which Murdoch sees as internally related, as part of a ‘scheme 
of concepts’ whereby the understanding of one concept develops and is influenced 
by the understanding of others, forming a general background in which, if 
something shifts, the rest is variously affected (SG 32-33). Secondly, Murdoch 
seems to offer a conceptual and linguistic observation to the effect that we recognise  
various and dissimilar things as good, without them appearing to share anything 
except their goodness. One way to understand this idea is that Good is a property 
that is shared by, or contained in, all things that are good.  
The two observations can be connected: if Good is a property that is 
instanced in each good object, this can also explain the relation of moral concepts 
and virtues to each other. What is important to stress is that for Murdoch the Good, 
conceived in this way, is not to be understood in terms of any other property: good 
things may share nothing but their goodness. On this point, Murdoch quotes G.E. 
Moore’s anti naturalistic argument with approval, at the very start of SG.24 The 
important corollary of this idea is that the unity of Good does not provide criteria 
for identifying good things. Good things can only be ‘seen’ to be good. Hence, the 
burden of morality lies, as Murdoch insists, on particular forms of perception – 
‘vision’25 – and the faculties and attitudes that make them possible – ‘attention’. 
However, Murdoch also offers a third, and apparently conflicting, reason to 
think of the Good as unity. Good things, besides being related to each other, are 
also related hierarchically, in degrees or ‘scales’ of goodness. Instances of kindness, 
generosity, courage, appear to us as related, in their imperfection, to ideal instances 
of the same virtuous actions. What relates them, Murdoch suggests, is the Good. 
On this picture, the Good is considered to be the general form of perfection that lies 
at the end of the scale, and that in relation to which good things obtain their 
goodness. This second claim complicates matters, but it is at the heart of Murdoch’s 
argument for the existence of the Good. On this view, rather than a common 
                                                 
24 This is true despite the fact that Murdoch calls her own theory a kind of naturalism (SG 44). 
However, what she means by ‘naturalism’ is something different from what Moore criticised, 
namely the idea that Good is an object of perception within the natural world, so itself a natural 
property. Based on this definition, Murdoch contends that Moore himself was in spite of himself a 
naturalist, because he thought that Good was a real constituent of the world (SG 3). 
25 Remaining with Moore, the idea of vision has an intuitionist legacy, as Bagnoli points out (2012: 
207-208) 
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essence, the unity of the Good appears rather as a matter of relation: good things 
are held together by their relationship to the idea of perfection – which Murdoch 
sometimes discusses with reference to the Platonic idea of the Form of the Good. 
The recognition of different objects as good and the perception of scales and 
hierarchies among good and bad objects are considered by Murdoch as facts which 
can be observed in everyday cognitive activity. What this activity is taken to show 
is the existence of an ideal that unites and organises good things. 
If Good is apprehended as unitary through the perception of degrees of 
goodness in the world, then the good things in the world are not good in themselves, 
but in relation to an indefinable ideal Good. This ideal Good can be understood in 
two ways. First, it can be a mysterious object ‘out there’ in the world, which 
determines the goodness of things. In this sense, it can be compared to the way 
gravity makes things heavy according to their position, or, indeed, following a 
metaphor of Plato’s of which Murdoch is fond, to how the light of the sun can make 
certain things bright when illuminated. Second, the ‘relational’ unity of Good can 
also be understood according to a notion of the Good present not in the world but 
in the mind, whereby the Good is a regulative ideal according to which the human 
mind perceives the varying goodness of objects. 
These are two different conceptions of the Good that Murdoch’s work 
suggests. Together with the essentialist view, they make up three ways to 
understand the Good: as a property of things, or as a relation, which divides between 
a regulative ideal provided by the mind, and an independent object according to 
which Good things acquire goodness. I shall consider which the correct 
interpretation is in the following chapter. Before doing so, other elements of the 
picture need to be brought in. 
If we return to the observations about the perception of scales in the world, 
we will see that Murdoch derives from them further considerations about the Good. 
From the experience of perceiving good things, observing their relation to other 
good things, and from the sense that there is always the possibility of something 
better and that it is important to know what things are good and to what extent (SG 
57-64), Murdoch derives not only the idea that the Good is a single object, but also 
its perfection, its being non representable, transcendent and necessarily real. These 
features, Murdoch holds, support one another as parts of the concept of the Good. 
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The perception of relative goodness in things, where some appear better 
than others, suggests, according to Murdoch, not only that there is something that 
unifies all these cases, but also and by the same token, that what unifies them does 
so in such a way that particular cases relate to the Good as to a model which they 
tend to but do not match (thus weakening the essentialist interpretation). The 
‘degrees of reality’ argument is meant to indicate not only the unity, but also the 
perfection of the Good. The Good is what lies at the end of the scale – that to which 
observable goodness tends, but which it never reaches. The Good enables us to 
compare good objects, acting as standard. ‘We come to perceive scales, distances, 
standards …’ (SG 61), and this perception suggests that there is an end-point to 
those scales. We see a loving action and perceive its goodness, but at the same time 
we relate it to the idea of perfect goodness. The Good emerges here as ‘the idea of 
perfection’ to which everything can be compared. Beautiful things, kind people, 
brave actions, all have a relation to the idea of perfection, and a certain distance 
from it. One can be sceptical that this is what in fact happens in our experience of 
the world;26 as observed in §2 above, the success of the concept depends to a large 
extent on whether it helps the reader to understand her own experience of value. On 
the whole, the observations about degree of goodness appear to apply differently to 
two objects: the world and ourselves. In relation to the world, it is the idea that we 
can perceive relative goodness. But it is in relation to ourselves that the idea is more 
convincing and powerful: there the Good acts as the ideal guiding and providing a 
standard to evaluative one’s own actions and being, where one’s attempts to be 
good can be endlessly refined, and inspiration for such refinement is drawn from 
an idea of perfection. This conception of the Good as idea of perfection from which 
the subject can find inspiration connects with the idea of the Good as ‘magnetic 
centre’: the Good works in human beings primarily as source of inspiration or 
‘object of attention’ which regulates consciousness and action; like Plato’s Form of 
the Good, Murdoch’s Good indicates an ideal and provides at the same time the 
desire and motivation to move toward that ideal.27 
                                                 
26 There can also be a moral discomfort about the idea that we compare good things, as if a good 
action (say, rescuing a drowning person) is not to be appreciated only in itself, but also with the 
awareness that there can be something better. However, this objection loses force if we assume that 
Murdoch is not talking about a conscious comparison in particular instances, and that she limits the 
idea of an explicit awareness to a sense of the whole of experience. 
27 I shall expand on this in Chapter 2§4. 
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The conception of the ideal needs to have a source, and Murdoch indicates 
that we conceive of the Good by looking at the world. Good must be real, she insists. 
What kind of reality the Good has is controversial and will be discussed in the next 
chapter; for the moment, let us understand the meaning of ‘real’ minimally, that is 
as opposed to what is subjectively created or projected by the individual. Murdoch 
holds that Good must be real for two reasons, one psychological, the other 
metaphysical: in the first instance, Murdoch observes, something which is not 
thought of as real would fail to provide real motivation, real eros (SG 61-2); for the 
same reason, the ‘magnetic centre’ must also be perfect, because the thought of 
mere slight improvement cannot play the same inspiring and motivating role: ‘the 
idea of perfection moves, and possibly changes, us (as artist, worker, agent) because 
it inspires love in the part of us that is most worthy. One cannot feel unmixed love 
for a mediocre moral standard’ (SG 62). The metaphysical reason for the reality of 
the Good lies in the fact that, because everything is perceived in relation to the idea 
of perfection, and because all of our actions and thoughts are in relation to it, then 
the Good is that without which nothing can be thought. To construct this argument, 
Murdoch adapts Anselm’s Proof (as we shall see in Chapter 2§2).  
To sum up: by looking at the world we discern various good things, but only 
good to a degree, and from those we infer the idea of perfection, i.e. the Good. Thus 
inferred, we also take the Good to be something real and not imagined. The idea of 
the Good or perfection that we form and re-form, constantly, by confronting the 
world, also shapes our thought and behaviour – on the Platonic assumption that 
every person aims at the Good, whatever they conceive that to be.28 
The idea that Good is the standard of perfection against which all things 
measure indicates that Good is not itself an object among others. The Good is 
understood by Murdoch as the standard of perfection suggested by experience, but 
not itself an object of experience (SG 60). This leads us to consider the two 
remaining interrelated characteristics attributed by Murdoch to the Good: its being 
transcendent and its being indefinable. The former implies the latter: if Good is not 
something that can be observed, it also cannot be described. All we can say about 
the Good is that it is perfect and, through the Good things in the world, we can see 
the direction in which it lies.  
                                                 
28 Cf. for ex. Meno 77a-87c, Gorgias 466a-468e and Symposium 204e-206a. 
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To say that the Good is transcendent is to place the Good beyond 
experience. Hence, the earlier suggestion that Good is manifest in the world seems 
to clash with the Good’s transcendence. However, Murdoch’s concept of 
transcendence is idiosyncratic. First, Murdoch talks about reality as being 
transcendent because it lies beyond one’s self (SG 58-9).29 In this sense, all reality 
‘transcends’ us, and so does the Good. According to this conception, the meaning 
of transcendence is, in a sense, upturned: what is transcendent is not outside the 
world, but it is the world. The idea that reality transcends us is important and needs 
to be understood on the background of Murdoch’s moral psychology and her 
conception of knowledge, where we see clearly how metaphysics and morals are 
intertwined: the world, according to Murdoch, is accessible to the subject not 
immediately, but through effort, and specifically moral effort. Knowledge as well 
as perception are, according to Murdoch, not ways of taking in a reality which is 
given to us ‘on a plate’ (MGM 215), but ways of ‘grasping’ that reality (TL 40): 
ordering, making sense, giving shape… in short, conceptualising. Murdoch 
attributes this activity to the faculty of the imagination, which can be understood as 
the personal and evaluative component of perception and understanding. 30  This 
world-grasping activity is moral because it depends on our values (individua l, 
social, or human) which, according to Murdoch, structure the whole of 
consciousness. Morality, then, is something that is at play all the time: ‘morality … 
is right up against the world, to do with all apprehensions of others, all lonely 
reveries, all uses of time’ (MGM 324). Because reality is transcendent, knowledge 
and perception are ways of actively reaching out to it. 
To claim that consciousness grasps or gives shape to reality in order to make 
sense of it is not, importantly, to deny that there are correct and incorrect ways of 
doing so. Indeed, the moral effort inherent in cognition consists in trying to grasp 
reality correctly, being guided by the desire to do justice to the object, and at the 
                                                 
29 See also MGM 498: ‘…“transcendence”, a word that I have used to mean a good “going beyond” 
one’s egoistic self … ’ 
30 See MGM Chapter 11. Murdoch regards the activity of the imagination as fundamental to all 
thought and perception, praising Kant for seeing this, but then distancing herself from him because 
he separates imagination from morality. Murdoch defines the imagination as ‘a type of reflection on 
people, events … which builds detail, adds colour, conjures up possibilities in ways which go 
beyond what could be said to be strictly factual’ which is also ‘a sort of personal exploring’ (DPR 
48).  
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same time shedding, as much as possible,31 any distorting influence.32 Concepts, 
therefore, are not ways of mirroring the world, but creative tools for making the 
world available to us. As such, they can be instruments of truth and knowledge, as 
well as of falsehood and fantasy, and of various possibilities between the two. Being 
shaped by the imagination, concepts are also not only public and static, but to an 
extent personal and idiosyncratic: what they mean and reveal to us is constantly 
changing, in sync with the changes in our consciousness, including our experiences 
and our changing understanding of the reality they refer to. Concepts are mobile 
and can be ‘deepened’. 
On this picture, it becomes clearer why Murdoch connects transcendence 
with realism (SG 59) and why she stresses that her concept of reality is normative 
(SG 40). If the world is not just given in perception, but coming to see it as it is 
involves the moral effort of properly using the imagination, then two important 
considerations follow. One is that correct perception is a moral achievement, and 
so the concept of reality itself is not a matter of morally neutral description, but a 
normative concept describing something that we ought to be constantly trying to 
grasp. This also means, secondly, that reality thus understood is something that 
transcends us both epistemically and morally, and that the distance between 
ourselves and the world can only be bridged by degrees and with moral effort.33  
If reality transcends us in the way described, and if concepts have such 
depth, then the Good, as itself something real, is also transcendent like everything 
else. However, as we have seen, the Good is not an object like any other for 
Murdoch. Rather than being an object of direct perception, the Good cannot itself 
be perceived, but is suggested or implied by what is perceived. The impossibi lity 
of grasping the Good relates to its very nature as a standard of perfection or, in other 
words, an ideal: an Idea or Form, the nature of which is not to be an object among 
                                                 
31 That it is hardly ever possible for human beings to have an unbiased, non -egocentric, undistorted 
view of the world is for Murdoch the meaning of the idea of the fall and original sin (SG 28). See 
Forsberg (2015) for a more sophisticated account of original sin than I can provide here.  
32 As we shall see in Ch.3§2 and in more detail in Ch.6, what distorts perception is primarily, for 
Murdoch, the ego, which is responsible for the creation of consoling or gratifying pictures of the 
world. 
33 While in MGM more space is given to the operations of consciousness as summarised above, in 
SG Murdoch seems more uncertain about whether all of reality transcends us in this way. 
Throughout, she is specifically concerned with morality, which she relates to people and human 
situations, as being of such complex nature that it is ‘infinitely receding’. She admits, however, the 
possibility that all reality and all the concepts used to grasp it are of this kind, ‘concrete universals’ 
which can always be deepened and improved (SG 29-30). 
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others, but ‘a source of energy’ and an organising principle. We know about the 
Good because of the role that it plays in shaping and ordering our perception and 
concepts about various instances of good things. These observations can lead to the 
conclusion that the transcendence of the Good is of a different kind from the 
transcendence of the world, and indeed Murdoch indicates that Good is a sui generis 
concept; however, no other meaning of transcendence is to be found in Murdoch 
and, importantly, she denies that there exists an ‘elsewhere’ to which this other 
transcendence could relate. If, as Murdoch emphatically claims, the Good is part of 
the world (because there is no other world, and any meaning to life must be found 
within life), then the Good transcends us as individuals, but does not transcend the 
world. It seems plausible to conclude that the difference in transcendence between 
the Good and other objects is quantitative. The Good is transcendent, on the one 
hand, to a greater degree than other objects: Murdoch always refers to the Good’s 
distance (cf. for ex. SG 31, MGM 178), never to its absence. From this perspective, 
Good is transcendent in a way similar to how other people, objects and situations 
in reality are transcendent, something which we can only perceive and understand 
progressively and through moral effort. Good is, however, also different from any 
other object because – as the standard of perfection – it cannot be an object of direct 
perception, however imperfect: ‘it is in its nature that we cannot get it taped … it 
lies always beyond’ (SG 62). The specific transcendence of the Good, then, seems 
also to lie in the Good’s ideal nature, resulting in elusiveness in perception and 
definition.  
Thus far, Murdoch’s concept of the Good appears to refer to something real, 
however transcendent, which is also a standard or ideal in relation to which we 
understand the value of any object. This can be understood, as we have seen, either 
as an ideal specification of a property which is variously instantiated, or as an object 
of comparison against which objects are measured but which is not possessed by 
them. To complicate matters further, the observations introduced above regarding 
the evaluative nature of consciousness are grounded, according to Murdoch, in the 
fact that we have a constant ‘orientation’ – of various kinds and degrees – to the 
Good. In other words, the way we perceive reality through the imagination depends 
on our values which, in turn, are structured according to our understanding of the 
Good. The Good is then the standard according to which consciousness organises 
itself: a transcendental condition for cognition. This leaves us with three ways of 
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understanding the Good, as a real but transcendent object intuited in perception: i) 
a standard external to the mind, according to which objects are evaluated; ii) a 
property variously present in those objects; iii) a transcendental condition of 
consciousness.  
Interestingly, the considerations Murdoch puts forward in relation to the 
transcendental nature of the Good are the same as those that are meant to prove its 
necessary reality. As we have seen, Murdoch argues for her picture of the Good 
from the bottom up, by pointing out features of our experience of good things and 
invoking the Good as that which such experience seems to presuppose. There is one 
experience that Murdoch regards as fundamental: the ubiquitous perception of 
value and scales of value. The experience – as we saw in relation to the reality of 
the Good – has two elements, the first focusing on the objects of perception, the 
second on the nature of perception itself. On the one hand, the fact that we perceive 
goodness in things, as well as the fact that we are aware of scales within such 
perceptions, points to the existence of the Good as a standard of perfection. On the 
other hand, the fact that such awareness of the presence of value and of relative 
goodness appears as a constant feature of human consciousness, without which 
consciousness itself would be unrecognisable, is taken by Murdoch to indicate that 
Good is a transcendental condition of consciousness.34 The co-existence of these 
two apparently irreconcilable conceptions of the Good is the heart of the problem 
of Murdoch’s metaphysics, which needs to be resolved in order to ground her view 
of moral perception. If Good is a transcendental condition of experience, it is part 
of the structure of the mind, and not an object in the world; on the other hand, if 
Good is something real and in the world, how does it act as necessary structure of 
the mind, and how would we be able to distinguish between what is real and what 
is part of our mental structure? 
Conclusions 
The first part of this chapter has provided the methodological tools to understand 
Murdoch’s argument about morality derived from observations of ordinary moral 
experience. Two of the central elements of Murdoch’s thought are the presence of 
                                                 
34 While the ubiquity of valuing plays a more important role in MGM, the observation about degrees 
of goodness is introduced in SG and used, also in MGM, to argue for the other attributes of the Good, 
namely its perfection and transcendent quality 
33 
 
evaluation in almost every act of cognition, and the assumption, displayed in the 
apprehension of moral situations and in the attempts to improve oneself, that the 
Good is something real, rather than mere convention or an expression of preference. 
The methodological remarks are meant not only to illuminate the concept of the 
Good, but will be relevant throughout this work.  
In sketching Murdoch’s conception of the Good as the central concept of 
her metaphysics, a number of tensions have emerged. The Good has been presented 
as something real, conceived of as a property of good objects, but also as the 
standard or ideal according to which value is measured. Further, the Good is 
described both as existing in the world, but also as a transcendental condition of 
consciousness. These tensions need to be examined further in order to understand 
not only Murdoch’s metaphysics itself, but also how attention works and what its 
relevance is: whether attention is an apprehension of a transcendent idea, whether 
it involves apprehending the goodness of objects, or whether it is a moral attitude 
whereby the Good operates as a structuring element of consciousness showing 
things in a moral light; or whether it is possible for attention to be all of the above. 
In the following chapter I address these questions, by examining on the one hand 
the ideal nature of the Good in relation to good things in the world, and on the other 
its relation to the mind. The discussion will clarify, therefore, how Murdoch’s 
framework makes it possible to justify the existence of a moral reality and to what 
extent that is independent of the mind. In that context, I shall delineate a picture 
which attempts to reconcile the apparently incompatible strands, filling in gaps left 
open by Murdoch while remaining faithful to the overall spirit of her thought.  
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Chapter 2 
Moral Reality 
Introduction 
In this chapter I seek to address the main tensions in Murdoch’s metaphysics that 
arose in Chapter 1. The central problem that emerged from the overview of 
Murdoch’s metaphysics was the complex and potentially paradoxical nature of the 
concept of the Good, which appears to be a real object, an ideal working as 
transcendental condition, and also a property of things. The concern is that 
Murdoch’s central concept might have potentially incompatible elements: a 
property instantiated in good things cannot at the same time be an object existing 
independently; and if Good is a transcendental condition, then it is part of the 
structure of the mind, not of the world.  
The aim of this chapter is to analyse this potential difficulty in depth and to 
offer a viable picture which makes sense of these aspects of Murdoch’s thought, 
and which suggests how these apparent fundamental tensions may be resolved. If 
successful, this will result in a form of realism about value which is able to justify 
the idea that morality is centred around attention as what enables the perception of 
value in the world. One of the clear difficulties in attempting such a task is that the 
tensions identified arise in part because Murdoch does not explicitly address these 
difficulties in her writing. Thus, whilst the analysis that follows and the suggested 
potential ‘solution’ offered in §5 below are based very clearly on Murdoch's thought, 
it is inevitable that a certain amount of interpretive licence regarding her position is 
required if the desired reconciliation is to be achieved. My aim is to present a viable 
and coherent picture of the relation between mind, world and value, drawing on 
Murdoch’s thought, without presuming to give an exhaustive representation of 
Murdoch’s philosophy itself. 
1 Three Questions about the Good 
In order to provide a suitable metaphysical picture on which to ground the idea of 
attention as central to the moral subject, I single out three questions that emerge 
from Murdoch’s metaphysics: the link between Good and truth; the relation 
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between Good and value, or Good and good things in the world; and the relationship 
between both Good and value, and the mind.  
The first question concerns the justification of Murdoch’s fundamenta l 
claim that Good is connected with truth. The idea, which she inherits from Plato, 35 
is assumed by Murdoch as obvious, so that its reasons are never fully spelled out. 
Is truth valuable because of the attitudes that lead individuals to it, which are 
recognised as virtues (selflessness, humility, courage)? In this case, it is truthfulness, 
rather than truth, that is considered good. Or is what makes these attitudes virtuous 
something inherent in truth, the idea that truth itself is a value? The latter 
explanation would require a justification as to how the value of truth is established, 
while the former makes the value of truth secondary to and dependent on the value 
of virtues. Since attention is the attitude or faculty that aims at truth and makes 
apprehension of it possible, the relation of truth with Good is crucial in explaining 
the centrality of attention in morality.  
The importance of attention as making truth available includes its enabling 
the apprehension of moral truths, or a clear perception of moral realities. Therefore 
it is crucial to the idea of attention that we establish the existence of a moral reality, 
which can be apprehended more or less truthfully. This question can be broken 
down into two: first, what is the relation between the Good, considered as an ideal, 
and good things in the world? Second, are Good and value part of the structures of 
the mind, or something that is found in the world? 
The second question I address, then, is about the relation of Good and good. 
Such relation can be understood in two ways. One possibility is that Good is a 
property of things, something that good things possess and that we can perceive 
directly. However, that would clash with Murdoch’s theory of the Good as being a 
non-perceptible, non-definable, transcendent standard according to which things 
are perceived as good in varying degrees. In the latter case, Good is not a property 
of good objects, but rather a regulative ideal, and Good itself is not present in the 
world, but something that organises the world. If so, the relation between the Good 
and good things appears somewhat obscure, and needs to be clarified in order to 
understand what it is that the attentive individual is supposed to apprehend, and the 
process by which she does so. 
                                                 
35 Cf. for ex. Republic 508a-e, 595c. 
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The third and last question revolves around the tension between the Good 
and value as transcendental conditions of consciousness, and Good and value as 
standards of perfection that exist independently of the human mind. The inherence 
of value in consciousness has important consequences for the distinction between 
fact and value. If all cognition is evaluative, then facts are themselves perceived on 
an evaluative background and the reality that is seen merely reflects one’s values. 
As far as attention is concerned, it would be difficult to see how a faculty of moral 
perception would be required if the principle of morality were not part of the world 
but a structuring element of consciousness. Yet, also crucial to Murdoch’s notion 
of the Good is the fact that it relates consciousness to the world. If that is so, 
attention can be important as the virtuous attitude of the mind, but what attention 
delivers is still not itself value. On the other hand, Murdoch also claims that Good 
exists in the world, as opposed to existing only in the mind. On this alternat ive, 
attention is not so much a virtuous attitude, valuable in itself, but is valuable in 
virtue of its ability to reveal a moral reality, which is moral independently of the 
way it is grasped. Between a transcendental idealist and a classical realist 
conception of the Good, I shall suggest a third way of understanding Murdoch’s 
arguments, which maintains a notion of reality and objectivity without 
presupposing a perspective outside human thinking and practises.  
Before addressing these questions, I provide an account of Murdoch’s 
reinterpretation of Anselm’s Ontological Proof, because that is where the 
metaphysical status of the Good is most openly stated by Murdoch. Looking at 
those arguments is helpful because Murdoch’s reading of the Proof contains all the 
elements that we have seen to be problematic: the connection between truth and 
goodness, the reality of the Good and its transcendental status, and its being 
perceptible in the good things of the world. The three questions will then be 
discussed in light of the consideration brought forward there. 
2 The Ontological Proof 
The chapter ‘The Ontological Proof’ in MGM sums up the metaphysical ideas about 
the Good put forward by Murdoch elsewhere, and presents them again in a different 
light. Murdoch’s reading of Anselm has been examined by Maria Antonaccio 
(2000), Marije Altorf (2008), and Stephen Mulhall (2007) among others, so my 
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presentation of it here will be limited to how it relates to the questions I am 
addressing.36 
Murdoch’s main interest in the ontological argument is that it proves, 
according to her, not the reality of God, but the reality of the Good.37 What the 
argument is about, she thinks, is ‘the unconditional element in the structure of 
reason and reality’, in the words of Paul Tillich which open the MGM chapter 
(Tillich 1951: 208). The Good, Murdoch goes on to argue, is such unconditiona l 
element. The acknowledgment of an unconditional element is seen by Murdoch to 
be a recurrent move in philosophy, appearing in various forms: as Plato’s theory of 
the forms, as Descartes’ own proof of God’s existence, and also as Kant’s 
categorical imperative. The unconditional, on which the Proof rests, is taken to be 
that which governs the whole of the world and life and without which life and the 
world would be unthinkable, what therefore exists necessarily, and is proven by 
everything that we think, see, and do. While Anselm identifies this with God, 
Murdoch takes that to be an unwarranted move, because all that Anselm proves in 
his argument is the existence of something unconditional and perfect, while all the 
other attributes of God are added to it. For Murdoch what is unconditional and 
perfect, instead, is nothing more than the idea of perfection, which is manifest in 
our sense that something matters, and that it matters in itself, absolutely. And that 
is precisely how Murdoch defines the Good: ‘it is really only of the Good that we 
can say “it is the trial of itself and needs no other touch”’ (SG 98). The absolute, 
Murdoch claims, is not God, but morality, which the idea of God includes, but 
which is more basic than God: ‘what is absolute and unconditional is what each 
man clearly and distinctly knows in his own soul, the difference between right and 
                                                 
36 Maria Antonaccio (2000: 123-9) reads the Ontological Proof as supporting her overall thesis that 
Murdoch is a ‘reflexive realist’, according to which the Good is grasped as an external entity  which  
is nevertheless only accessible by consciousness reflecting on itself. Antonaccio derives her 
conclusion from the idea that the necessary existence of God/Good implies that God/Good is a 
condition of experience and therefore can only be perceived by reflecting on consciousness itself. I 
offer some considerations against this conclusion in §4.1.1 below. Stephen Mulhall’s (2007) reading 
is compatible with the one I present here, although it has a different focus: in his paper, Mulhall is 
interested in comparing Murdoch’s atheistic interpretation with Christian doctrine, arguing that 
Christianity can accommodate Murdoch’s criticism of a personal God, and that it may also be better 
equipped at dealing with the presence of God/Good in the world and with th e experience of 
meaninglessness and absence of God/Good. 
37 More broadly, Murdoch is seeking to explain a religious spirit in terms of morality and without 
recourse to a supernatural entity: ‘religion is a mode of belief in the unique sovereign place of 
goodness or virtue in human life’ (MGM 426). For one way to interpret this idea in the context of 
truth and attention, see §3 below. 
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wrong’ (MGM 439). The unconditional is omnipresent, both in the world and in the 
individual:  
[it is] inseparable from one’s sense of oneself, like the Cartesian sense of one’s  own 
existence and as directly grasped. Kant is confident that we all recognise it. And the 
man in the street, if untainted by theory, would probably assent to both ideas, to 
cogito ergo sum and to his ability to discern right from wrong. (MGM 439)38 
Drawing together the world and the self (or ‘soul’), the idea of the unconditional is 
found also in Descartes’ proof of God’s existence, which Murdoch sees as a direct 
development of Anselm’s proof, the intuition of something exceeding the mind 
grasped by observing the mind’s contents. Murdoch also believes that Plato’s 
‘degrees of reality’ argument, 39  which points to the existence of the Forms, 
coincides with her and Anselm’s ‘degrees of perfection’ argument, which aims at 
establishing the existence of an endpoint to the goodness observed in the world. 
Similarly, Kant’s Categorical Imperative is what serious reflection on the part of 
the individual yields as something absolute governing reason, which one needs to 
obey for its own sake: ‘the idea of Good (goodness, virtue)’, Murdoch writes, 
‘crystallises out of our moral activity. The concept of Good emphasises a unity of 
aspiration and belief concerning the absolute importance of what is done on this 
heterogeneous scene’ (MGM 426). The unconditional reality of the Good is 
discovered by observing its omnipresence in reality as well as in the mind. 
Murdoch identifies two arguments as part of Anselm’s Proof: the logica l 
and the metaphysical. The logical argument, for which Anselm is better known, has 
two formulations: the first is meant to show that if God, defined as ‘a being than 
which a greater cannot be conceived’ exists in the mind, it must also exist in reality, 
since existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind. This formulation was 
famously rejected by Kant, with the observation that existence is not a predicate, 
and therefore not something that adds to a concept, but merely posits it. Anselm 
seems to be trying to think something into existence, as Gaunilo reproaches him for 
doing, but by the same token anything could be thought into existence. The second 
formulation, a reply to Gaunilo, which Murdoch thinks is the fundamental move, 
points out that God is not like any other object: God is not something greater than 
anything else, but a being than which a greater cannot be conceived: a necessarily 
                                                 
38  Edith Brugmans (2007) reads Murdoch’s Ontological Proof as an attempt to ward off moral 
scepticism. Her analysis of MGM is brief, and the anti-sceptical motive is mainly examined through 
Murdoch’s novel An Accidental Man. 
39 Cf. Republic 509d–511e and MGM 405-6. 
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existing being, whose non-existence is impossible. If such a being is conceivable, 
what is conceived is a being which exists necessarily.40  
At this point, one could deny that such being is conceivable. To which 
Anselm replies by pointing at the experience of the world, where we see that what 
is good is like the greatest good, and that God (perfection) is perceived in less 
perfect instances of her/him (MGM 394-5). This is what Murdoch calls ‘the 
metaphysical argument which is also an appeal to experience’ (MGM 395), an 
argument which she claims is a reworking of Platonic ideas (MGM 392). The 
appeal to less perfect instantiations of Good is for Murdoch the starting point, 
identified with her recurring observations about the perception of degrees of 
perfection in the good things of the world. From our experience of goodness in the 
world, Murdoch believes, we are led to imagine something better than anything, of 
which imperfect things participate, as in Plato’s myth of the cave. Such standard, 
however, does not only come to mind when confronted with something good, but 
in all experience, including when perceiving something that appears like a negation 
of the ideal. It also operates, importantly, every time we distinguish truth from 
falsity, when we engage with reality aiming for correct perception and judgment. 
In short, all perception and cognition is a relation to a standard of perfection. 
According to this argument, the idea of perfection appears not as something 
contingent, the object of certain particular experiences, but as something that 
supports every cognitive activity. Perfection is what everything tends to, the 
standard by which everything is evaluated, and experience shows that. What 
follows is that i) such standard is never itself directly perceived, and that ii) it is 
considered to be necessary, not contingent, because it is indirectly experienced 
everywhere and nothing can be thought or experienced without it. This is why, 
Murdoch claims, the metaphysical argument urges on the logical argument, in the 
same way as Wittgenstein thought life could ‘force’ the concept of God on us 
(Wittgenstein 1980 85-6, in MGM 440). Observation of experience leads to the 
metaphysical claim that every cognitive activity is related to a standard, and that 
standard, in turn, if it is to exist at all, exists necessarily. Perfection is not an object 
among others. Thus the proof is one ‘from all the world’, and only the totality of 
                                                 
40 A version of this argument has been constructed by Norman Malcolm (1960). 
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experience can testify to something which is supposed to surpass it and hold it 
together. The desire to know anything at all is itself a manifestation of the Good. 
As Murdoch acknowledges, the ontological argument is not compelling for 
everyone, because it appeals not to the intellect, but to faith; Anselm’s beginning is 
credo ut intellegam. One could, for instance, deny the premise that we perceive and 
think in terms of an unconditional standard of perfection. Here we return to the 
‘invitational’ character of Murdoch’s appeal to experience observed in Ch.1§2. Her 
metaphysical arguments cannot be logically or empirically proven, yet they invite 
the reader to notice something about life, to see it in a certain light, and if that way 
of seeing it illuminates and explains something about it, then it is worth pursuing. 
The idea of faith is invoked, by Anselm and Murdoch, not as an irrational surrender 
in order to make any claim one feels like making, but as an attitude of the mind bent 
on discovering something that it only darkly intuits. It is more akin to Plato’s love 
or eros, the desire to apprehend the Forms that it does not yet see. As Simone Weil 
notes, ‘the proof does not address itself to the understanding but to love’ (2013: 375, 
quoted in MGM 505). Here we can note again, under another aspect, how Murdoch 
is practising, and inciting us to practise, philosophically, the same attitude that she 
holds as central to the moral life more generally: attention, as the desire to discover 
something that one does not yet fully comprehend, that nevertheless presents itself 
compellingly to consciousness.41 
On Murdoch’s reading, what the Proof demonstrates is that there exists 
something unconditional, necessary and absolute, perceived as structuring both the 
mind and reality – nothing less, but also nothing more. What follows, strikingly, is 
that God cannot be what is proven by these arguments, because God, understood as 
a personal God, an omnipotent and omnipresent being (‘the traditional sense’ of 
god, which according to Murdoch ‘is perhaps the only sense’, MGM 364-5) cannot 
both exist in the world (contingently) and necessarily. Following Findlay (1948, in 
MGM 411-2), Murdoch holds that what the Proof proves is in fact God’s necessary 
nonexistence: God is not an entity, because as such s/he would be contingent. This, 
according to Murdoch, brings out the ‘deep meaning’ of the Proof (MGM 412): a 
personal deity cannot be the necessarily existing God, but God nevertheless 
                                                 
41 ‘Credo ut intellegam (I believe in order to understand) is not just an apologist’s paradox, but an 
idea with which we are familiar in personal relationships … I have faith (important place for this 
concept) in a person or idea in order to understand him or it’ (MGM 393). 
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symbolises something non-contingent, the ‘absolute’ or ‘unconditioned structure’, 
which is morality. Like God, if the Good is the absolute thus conceived, Good is 
also indefinable. This is important: Murdoch’s Good is, in a sense, ‘empty’, it is 
something to which everything points, but, not being an object in the world, it has 
itself no property or form that can be specified.42 Murdoch’s proof tells us that the 
Good exists and it is everywhere, but nothing more can be said about it. 
Nevertheless, having summarised why and how Murdoch thinks Good exists, I shall 
now attempt to say something about it, not in order to describe it, but in order to 
clarify its operation in human life and in the world, and its relation to truth. 
3 Good and Truth 
There is a close connection between the necessity and omnipresence of Good as 
shown by the proof, and the relation of Good to truth, which is another cornerstone 
of Murdoch’s metaphysics. ‘Truth is very close to good’ (MGM 325), Murdoch 
writes, but how close, and in what way? As my starting point to address this 
question, I take the claim that our inherent orientation to the Good is discovered in 
our experience of constantly distinguishing, not only what is good from what is bad, 
but also what is true from what is false. On closer inspection, many of the 
formulations of Murdoch’s transcendental view of the Good have to do with truth 
and truthfulness: ‘the concept of consciousness should contain the (moral) idea of 
truth-seeking’ (MGM 243); ‘truth … which we are forced to attend to in all our 
doings, is an aspect of the unavoidable nature of morality’ (MGM 418). Murdoch 
takes the connection of the Good with truth from Plato, calling it ‘one of the most 
fruitful ideas in philosophy’ (FS 425); she also takes from Plato the image of the 
Good as the sun, which illuminates reality, making it visible. Good is, following 
this image, what inspires every act of cognition, leading it towards the truth. But 
every act of cognition is also a way of relating to an external reality with the aim of 
apprehending it truthfully. Truth and Good share the fact that every activity of the 
mind involves a movement toward or away from them. 
However, like the sun in the Platonic image, the Good is the source of 
inspiration of cognition, but not itself an object of apprehension. What the sun does 
                                                 
42  Murdoch, however, does not like to attribute emptiness to the Good, preferring to call it 
‘mysterious’ (SG 99). What I mean here by ‘empty’ is what Murdoch often emphasises, the 
impossibility of attributing any property to the Good. 
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is shed light on reality, making apprehension of it possible: so the Good makes it 
possible to apprehend individual truths. It then becomes clear that truth is not the 
same as the Good: the apprehension of truth is dependent on the Good, insofar as 
the Good is what structures and embraces the whole of reality, including the mind 
in its search for truth. This is how Plato puts it in the Republic: 
This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of 
knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea of good, and you must conceive it 
as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known.  (Republic 508e) 
The value of reality, truth and knowledge in Murdoch’s philosophy is often 
assumed (‘it was assumed that it is better to know the truth than to remain in a state 
of illusion’, SG 64) and much is often implicitly made to depend on it, even though 
it is one of the most difficult and deepest parts of her system. My attempt to shed 
light on the issue will proceed by offering three different aspects under which to 
see truth as related to Good: a psychological, a metaphysical or mystical, and an 
instrumental aspect. 
First, what I call the psychological aspect. As has been observed, Murdoch 
relates truth and goodness by claiming that the same attitudes and faculties are 
required for both (SG 64).43 A good person is also better able to see clearly, and 
truthfulness is a fundamental virtue: ‘truthfulness, the search for truth, for a closer 
connection between thought and reality, demands and effects an exercise of virtues 
and a purification of desire’ (MGM 399).44 Probably inspired by Weil, Murdoch 
frequently claims that all intellectual activities, such as learning a language or 
working on a mathematical problem, are moral exercises: the same attitudes and 
virtues are required. The ability to grasp the truth in studies, art, everyday morality, 
is considered to depend on one’s moral qualities, primarily one’s ability to attend. 45 
Two caveats: it need not follow that the erudite is the exemplar of the good 
person, truthfulness being here better understood as an ‘imaginative grasp’ rather 
than ‘rational survey or ability to learn’ (MGM 324), in line with Murdoch’s overall 
theory of knowledge, whereby ‘”Truth” is not just a collection of facts’ (MGM 
                                                 
43 Cf. for ex. Robjant (2011a: 996). 
44 Cf. Simone Weil: ‘love of truth is always accompanied by humility’ (1962: 25). 
45 These examples follow closely on Simone Weil’s reflections  in RRSS. 
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399).46 It also does not follow that the person who can in some cases grasp truth 
very well (a good artist, for example) is a good person overall, since, as Murdoch 
is keen to emphasise, ‘in morality we tend to specialise’ (MGM 87, 323, 291).47 
Specialised truth-seeking can, nevertheless, serve as a useful training as well as a 
model for virtue.  
Why is virtue required for correct understanding? The answer depends on 
Murdoch’s conception of knowledge and of the activity of conceptualising. In her 
view, as we saw, we apprehend the world through a conceptualising activity which 
is itself determined by the individual’s concerns, desires, character traits… 
Perception is then the expression of the individual’s moral character and values. If 
reality is not given to perception immediately and impersonally, but is known by 
the individual through continuous moral effort, it follows that successful 
knowledge of reality coincides with virtuous consciousness: ‘a good quality of 
consciousness is the continual discrimination of true and false’ (MGM 250). What 
makes perception more accurate and allows us to ‘see more’ is nothing but virtue, 
including the desire to perceive things as they are (Murdoch often calls it eros) – to 
do them justice, concomitantly with the suppression of the distorting influence of 
the egoistic drives (‘unselfing’): 48  all this resolves itself in the exercise of 
attention.49 Given the ‘degrees of reality’ argument, and the conclusion that Good 
is what structures the whole of reality, we can say that the virtuous (attentive) 
consciousness desires the Good (as Plato’s eros does), and thus orients itself 
towards it, thereby discovering what is real. 
                                                 
46  Murdoch is not suggesting that we turn into the characters of Flaubert’s novel Bouvard and 
Pecuchet, which in fact exposes the dangers, including the moral dangers, of pursuing knowledge 
taken as an inert ‘collection of facts’. Nor should a more discursive ability to grasp reality be 
preferred over an instinctive grasp of it, or the latter to the former. It is also not obvious that the two 
can be clearly distinguished (cf. MGM 324). 
47 Murdoch makes this claim despite the argument about the unity  of the virtues. The two can be 
reconciled by taking virtues to be mutually dependent when they are exercised, but not necessarily 
always present consistently in an individual. 
48 Genevieve Lloyd (1982) argues that this is where the value of truth rests for Murdoch; Lloyd 
contrasts the value of truth as residing in the self-transcendence of truthful perception with both the 
idea that there is something valuable ‘out there’ independently of the mind, and with the idea that 
value is in the mere effort to see clearly. Although I agree with her on both points, her claim that 
truth is valuable only because of the self-transcendence it requires looks dangerously similar to the 
second alternative she rejects. For truthful perception to be valuable, as we shall see, more than the 
value of a truthful attitude seems to be required. 
49 Murdoch describes moral perception thus: ‘all just vision … is a moral matter… the same virtue 
(love) [is] required throughout and fantasy (self) can prevent us from seeing a blade of grass just as 
it can prevent us from seeing another person’ (SG 70). 
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The desire for perceiving reality correctly is then the same as the desire for 
the Good, insofar as they involve the same mental attitudes and activities. The 
orientation to the Good involves turning the mind away from the distorting ego to 
something external, facilitating the grasp of what is true. The desire to be good to 
someone, for example, will make one turn one’s focus away from oneself and 
towards the person, in an attempt to see them clearly. The search for truth and for 
Good are in lockstep: being moved by Good (or ‘purifying one’s energy through 
attention to the Good’) coincides with correct perception of the other, 
understandable in relation to the idea of doing them justice, which is nothing but 
seeing them as they are. Thus, Murdoch holds, following Weil, that justice is the 
same as love: loving another person, looking at them being animated by the desire 
for the Good, is incompatible with harbouring illusions about them (See Ch.4§2). 
The Good is the sun which makes reality visible. 
An impression of circularity is formed: it may appear that what makes truth 
morally desirable is not to do with truth itself, but with the attitudes through which 
truth is known (selflessness, attention, justice etc.). That what is valuable is not 
truth, but truthfulness. However, truthfulness and the related virtues are, at least in 
part, considered virtuous precisely because they are conducive to clearer vision and 
apprehension of the truth, which depends on the Good. The question to be addressed 
is then: Is there anything valuable in truth as such? The question can also be posed 
the other way around: why does orientation toward the Good, or desire for the Good, 
make reality available to the subject? (Or again, to use Murdoch’s phrase in SG 
103: why does love become just by going to its object via the Good?). Both attention 
– as the central truth-discovering attitude or faculty – and the Good make truth 
available to the subject, but in different ways: while attention relates to our 
psychological ability to perceive reality, the Good is linked with truth 
metaphysically. Attention itself involves a desire for the Good, which is also a 
desire for truth, yet Good is primary over truth; it is still therefore necessary to 
explain how truth depends on the Good.  
Part of what the Ontological Proof does, in Murdoch’s formulation, is to 
provide us with a sense of the close connection between Good and truth. I call this 
the metaphysical aspect of the question. In Anselm, as in Descartes and Plato, 
Murdoch discovers a similar ‘cognitive moral vision’ which ‘unites all knowledge 
as God-discovering activity whereby all truth reveals him’ (MGM 444). As noted 
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above, the idea of the Good is discovered by looking both at the world and at the 
mind as engaged with the world, and not at single instances of cognitive activity, 
but at the whole of thinking, which is discovered as being in constant engagement 
with reality. Every question of value is at the same time a question of truth, because 
value is seen to underlie the whole of thinking, perceiving and feeling – all of the 
relations of the individual with the world. With the Proof, Murdoch finds something 
of ultimate value in reality, the standard to which all acts of the mind – which are 
necessarily acts of engaging with reality – are seen to relate. The idea of totality is 
important here: Good is discovered in all experience, all reality.  
There are three ways in which the metaphysical idea of the omnipresence 
of the Good in reality can be understood. First is the idea that every single object or 
event is good insofar as it is real. While this thought can be found in Weil, in the 
context of a Christian metaphysics according to which everything is good insofar 
as it is God’s creation, Murdoch does not make such claims. The idea that 
everything is good, although understandable in a religious context, 50  is very 
difficult to justify, including as it does the idea that things like murder and hatred 
are good. A formulation of the metaphysical aspect of the relation of truth and Good 
which is less problematic and more easily attributable to Murdoch concerns the 
value of existence itself, which is manifest, on the one hand (and secondly), as awe 
at the existence of the world as a whole, and on the other (thirdly), as awe at the 
existence of any individual thing. These two aspects are intertwined, since the 
apprehension of the Good in the whole of experience, which suggests the necessary 
reality of Good, is in turn built up through various particular instances of cognition. 
Nevertheless, it is the experience of the ubiquity of Good in the whole of reality, 
and therefore in truth itself, that is central for Murdoch. This aspect of the 
connection between Good and truth can be also be called mystical, similarly to the 
notion of mysticism to be found in Tractatus 6.44, as a sense of the totality of life 
and experience: ‘not how the world is, but that it is, is the mystical’ (quoted in SG 
85). Murdoch finds absolute meaning in the very existence of the world and in 
                                                 
50 Chappell (2014: 311) suggests that this is indeed a possible way of understanding Murdoch, 
although in his presentation this idea converges with the value of the world as a whole, exemplified  
in Father Zossima’s exhortation in The Brothers Karamazov: ‘love all God’s creation, the whole and 
every grain of sand in it. Love every leaf, every ray of God’s light. Love the animals, love the plants, 
love everything. If you love everything, you will perceive the divine mystery in things’ (Dostoevsky 
1952: 167, quoted in Chappell 2014: 311). 
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reality itself, which leads her to conceive of the source of meaning and value as 
embracing everything. The value of truth is implicit in the whole idea of Good as 
the necessary element of reality: if Good is ubiquitous, the intuition of the Good 
takes the form of a ‘Yea saying’ to life and the world.51 Conversely, illusion is a 
turning away from the world, a ‘Nay saying’ that negates the absolute Good at the 
same time. What this conception establishes is the value of truth as an inherent 
aspect of the orientation to the Good, the reaching out of the mind to the world.  
Lastly, if the Good is the light that makes reality visible, it follows that the 
moral relevance of reality is also revealed by the Good. This is the instrumenta l 
aspect of the value of truth: seeing things as they are enables a correct moral 
understanding. This idea can be understood in two ways, depending on the 
conception of the reality of value endorsed: on the one hand, for the anti-realist, 
correct apprehension of non-moral facts enables sound moral judgment by making 
the correct application of principles possible; on the other hand, for the moral realist, 
correct apprehension of facts includes correct apprehension of moral facts.  
Although I have yet to address the question of whether morality can be 
consistently both a matter of how one sees the world, as well as something that 
exists within the properties of the world,52 Murdoch seems committed to both, so it 
is the second kind of instrumental value of truth that is relevant here: if there are 
moral facts in the world, and if the Good reveals truth, then part of what Good 
reveals is moral truth. If that is the case, it will take a good (attentive, or Good-
inspired, Good-desiring) quality of consciousness to perceive things as they are, 
including their moral character. Thus, the possibility to perceive the moral features 
of the world makes truth valuable because, if reality contains moral features, 
perceiving reality correctly will also enable the perceiver to apprehend its moral 
character. This is the most straightforward aspect of the value of truth among those 
presented so far. If there is a moral reality, and if it can be perceived by the truth-
seeking faculty/attitude I call attention, then this aspect of the value of truth places 
yet another kind of importance, and of a very significant kind, on attention as a 
                                                 
51 Almost a Nietzschean affirmation, but without the notion of amor fati. The idea is concisely 
expressed in a poem by Constantine Cavafy, ‘Che Fece ... Il Gran Rifiuto’ (1975). 
52  To anticipate, in favour of the existence of moral facts, the following considerations can be 
offered: if Good is the absolute element in the mind and the world, then things in the world are more 
or less good too, insofar as they are ‘oriented’ to it, or participate in it. As Murdoch repeatedly 
stresses through the ‘degree of reality/degrees of goodness’ argument, the world – reality – contains 
things, people and situations that are good and others that are less so. 
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moral concept (which I discuss in relation to moral perception in Chapter 5). This 
question – crucial to understanding what the Good and morality are – hinges on 
whether Murdoch can be consistently conceived as a moral realist.  
4 The Problem: Mind or World? 
The nature of the Good and therefore of value constitutes the central interpretat ive 
difficulty of Murdoch’s metaphysics. There is a tension between two apparently 
opposed views of the nature of morality. The Good is presented, on the one hand, 
as a transcendental condition and thus part of the structures of the human mind; on 
the other, it is said to be found in the world, to be real and out there. Although Good 
and value are not the same, as we shall see, Murdoch presents value along the same 
lines. The question can be framed as a choice between transcendental idealism and 
classical realism. In this section I intend to show how neither theory entirely fits 
Murdoch, but that she reframes the very question about the nature of Good and 
value by radically reconceiving the nature of reality and cognition. Offering a 
different conceptualisation of consciousness and reality, the solution I propose after 
this section combines the evaluative nature of consciousness with the reality of 
value, therefore justifying the importance of attention both in terms of what it 
discloses, and in terms of the value of attending.  
The question of the nature of the Good needs to be distinguished, before we 
proceed, from the question of the nature of value. Discussions of Murdoch’s moral 
philosophy generally fail to make this distinction, and this is partly due to the fact 
that Murdoch herself sometimes uses ‘Good’ and ‘value’ interchangeably. However, 
the distinction is of crucial importance: what characterises the Good is that it is an 
ideal and implicit in every act of cognition; however, since Murdoch does not claim 
that every person is perfectly good and with perfect understanding of the ideal, nor 
that everything is good, the relation or orientation to the Good must be present only 
imperfectly and by degrees, both in moral subjects, as well as in things and states 
of affair. That is what, I suggest, can be called value: the various understandings of 
the Good and degrees of goodness that are found in people, things, and situations. 
In the case of human beings, what we all possess, Murdoch claims, is not the Good 
itself, or a perfect understanding thereof, but an orientation to the Good. This 
orientation is the individual’s sense of value. 
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So the question about the reality of the Good needs to be differentiated from 
the question about the reality of value. However, since the Good is the source of 
value, the same kind of question is addressed to both. The question concerns the 
degree to which Good and value are dependent on the mind, or whether they can be 
considered mind-independent. With the Good, the tension is between a regulat ive 
ideal and something that exists in reality as a property of things; with value, the 
tension is between a transcendental condition – determined by the Good – and the 
objective existence of value, in the form of moral facts or truths. It is the latter that 
concerns us more here, in relation to the way in which an attentive subject 
encounters the world, and whether attention makes it possible to disclose a mora l 
reality. At the same time, if attention is a particular mode of cognition, which is 
determined by value, which is in turn an orientation to the Good, then attention 
itself depends on apprehension of the Good. 
4.1 The Reality of the Good 
The Good in Murdoch appears torn between being a regulative ideal and being part 
of empirical reality. In the previous chapter we saw that Murdoch also defines the 
Good as transcendent; yet that does not need to point to a third categorisation of it, 
because for Murdoch transcendent does not mean ‘elsewhere’, but beyond the 
subject’s immediate grasp. The Good is conceived as infinitely distant, rather than 
absent. That allows Murdoch to place Good within reality, while at the same time 
maintaining its indefinable and ideal status. Murdoch expresses this thought by 
putting Kant and Plato side by side: Good is transcendent because infinitely distant 
and never fully seen (Plato), but it is also ‘here’, operating in our every thought and 
action, available by degrees to anyone who seriously looks for it (Kant) (cf. MGM 
178). Although Kant’s view is more ‘democratic’ and Plato’s ‘aristocratic’, as 
Murdoch puts it, the difference lies in the degree of distance, or the difficulty of 
grasping the Good, not in the Good’s nature or ‘location’ (MGM 178). Thus we can 
combine Murdoch’s claims about the transcendence of the Good with her idea that 
there is no ‘elsewhere’. 
But we are still talking in metaphors. Despite Murdoch’s stress on the depth 
and indispensability of metaphors, what does it mean that Good is distant but here? 
It is not a physical location that Good occupies. The distance, as presented above, 
refers to the difficulty – in fact, the impossibility – of getting a clear idea of what 
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the Good is, and of its being perfectly instantiated in something. That is because the 
Good is an ideal or Idea, by its very nature not something that can even be fully 
instantiated in something observable. Its very nature is to be what Murdoch thinks 
the Forms are, ‘essentially objects of love’ (MGM 146): the Good manifests itself 
in the way it inspires the mind and organises the world. As something absolute or 
unconditional, the Good is ‘the unconditional element in the structure of reason and 
reality’ (MGM 391). Good structures reason and reality – this is a clue that can help 
to answer one of the questions set in this section, about whether Good is part of the 
structure of the mind or it is in the world. The Good, understood as the absolute or 
unconditional element in mind and reality, needs to be divided between its role in 
the human mind, and in the rest of the world. With regards to the world (objects 
and states of affairs), the relation to the Good depends on the extent to which things 
resemble the ideal. In relation to the mind, the role of the Good is to structure 
thought and perception and provide motivation.  
4.1.1 Good and the Mind 
Let us start with the role of the Good in relation to the mind. (I discuss the relation 
of Good and world in §4.1.2 below). For human beings, Murdoch’s Good, like 
Plato’s Form of the Good, provides ‘energy’ and a ‘sense of direction’ – one 
through the other. By being conceived as the idea of perfection, the Good motivates 
us to try to get closer to it (on the assumption that we want whatever we think is 
good), and by doing so, it also provides the structure of value through which will 
and imagination organise perceptions and thoughts. Described in this way, the 
Good seems to be a regulative ideal, part of the structure of the mind, through which 
the mind orders reality.53 The proof of the reality of the Good is in its effects, the 
way in which it motivates us and influences us. Whatever does this, Murdoch argues 
(with a nod to Keats, Weil and Valery – cf. MGM 506), must be real. 
This last observation introduces an element of uncertainty in the conception 
of the Good as only a regulative ideal. It suggests that Good works as a regulat ive 
ideal precisely because it is more than that – something real and ‘out there’. If it 
were not thus real, it would have no such effect. ‘Out there’ does not mean that it 
exists in any ‘heavily material sense’ (MGM 146), but as something ungraspable 
and absolute. Good is real ‘as an Idea’ (MGM 508). Murdoch’s point is that we 
                                                 
53 Ana Lita thinks that the Good is precisely this (Lita 2003: 172, endnote 8). 
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experience the Good as something that governs the whole of reality and, in the 
absence of any proof to the contrary, that experience needs to be taken seriously. 
As Anthony Rudd notes, the phenomenology of the Good suggests something more 
than a regulative ideal: ‘good is not an idea we project towards the end of the road; 
it is what is already there, pulling us towards it’ (Rudd 2012: 158). However, if the 
idea of the Good is something that structures the whole of human consciousness, it 
is impossible to say whether it is ‘out there’ or only something in terms of which 
we see everything. Yet our experience, Murdoch claims, suggests that it is out there.  
Maria Antonaccio has famously tried to reconcile the reality of the Good 
and its being part of the workings of the mind by attributing to Murdoch a view 
which she calls ‘reflexive realism’, a reading that has almost become standard.54 
According to the reflexive realist reading, ‘the Good is discovered through the 
medium of consciousness as it reflects on itself; yet at the same time, the act of 
reflexivity reveals the Good to be a perfection or “higher condition” that transcends 
or surpasses consciousness’ (2000: 119).55 Antonaccio’s proposed reading can be 
attractive because it accommodates the idea that the necessity of the Good is 
grasped (following Anselm as well as, in their own ways, Descartes and Kant) by 
the individual and inwardly, ‘in one’s own bosom’. Thus Antonaccio finds support 
in Charles Taylor’s idea of ‘inwardness’ as a modern form of moral consciousness. 
Taylor (1989) sees the move to inwardness in the transition between Plato’s and 
Augustine’s views of the Good, the latter being taken as the first and emblematic 
‘reflexive’ thinker.56 For Antonaccio, Murdoch is akin to Plato in positing the Good 
as something real and external to the individual, but also akin to Anselm in seeing 
the Good as being grasped reflexively, where self-consciousness is correlative to 
Good (2000: 126). 
While it is certainly true that Murdoch draws attention to the operations of 
consciousness in the Proof and talks of orientation to the Good as a transcendenta l 
condition of consciousness, what the reflexivity of the Proof yields is not so much 
an apprehension of the Good itself, but an understanding of its necessity and 
                                                 
54 ‘Reflexive realism’ comes from theology and William Schweiker (Antonaccio 2000: 197, fn. 35). 
See also Heather Widdows (2006), who espouses a view very similar to Antonaccio’s. 
55 The idea of reflexive realism is central in Antonaccio (2000) and in her more recent (2012b). The 
exposition of the ontological argument as supporting reflexive realism, in particular, can be found 
in Antonaccio (2000: 123-9), and in Antonaccio (2012b: 110-4). 
56 Taylor (1992: 136-9). 
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omnipresence. In fact, the starting point of the Proof lies in everyday perception, 
which already includes (necessarily partial) perceptions of the Good in the world. 
But the Proof as a whole is a philosophical argument to demonstrate, not just the 
Good, but the necessary reality of the idea of Good.57 By observing consciousness, 
what we become acquainted with is not so much the Good – that is perceived in the 
world – but with the ubiquity of value, the way Good works in us. Reflexivity may 
convince a philosophically inclined person that Good is real and everywhere, and 
if it does help morally it is by showing the individual her own relationship with the 
Good, but not the Good itself. Therefore, while Antonaccio’s proposition is 
attractive, its emphasis on the necessary correlation of consciousness and Good fails 
to account for the reality of the Good which is grasped, as opposed to what 
reflexivity suggests, when consciousness is directed away from itself and to the 
world. The Good is also (partially) accessible to the unreflective yet virtuous 
individual (the notorious ‘virtuous peasant’, SG 2), who attends to the reality 
outside her mind. 
Murdoch’s appeal to experience is an attempt to demonstrate that Good 
exists, as an indefinable and transcendent ideal, but objectively. What remains yet 
to be explained is how value, conceived as the relation of the individual to the Good, 
and as the manifestation of Good in the world, can be objective and real. I shall start 
with the second question: how Good relates to value in the world, or good things 
with a small ‘g’; having considered the existence of value in the world, I shall then 
move on to address the issue of whether an inherently evaluating mind can be said 
to genuinely discover value outside itself. 
4.1.2 Good and good 
The Proof hints at, but does not specify, the nature of the relation between the Good 
and good things in the world. Murdoch’s argument starts from the observation that 
Good is conceived as real by observing good things in the world, and that there is 
a unity to good things, but how does the Good relate to the perceptible moral 
properties? This question needs to be answered in order to clarify the nature of the 
value that attention is supposed to apprehend. We have seen that, for Murdoch, 
Good is an ideal, not something that can ever be fully grasped in perception, but at 
                                                 
57  As Marije Altorf (2008: 98) notes, although she does not follow up this idea to explore the 
consequences. Cf. MGM 428. 
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the same time it is constantly suggested by every act of perception as being ‘there’ 
in the world. The nature of this ‘suggestion’ is at stake: Good can be either a 
property imperfectly instantiated in good things, or something that is not there at 
all, but somehow related to objects and situations. How to spell out this relation is, 
as Murdoch recognises, a difficult and crucial problem: ‘one of the great problems 
of metaphysics is to explain the idea of goodness in terms which combine its 
peculiar purity and separateness (its transcendence) with details of its omnipresent 
effectiveness in human life’ (MGM 408). 
For clarity, I distinguish between the Good with a capital ‘G’, or the idea of 
perfection, and good with a small ‘g’, or particular value properties. Good, as the 
idea of perfection, is suggested by the things of the world, but it is never itself seen. 
The ideal, invisible and indefinable nature of the Good warns against taking it as a 
property of things. The Good is also, for this reason, defined by Murdoch as 
transcendent, something that governs the whole of reality but is not itself part of 
what we can perceive. Good things with a small ‘g’, on the other hand, are the 
objects of perception which indicate the existence of the Good and which we 
understand using thick concepts: kind things, generous things, etc. 
Murdoch claims that the Good is present both in the soul and in the world. 
This requires a distinction, as we saw, between the role of the Good in relation to 
the soul or mind, and in relation to the world: in relation to the mind of individua ls, 
Good is the standard at which we aim in our understanding of reality; in relation to 
the world, Good represents the standard of perfection that is suggested by every 
instance of goodness, but never itself seen. Good in the world and Good in the mind 
stand in circular relation: the more one grasps good things in the world, the clearer 
one’s conception of the Good, and the clearer one’s conception of the Good, the 
easier to discern good things in the world – their relationship of things to one 
another and to the ideal. This is how Murdoch tries combine the intuition that ‘some 
things really are better than others’ with the idea that ‘we see the world in light of 
the Good’ (SG 97-8). 
How is the Good, then, ‘suggested’ or ‘intimated’ by good things? As we 
saw, the simplest solution would be to claim that Good is a property of things, a 
common essence shared by things, people, and situations that we can rightly call 
good. This interpretation is problematic for a number of reasons: first, the fact that 
the relation of the Good to the mind is not the same as its relation to the world, 
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because the ideal cannot have the same ‘magnetic’ force on inanimate matter, 
suggests that Good cannot be the same essence in everything. Secondly, there are 
Murdoch’s repeated injunctions about the impossibility of directly perceiving or 
defining the Good. As Murdoch claims, when we look at the world we see little that 
is good, and nothing that is perfectly good (SG 61). Thirdly, and related to this, is 
Murdoch’s recommendation that when we talk about the world we use secondary 
or thick concepts, because the thin Good refers to perfection, which is never fully 
instantiated, and is therefore ill adapted to describe particulars. 
These are the reasons to read Murdoch as presenting an anti-essentia l ist 
picture about value and the Good.58 What we do perceive in the world are particular 
value properties, not the Good itself. As we saw in Chapter 1, however, value 
properties are connected to each other through the Good. If the connection is not 
represented by a common essence, it must lie elsewhere. What we perceive in 
reality, by perceiving particular values, are degrees of perfection, suggesting that 
something could be better, and a sense of the direction in which improvement lies. 
Good is what one would see if the goodness perceived in particular objects were 
increased ad infinitum and abstracted from any particular, the idea to which any 
‘good’ thing tends. But, for that very reason, it is not something which it is in fact 
possible to perceive. The Good itself is not to be found in any object or situation, 
because it encompasses the totality of goodness in abstraction from particulars, as 
the Proof shows, by appealing to the totality of experience. If the Good is conceived 
as a property of things, it is not such that it isucan be found, complete, within things, 
like a common essence, but a various and partial manifestation. 
The Platonic image of the Good as the sun can be used to clarify this relation. 
Murdoch writes: ‘[the sun] is real, it is out there, but very distant. It gives light and 
energy and enables us to know the truth. In its light we see the things of the world 
in their true relationship’ (SG 92). The sun is the source of vision, not itself seen, 
so it is not an object of perception among others. We can see that the Good is, by 
the same token, not a property of things, if we consider that what the sun does is 
provide light so that things are seen as they are and in their true relations, but light 
                                                 
58 Murdoch’s Platonic inheritance, although it has been taken as a reason to read Murdoch as an 
essentialist, can in fact be a reason to support the opposite conclusion. For an anti-essentialist reading 
of Plato in relation to the concept of virtue, see Rowett (2013). Murdoch herself declares to be 
against an essentialist interpretation of Plato (by Don Cupitt) in MGM 455. 
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is not a property of the things that are illuminated.59 The sun, like the Good, has a 
dual function: it makes it possible for us to see things rightly, if we orient ourselves 
to it – by coming out of the cave, and not looking the other way, which Murdoch 
equates, respectively, with attention and self-concern; and it also sheds light upon 
the world, illuminating some things more, others less, others not at all. This second 
aspect of the sun is helpful in understanding the relation of Good with good things : 
like the light of the sun, which shines differently on different objects, while the 
objects do not themselves contain light (or, following the analogy used in Chapter 
1, like gravity provides objects with various weights, without being a property of 
the objects), so the Good, besides allowing us to see things as they are, also provides 
value to things, in various degrees and according to the particular objects’ properties. 
The analogy of the sun and light also shows more clearly the importance of 
using thick concepts for describing good things, which unite the moral and the 
descriptive, as opposed to thin ones, as Murdoch suggests (SG 42):60  just like 
objects have different colours depending on their own properties, but also on 
whether and how they are illuminated, so individual instances of generosity, care, 
etc. have various properties which partly determine the particular concept used, but 
the evaluative nature of the concepts also depends on the closeness of the objects 
to the ideal of perfection.61  
This understanding of the relation between the Good and good things has 
important consequences for what it takes to perceive value: on this view, the faculty 
required for perceiving the particular situations and their moral qualities has to be 
attuned both to the ideal – which makes values what they are – and to the particular 
reality. Attention, as presented in SG, covers precisely this dual function: it contains 
the element of desire for the Good, the eros, which strives for excellence and at the 
same time turns the individual’s concerns away from the self and to the ideal; and 
                                                 
59 As McDowell writes of Plato’s metaphor, inspired by Murdoch: ‘the point of the metaphor is the 
colossal difficulty of attaining a capacity to cope clear-sightedly with the ethical reality that is part 
of our world…’ (McDowell 2001a: 73). 
60 Murdoch can be seen as anticipating Bernard Williams (1985) in highlighting the importance of 
thick concepts. 
61 Here too we can hear echoes  of Weil’s notion of attention. For Weil, love of the world and other 
people are forms of ‘implicit love’ of God, because God cannot be loved directly, given his absence, 
but only through the world and human beings, which are God’s creations. Nonetheless, God’s  
creatures are not loved because of what we can see of God in them, but as in themselves. Loving 
them merely in virtue of their relation to God would be, for Weil, a sin, nor would it be genuine love, 
since love is attention to the object itself, for its own sake (cf. ‘Love of the Order of the World’, in 
WG). 
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it also attunes itself to the particular case, discerning its moral quality in relation to 
the ideal but inseparably from the particular features of what it is confronting, 
taking part in the virtuous circle described above.62  
4.2 The Reality of Value 
Having clarified the reality of the Good according to Murdoch, and its relation to 
the mind on one hand, and to value or (small ‘g’) good things on the other, it still 
remains to consider whether the two elements of the Good can be put together. This 
will be done by considering the reality of value: as we saw in §4, value is what the 
relation of Good to the mind and to the world forms. So the central problem we are 
discussing can be reformulated with relation to value as the tension between the 
idea of value as a transcendental condition, and value as something in the world. 
The question can also be formulated as: is value a lens through which we see the 
world, something that is imposed upon reality by the human mind, or is it something 
that the mind discovers in the world, there independently of us? 
Justin Broackes places this problem among the ‘unfinished business’ of 
Murdochian scholarship (Broackes 2012a: 79), indicating that a definite solution 
has not yet been found, and signalling that the reason is that it cannot be found, 
because the tension may be internal to Murdoch’s work. The essay that is most often 
referred to as containing the idea of value being ‘introduced’ in the world by the 
mind is ‘The Darkness of Practical Reason’ (DPR), a response to Stuart Hampshire. 
There Murdoch writes: 
A constructive activity of imagination and attention ‘introduces’ value into the world 
which we confront. We have already partly willed our world when we come to look 
at it; and we must admit moral responsibility for this ‘fabricated’ world. (DPR 201) 
This passage can be pitted against others in which Murdoch claims that value is 
found in the world, rather than inserted or created, for example: ‘… the word 
discovery is very much in place here. One is just not inventing it out of oneself, one 
is finding it out…’ (Murdoch interviewed by Christopher Bigsby, in Dooley 2003: 
110, quoted in Broackes 2012a: 79). 
                                                 
62 The answer to these questions also bears on the problem of Murdoch’s particularism noted in 
Chapter 1: if Good were something that can be seen and described, then it would be possible to 
move from it to individual cases, and obtain a principle that will explain or reveal the moral character 
of those instances (cf. Clarke, 2012; Bagnoli 2012). However, if Good is an indefinable ideal which  
organises values but is not itself perceptible, then nothing but case-by-case discernment will be able 
to reveal the moral quality of situations and things. 
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Is this a genuine contradiction, where one alternative is to be discarded? 
One hypothesis would be that Murdoch moved progressively towards realism in her 
later work, while DPR dates back to 1966. This possibility is to be rejected for two 
reasons: firstly, the later MGM contains plenty of observations about how 
perception depends on evaluative ways of constructing the world. For example: 
When we settle down to be ‘thoroughly rational’ about a situation, we have already, 
reflectively or unreflectively, imagined it in a certain way. Our deepest imaginings 
which structure the world in which ‘moral judgments’ occur are already evaluations. 
(MGM 315) 
In fact, the idea that consciousness is inherently evaluative recurs throughout 
Murdoch’s work. Secondly, the controversial words (‘‘introduces’, ‘fabricated’) in 
the passage from DPR are in scare quotes, cautioning against taking them at face 
value. Overall, it seems more plausible to suggest, as Broackes does, that Murdoch 
is in DPR chiefly interested in presenting a clear contrast to Hampshire’s theory, at 
the cost of a possible misrepresentation of her own view.  
These observations do not, however, solve the tension that Murdoch 
presents, which is not only a matter of isolated passages but recurs throughout her 
philosophical work. The ideas that there exists a morally correct way of seeing the 
world, and that consciousness is fundamentally evaluative, are both at the centre of 
her philosophy. In order to address the question about whether value is something 
inherent in cognitive activity, or whether it is something that cognitive activity 
reveals as part of reality, it is necessary to take a step back and look both at 
Murdoch’s theory of cognitive activity, and at her understanding of what ‘reality’ 
is. 
4.2.1 The Nature of Consciousness 
One of Murdoch’s most important arguments, to be found in different forms both 
in her early essays like VCM, TL and DPR, as well as in MGM, is that cognition is 
inherently evaluative. In VCM, the argument is presented mostly as a critique of 
theories which assume a world of fact upon which value is projected; against such 
dichotomy of fact and value, Murdoch notes that the very understanding of what 
the ‘facts’ are depends on values, which select salient aspects according to which 
they organise the perception of the situation through concepts, which yield certain 
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‘facts’ rather others.63 There is, for Murdoch, no ‘impersonal world of facts’ (SG 
25) to be perceived and then evaluated. Thought and perception are not ways of 
‘mirroring’ the world, but they are ways of making sense of it through the activity 
of conceptualising, which according to Murdoch is more like ‘grasping’ or 
‘possessing’ something that cannot be identified prior to such grasping. And such 
grasping, Murdoch indicates, is inescapably evaluative.64  
This view contains two original and controversial claims: the claim that 
perception is not immediate, but itself structured by concepts and conceptual 
schemes;65 and that concepts are evaluations, because they are the way in which the 
human mind, which is the mind of beings for whom morality is ubiquitous 
(according to Murdoch’s Ontological Proof), approaches the world. Both claims, 
leading to the conclusion that cognitive activity is inherently evaluative, are 
developed in MGM. In the chapter ‘Imagination’ (Ch. 11 of MGM), Murdoch 
agrees with Kant in holding that perception and understanding are ways of 
‘organising’ reality according to the faculty of the imagination. But she 
immediately departs from Kant in maintaining that imagination is a moral faculty, 
and therefore not something automatic, but something that we can to an extent 
influence, through values and the will. 
The world around us is always presented by a free faculty, which is not that of reason 
thought of as ‘beaming in’ upon purely empirical situations not otherwise evaluated. 
Imagination … can scarcely be thought of as morally neutral … Our deepest 
imaginings which structure the world in which ‘moral judgments’ occur are already 
evaluations. Perception itself is a mode of evaluation. (MGM 314-5) 
The claims about the ubiquitousness of a moral faculty in cognition are supported 
by the phenomenological observations about the perception of value in reality or 
                                                 
63  This idea of Murdoch’s is far reaching and, despite frequent criticisms of Murdoch for her 
exclusive focus on the individual, can equally be applied to groups, in the analysis of political and 
cultural ideologies. The idea also constitutes a critique of contemporary analytic moral philosophy 
itself, pointing out that its ideas about an impersonal world of facts or about the freedom of the will 
are pictures which are not forced on us, but have been selected based on specific values (in this case, 
for Murdoch, a ‘liberal ideology’). These ideas have been influential, emerging for instance in Hilary  
Putnam’s critique of the primacy of a certain conception of scientific thought which professes to be 
value neutral, while relying on values such as coherence and simplicity. See Putnam (1992: Part 2). 
64  ‘If we think of conceptualising rather as the activity of grasping, or reducing to order, our 
situations with the help of a language which is fundamentally metaphorical, this will operate against 
the world-language dualism which haunts us because we are afraid of the idealists. Seen from this 
point of view, thinking is not the using of symbols which designate absent objects, symbolising and 
sensing being strictly divided from each other. Thinking is not designating at all, but rather 
understanding, grasping, “possessing”’ (TL 41). 
65 Cf. McDowell (2006) and the discussion in Chapter 5 below. 
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‘the argument from experience’ in the Proof. To recapitulate the argument: we look 
at the world, and discover therein valuable things, as well as their relationships to 
each other and to something absolute (the idea of perfection or the Good); the 
discovery of the absolute is the discovery of something which governs the whole of 
reality, the world and the mind; that indicates that all our acts of cognition are in 
one way or another structured by an orientation to the Good. This orientation is 
value. So cognition and consciousness are inherently evaluative.  
The evaluative activity of perception and thought, deployed in punctual acts 
of apprehending the world, depends, for Murdoch, on the larger background of the 
individual’s consciousness. Claiming that cognition is an active grasping, rather 
than a passive receiving of information, Murdoch also believes that the individua l 
is partly responsible for what she sees and knows. Two chapters in MGM (6, 8) are 
aimed at rehabilitating the idea of consciousness as something substantial and 
observable, in order to show how the morality of individuals depends on their 
consciousness, and that we are partly responsible for all we know and think: ‘we 
need the concept of consciousness to understand how morality is cognitive. How 
there is no ubiquitous gulf fixed between fact and value, intellect and will’ (MGM 
265). Consciousness is understood as the ‘mode of being’ of the individual, her 
cognitive activities seen as a cohesive whole, but open and constantly evolving, 
where the parts influence each other, and which contains all aspects of the 
individual. The background of consciousness stands in mutual relation to values, 
where values build up consciousness, but also depend on the background thus 
built.66 
The idea of value as transcendental condition of consciousness can apply 
both to specific values (like, say, a belief in democracy), as well as to one’s whole 
sense of, or approach to, life. One’s perception or understanding of an object, a 
person or a situation is related to one’s moral sense and views, whereby for instance 
what one considers important highlights certain elements of a situation and hides 
others. If that is true, particular thoughts and perceptions can be said to have moral 
‘colour’, determined by one’s overall ‘quality of consciousness’. The moral being 
of an individual, therefore, finds expression not only in her choices and actions, but 
                                                 
66 The idea that values are constitutive of the individual’s self has famously been developed by 
Charles Taylor (1992), explicitly acknowledging Murdoch’s influence (Taylor 1992: 3). Antonaccio 
(2000) highlights the connection between Taylor and Murdoch in various occasions. 
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also and more poignantly in her particular ways of taking in or seeing the world: 
the concepts she uses (because ‘moral differences are conceptual differences’, 
VCM 82), as well as the way she understands those concepts. Generally, the 
descriptions she gives of situations are themselves moral ‘choices’,67 because they 
express her quality of consciousness and her sense of what is important, what life 
is like, what is meaningful, etc. Even in apparently ‘innocent’ moments, our 
evaluative nature is at work, including when we are trying merely to apprehend 
‘facts’, because what facts are, and what counts as fact, is not determined 
independently of value, and because ‘almost any description involves an evaluat ion’ 
(MGM 155).68 
The idea that consciousness is structured according to value, however, can 
appear deeply problematic for Murdoch’s desired realism. The claim that values 
determine what we see can be part of an anti-realist, subjectivist view, according to 
which value is what each individual imposes on the world. That would be so if 
Murdoch only claimed that every individual had a particular sense of value, which 
shaped her way of seeing things. However (and here we return to the connection 
between value and the Good), the value that structures consciousness is, as we saw, 
an ‘orientation’ to the Good itself, which is one and real (MGM 166).69 The values 
that inhere in consciousness are particular understandings and applications of the 
Good, or the idea of perfection. Like anything else, however, the Good is something 
that individuals can grasp more or less well, about which they can also be very 
deeply confused. Saying that consciousness is structured according to its relation to 
the Good, then, leaves unspecified what kind of relation to the Good each 
consciousness has. The Good, conceived as the idea of perfection as presented in 
the Ontological Proof, is a concept with no specifiable content, so that each 
                                                 
67  I do not intend the word ‘choice’ here to mean that moral understandings of situations are 
deliberately or consciously chosen by the individual, but to signal that the individual plays a role in 
her understanding of a situation, often determined by countless prior choices, mainly having to do 
with the contents of one’s thoughts. 
68 Murdoch seems to waver on the point of whether all acts of consciousness are evaluations. In 
MGM, after stating that ‘consciousness is a form of moral activity’, she adds: ‘of course this does 
not imply that all states of consciousness are evaluating or can be evaluated’ (MGM 167). I take this 
statement not as a denial that it is possible that all states of consciousness are evaluative, but as a 
refusal to make pronouncements about how things must be: ‘“Every second has moral quality” 
would have to be a synthetic a priori proposition!’ (MGM 167) 
69 Cf. Martinuk (2014: 184): ‘concerning the nature of the Good, the differences between Murdoch 
and Taylor are clear: Murdoch defends a uniquely Platonic conception, while Taylor defends the 
Good as a kind of placeholder filled by a variety of genuine, albeit differing and perhaps 
irreconcilable, conceptions’. 
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individual will have to pursue it by herself, yet it is also one and real, so that while 
it is possible to grasp it poorly, it is also possible to improve one’s grasp of it. 
Therefore, while values are multifarious and potentially mistaken to various 
degrees, the Good provides the objective standard for the evaluation of the values 
that structure consciousness, preventing a subjectivist understanding of such values.  
What this means, importantly, is that there are both correct and incorrect 
ways in which one’s evaluative outlook can grasp the world. At the same time, 
because we are limited beings, and cannot grasp anything in a perfectly complete 
and comprehensive way, there is also more than one possible construction of reality, 
or various compatible ‘takes’ on a situation, where individual perspectives can 
include a greater or smaller number of ways of seeing something.70 For instance, a 
twelve year old child from a disadvantaged family in a favela can be described using 
a variety of concepts and from various perspectives: he can be a human being who 
is in need of greater material comfort, a creative young person with artistic potential, 
a difficult son to a mother who seeks to discipline him, and so on; someone might 
also see him as cheap labour for one’s firm. These perceptions are not all equally 
valid: to exclude the last construal as unwarranted requires a moral sensitivity 
which is receptive to the reality being observed, and a moral imagination which can 
disclose both the actuality as well as the possibilities and requirements of that reality 
– which are summed up by the idea of being ‘closer’ to the Good.71 The standard 
provided by the Good to the evaluating mind needs to fit the reality being observed. 
Simone Weil (1946) calls these ‘readings’ of reality, likening them to the literal 
situation in which one reads ‘15’ when printed on the page is the number 14: the 
ways of reading are individual, but the possibilities are fixed by the world. 72 
Likewise, Weil writes, to contemplate not returning a loan is to misread the reality 
in front of one; it is to wish the loan to be something different from what it is, to 
wish it not to be the possession of someone else who also wants it back. So to think 
of a child as cheap labour is to ignore the needs as well as desires that the child has. 
                                                 
70 Cf. Putnam (1997), who argues that while there can be no scientifically established single true 
description of the world, there are various possible descriptions of it, but, crucially, they are not a ll 
equally correct. The possibility of more than one description does not entail relativism. 
71 This question is discussed further in relation to moral perception in Ch.5. 
72 Although, in the example, there does not seem to be more than one possible reading. In many 
situations, however, that is not the case. 
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To avoid these ‘misreadings’, Weil suggests, one needs to pay attention to the 
object (Weil 1946: 16-19).73  
These final considerations include, alongside the standard that the Good 
provides to the evaluating mind, the idea that there is a standard or criterion for the 
determination of value in reality. Such standard still needs to be accounted for. 
What has been clarified so far is the evaluative nature of consciousness and the 
necessity, in Murdoch’s framework, for consciousness to grasp the world according 
to an evaluative activity which, instead of distorting or projecting upon reality, can 
grasp it correctly. The better one’s understanding of the Good, the more suitable 
one’s evaluative conceptual scheme will be to grasp reality. This is the relation of 
Good, as an objective standard, to the mind. The account thus offered, however, is 
compatible with a purely transcendental understanding of value. Such 
understanding would, however, clash with a realist interpretation of value, which is 
required both to explain what grounds the suitability of particular evaluat ive 
conceptual schemes, and also to claim that attention, while being itself a valuable 
exercise of consciousness, also discloses a moral reality. In other words, the relation 
of Good to value in the world, explored above, needs to be squared with the relation 
of Good to consciousness, or with value in the mind, just discussed. Murdoch is 
aiming at such reconciliation when she claims that ‘goodness is connected with 
knowledge’ (SG 38) and that the Good is what unites consciousness to reality. So 
the question to be addressed is: How can an evaluative faculty at the same time 
discover value?  
4.2.2 Realism about Value 
The claim that there is a correct orientation to the Good which makes it possible to 
see the world clearly carries various implications which need to be justified through 
a realist account: first, that there is an objective centre of value, the Good, on which 
clear and just perception depends; second, that both the Good and what it 
illuminates exist objectively, independently of any individual’s grasp of them; 
lastly, that there is a way of being such that one is able to perceive more clearly, 
and that such a way of being is not mere receptivity, but involves actively exercising 
                                                 
73 As Peter Winch puts it, ‘clarity about the nature of the loan is … a kind of clarity which requires 
that I attend to reality of the lender’s position and thereby also see my own position from a differen t 
point of view’ (Winch 1989: 117). 
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the right faculties in the right way. The last claim refers to the idea that, if reality is 
given to the individual via the activity of an evaluative consciousness, the 
possibility of seeing reality as it is depends on such consciousness being 
evaluatively structured in the right (most realistic) way. That is the idea of attention, 
in which a better grasp of the Good makes clear vision possible.74 
The reality of the Good, which Murdoch claims to establish with the 
Ontological Argument, has been discussed above. What still needs to be clarified 
is the possibility of apprehending, in the attentive state, a moral reality which is 
independent of the individual. ‘Moral reality’ refers both to the reality of the Good, 
as well as to the reality of the moral facts that orientation to the Good helps to 
discover, and it is the latter that requires clarification here. If attention makes it 
possible to see reality clearly, and if such reality includes moral facts, then attentio n 
is not only a virtuous truth-discovering attitude, but also valuable because it 
provides a clear vision of moral situations, and thus better moral understanding. 
The claim that I wish to defend, in relation to Murdoch's philosophy, is that 
attention yields a genuine cognitive achievement in relation to moral facts. 
Therefore, moral facts need to exist independently of the attentive subject. These 
claims are reflective of Murdoch’s professed realism, which I now turn to explore. 
Whether the attribution of realism to Murdoch’s theory is correct or not depends, 
on the one hand, on what is meant by ‘realism’, and on the other, on Murdoch’s 
understanding of ‘reality’ and ‘truth’ and, consequently, what it means for 
evaluations to be true of something found in reality. 
The first difficulty arises with deciding what realism is. Characteristic of 
‘classical’ moral realism are the claims that moral statements describe facts in the 
world, and that the truth or falsity of those statements is mind-independent. If those 
are the criteria to be met for a theory to be described as moral realism, Murdoch 
would face difficulties satisfying them. The mind-independence of the truth of 
moral statements – and the same goes, importantly, for any statement – is 
challenged by Murdoch’s idea that knowledge and perception are a way of grasping 
of the world, so that every concept, including ‘fact’ and ‘world’, is a sort of 
collaboration or encounter, the result of our constantly perfectible movement 
towards a transcendent reality. It is, however, not obvious, as we shall see, that 
                                                 
74  Since the Good is indefinable and cannot be fully grasped, apprehension of it can only be 
described in relative terms. 
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Murdoch discards completely any sort of mind-independence, as well as the idea 
that a theory needs to endorse it in order to be called realist.75  
Secondly, the debate between realists and anti-realists is traditiona lly 
grounded on a general agreement on what counts as a moral statement, with the 
realist asserting the existence of the referents (i.e. moral properties or facts) of moral 
statements, and the anti-realist denying their existence. Murdoch rejects this very 
premise, showing that moral statements cannot be clearly separated from non-moral 
statements, since the very activity of apprehending and describing reality is a moral 
activity, and dividing between what is moral and what is not moral is also something 
in which value inheres.76 So the contrast and comparison that is at the heart of the 
dispute, whether moral properties and facts are like other properties and facts in 
their being objects of perception in the world, does not even take off within 
Murdoch’s system. 
These considerations do not, however, resolve the tension that gives rise to 
doubts about Murdoch’s realism, the tension between the idea that value is a 
‘transcendental condition’ of consciousness or that morality depends on how we 
see the world, and the idea that value is something we discover in the world. 
4.2.3 Reflexive Realism about Value 
Maria Antonaccio has offered a solution to this problem with her ‘reflexive realist’ 
interpretation of Murdoch’s thought (cf. §4.1.1 above). However, Antonaccio does 
not explicitly differentiate between the theory’s validity in relation to the Good and 
in relation to value. We saw above how reflexive realism applies to the Good. I now 
consider whether the theory can help with solving the tension about value. 
According to Antonaccio, value, like the Good, is to be found ‘in the reflexive 
“space” that exists between the truth seeking mind and the world’ (2000: 51). In 
this way, Antonaccio attempts to settle the problem of whether Good and value 
exist in the world or in the mind (the tension between realism and idealism) by 
placing Good and value between mind and world. In fact, this ‘reflexive space’ 
                                                 
75  Dancy (1986), Putnam (1992) and McDowell (2001a, 2001c, 2001d), among others, have 
challenged this latter assumption, with Putnam and McDowell rejecting the idea that objectivity, 
truth and reality can have any meaning apart from a human perspective. 
76 This view does not need to be taken to deny that there are concepts that we consider as ‘moral’ 
and others that we do not. What it means, rather, is that i) all concepts are the result of human 
thinking, which is inherently moral (as Murdoch puts it, it is not that all concepts are moral, but that 
they do not occur in a ‘moral void’); and ii) the distinc tion cannot be made in advance of the 
particular situation and relative moral salience of its components (cf. Diamond 1996: 108). 
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refers primarily to the mind, but to the mind as it reflects on its own apprehension 
of reality – rather than, as Murdoch clearly suggests, apprehending reality itself by 
directing attention away from the workings of the mind. In its reflexivity, the 
reflexive realist interpretation seems to weaken realism to the point of making it 
unrecognisable.  
Antonaccio offers a passage from SG to back her view: ‘the value concepts 
are here patently tied on to the world, they are stretched as it were between the truth-
seeking mind and the world…’ (SG 90) What is noticeable about this passage, as 
David Robjant (2011a) has noted, is that Murdoch is here talking of value concepts, 
not of values. While the idea that value concepts are something ‘between mind and 
world’ seems hardly controversial, it does not follow from it that value itself 
inhabits that space.77 The reflexive realist interpretation, Robjant worries (2011a: 
998), risks doing away with the referent, and making concepts into their own 
referents, moral reality becoming imprisoned in concepts only. Whereas the ‘stretch’ 
that concepts represent very much depends on what the world is like, as Murdoch 
makes clear in SG: concepts – including moral concepts – develop and are learnt 
primarily by attending to the same objects in the same contexts (SG 32).78  
This conception of value as ‘stretched out’ nevertheless has some appeal, 
because it explains Murdoch’s idea that value inheres in consciousness and so 
morality depends on how we see the world, while retaining the sense that the world 
toward which value is stretched plays a role in the picture. However, rather than 
offering a solution, this only reformulates the problem, while shifting the balance 
towards idealism. In this way, reflexive realism does little justice to the object of 
moral vision, and to Murdoch’s stress on ‘reality’ as a normative concept. Whereas, 
as the full passage from which the quote above comes reads:  
The value concepts are here patently tied on to the world, they are stretched as it 
were between the truth-seeking mind and the world, they are not moving about on 
                                                 
77 Similarly to Antonaccio, Bagnoli quotes the same passage on value concepts and rephrases it as 
‘values are anchored to the world through the workings of our mind’ (Bagnoli 2012: 209). At times  
reflexive realism only appears to claim that knowledge must pass through the structures of 
consciousness, or that we can only comprehend reality with the ‘tools’ of our minds. If that were so, 
it would amount to a relatively uninteresting claim, and not one that would warrant a theory with a 
new label, as Nora Hämäläinen (2013) and Robjant (2011a) note. 
78 The idea that attention to a common object is central to the development of vocabulary and of 
concepts, and that learning takes places through ‘joint attention’, as briefly suggested by Murdoch, 
is widely studied in psychology and philosophy of perception. See for e. Tomasello (1995) and 
Campbell (2002). 
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their own as adjuncts of the personal will. The authority of morals is the authority of 
truth, that is of reality. (SG 90) 
The passage suggests that it is on reality, ultimately, that the authority of morals 
lies. If how we see matters, then the object of such perception matters too, indeed 
more, because ways of seeing are evaluated according to the their ability to do 
justice to the object. Observing consciousness, considered as a locus of morality, 
can indeed tell one a lot about the subject of that consciousness, their ‘texture of 
being’, as Murdoch puts it. But the quality of moral consciousness depends 
crucially on how clearly and justly one sees the world. Reflexive realism, therefore, 
does not help to reconcile Murdoch’s realism about value with the evaluative nature 
of consciousness. If the reconciliation is possible, a different approach is required. 
5 A Possible Solution 
In what follows, I suggest one way to understand Murdoch’s philosophy so that the 
transcendental and the realist claims can be reconciled. The framework I propose is 
one in which value is a real constituent of the world, but, in order to apprehend it, 
an evaluative capacity is required. Value is then something different depending on 
whether it is in the world or in the mind. The solution below is not explicitly put 
forward by Murdoch herself, there being in her writing no explicit recognition of 
the tension and therefore no account of how it can be accommodated. Neverthele ss, 
it is clear that Murdoch argued both for the reality of value in the world, and for its 
role as shaping consciousness. What I suggest is a potentially plausible way of 
capturing the spirit of Murdoch's claims about the objective reality of value which 
avoids the exhaustive disjunction between some form of idealism and realism. 
The first step consists in differentiating between value as shaping 
consciousness and value as object of consciousness. Both depend on the Good, but 
they play different roles. In the first case, the value that shapes consciousness takes 
the form of particular concerns or principles, which need to be generic enough to 
act as lens or as organising principles according to which perception can be 
structured. So, for example, a person who values justice will be more ready to 
perceive situations in the light of justice-related considerations, and more sensitive 
to that element of particular cases. Besides particular values or concerns, the idea 
that value structures consciousness also relates to the intensity and promptness with 
which a moral sensibility is ready to discern moral features of reality. A general 
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concern with the Good, according to Murdoch, is likely to make the individual more 
receptive to reality because of her desire to see clearly and justly. In the second case, 
the value of particular objects or situations is a property of those objects and 
situations. The specific relation to the Good or perfection determines the goodness 
of the object, but, as we have seen, the value of the object is a more specific property, 
in which a degree of perfection is instantiated in a particular way: as justice, beauty, 
honesty, etc. 
Murdoch conceives the mind as continuously engaged in trying to grasp a 
reality which transcends it. In her attack on post-structuralism, she emphasises the 
importance of being aware that there is a reality beyond us, not just as individua ls 
but as human beings, even beyond the ways in which we conceptualise it: ‘of course 
we are constantly conceptualising what confronts us … but what we encounter 
remains free, ambiguous, endlessly contingent, and there’ (MGM 196), and 
recuperates the idea of correspondence, which she holds as ‘essential’, being ‘the 
fundamental fact and feel of the constant comparison and contrast of language with 
a non-linguistic world’ (MGM 195-6).  
However, because of the structure of the mind, which can only apprehend 
the world through imagination and concepts, a perfect transparent correspondence 
is not possible. Human faculties and concepts are useful tools for deepening one’s 
understanding of the world, but they are ultimately limited, and the moral-epistemic 
‘pilgrimage’ described by Murdoch is by its nature incomplete. While Murdoch 
does not deny the existence of the world ‘as it is in itself’, nor that at exceptiona l 
times human individuals can get a half-glimpse of it, such direct apprehension is 
conceived as an ideal: a sort of Platonic noesis, one in which we are no longer 
thinking, no longer conceptualising and organising, where ‘the imagining mind 
achieves an end of images and shadows’ (MGM 320), similar to Dante’s climactic 
transformation of the intellect at the end of the Paradiso (MGM 319). 
One level below, ordinary consciousness is able to access reality through 
concept-using evaluative imagination. Here, through the ‘transcendental barrier’ 
which Murdoch pictures as a porous sponge, is where the encounter or 
reconciliation between the evaluating mind and the value in the world takes place. 
The only way in which we can apprehend the world is through faculties and 
concepts, which are governed by moral sensibility; the concepts we deploy, and 
how we deploy them, participate of the moral sensibility, both of the individua l, 
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and of the community which has developed those concepts. So value appears as a 
necessary element of the operation with which the mind reaches out to reality. This 
is what the characterisation of value as transcendental refers to.  
It follows from this that moral faculties are employed in perception of all 
reality, whether it is considered moral reality or not. So the argument about the 
objective existence of reality as perceived through moral consciousness takes as its 
object both moral and non-moral reality. Moral perception enables the perception 
of reality, whether moral or not. But the moral quality of perception and its 
individual character entail that it cannot be determined in advance whether 
something counts as moral or not. 
Within ordinary concept-using cognition, apprehension of reality can be 
more or less successful: at one end of the spectrum there is attentive consciousness, 
which enables the best possible apprehension of the world achievable through the 
proper use of the imagination and applying the right concepts in the right way; at 
the other end, there is fantasy, where concepts are misapplied and misunderstood 
and imagination does not reach out to reality but apprehends through the veil of 
self-gratifying desires. (This distinction is explored in the following chapters, 
especially Chapters 3 and 6). 
The problem for realism arises from the claim that particular faculties, such 
as the imagination and moral sensibilities, shape our perception of reality. However, 
that does not entail that what is perceived as moral fact is not part of reality, or that 
it is a distortion of it. Rather, (moral) faculties, to which the ability to use concepts 
is central, can be understood as grasping a reality which is ‘out there’ and separate, 
but which cannot be grasped by human beings independently of those facult ies. 
Similarly, to claim that vision is required to see does not entail that the objects of 
vision are projections or creations of the mind. There is something in reality to 
which thought latches on, and the success of particular concepts depends on 
whether they fit or grasp the reality that they describe. The testing ground of 
consciousness, as Murdoch puts it, is the world. So the testing ground of the 
evaluative activity of cognition is the reality that cognition takes in. The idea tha t 
the Good structures both mind and world can be understood thus: there are degrees 
of perfection in reality, manifest in various moral facts and properties, and the mind, 
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in order to perceive them correctly, needs to be attuned to the same idea of 
perfection which determines specific moral facts.79  
Murdoch’s model of (moral) reality can be pictured as an encounter between 
a conceptualising evaluating consciousness and a reality external to the mind which 
can nevertheless only be grasped through the ‘tools’ of the mind. The relationship 
between mind and world is reciprocal but not symmetrical: mind seeks reality, but 
it is reality that dictates which concepts and ways of seeing it are possible and which 
are not. While we only encounter reality through concepts, what we encounter is 
constrained and determined by the objective features of the world. The evaluat ing 
consciousness shapes the world to make it available to us, but the authority of 
morals is the authority of reality (SG 90).  
This position cuts across the fact/value divide according to which fact is 
perceived directly and value is projected: nothing is perceived directly, if that means 
passively and without the workings of the human faculties; at the same time, that 
does not require us to discard the notions of ‘fact’ and ‘truth’, but only to recognise 
that they are arrived at through a different process. It is, in fact, precisely the values 
through which we see reality and organise it into concepts that can help rather than 
hinder correct perception of reality, by providing useful conceptual schemes, and 
the motivation to seek to improve one’s perception (as we shall see in Chapters 3 
to 5).  
5.1 Murdochian Human Realism 
To accept that reality is not independent of the mind distances Murdoch from 
‘standard’ moral realism, which holds that moral reality is mind-independent 
(Bagnoli 2012: 210), but it also distances her from such metaphysical realism about 
the world more generally, where not only moral facts, but all facts are mind -
independent. On the other hand, Murdoch’s view seems consistent with various 
alternative forms of realism proposed more recently, which maintain truth and 
reality as something objective, but deny that those concepts can even be made sense 
of independently of a human perspective. Hilary Putnam’s ‘internal realism’ 
                                                 
79 Thus Laverty (2007) attributes to Murdoch a philosophy of the ‘third way’, ‘between absolutism 
(an objective impersonal unified truth) and subjectivism (proliferating, plural subjective “truths”)’ 
(Laverty 2007: 9), where the mind is pictured neither as a ‘mirror’ nor a ‘lamp’, but as a ‘lens’, 
which grasp a reality external to itself but, necessarily, with its own resources, which order and form 
it in such a way as to make it available to us. 
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(1992)80 and John McDowell’s (2001) form of realism are two such theories, and 
both acknowledge Murdoch as having inspired elements of their views.  
Both Putnam and McDowell are also heavily influenced by Wittgenstein, as 
well as by Kant, in their rejection of the premise on which idealism and realism are 
pitted against each other: either concepts are products of a mind-independent 
empirically established reality, or they are mental creations. Wittgenstein implodes 
such a dichotomy, by noting how the very distinction depends on language :81 his 
‘Copernican revolution’, as Dilman (2002) writes, is the idea that ‘our language is 
not founded on an empirical reality with which we are in contact through sense 
perception. Rather our language determines the kind of contact we have with such 
a reality and our conception of it’ (Dilman 2002: 76). Language determines the kind 
of contact we have with reality, but that does not imply, crucially, that reality is 
determined by language.  
For Murdoch, it is the inherently evaluative, imaginative activity of 
consciousness and the concepts it uses that are primary to this distinction. Concepts 
are human ways of grasping and making sense of reality, and they are also, for 
Murdoch, embedded in an inescapably human moral sensibility; it follows that an 
understanding of such sensibility – which involves sharing into moral sensibilit ies 
– is required in order to understand the concepts.82 What concepts capture, on the 
other hand, is not determined by the mind; rather, specific concepts can be more or 
less appropriate ways of grasping a particular reality: the correct application of a 
concept depends on the world. 
These ideas partly anticipate the line of argument put forth by McDowell 
(2001d), who similarly argues that since the human community is made up of 
people whose activities include moral thinking, then grasping moral concepts 
within such a community requires having already a sense of value, or an ‘evaluat ive 
outlook’, which enables one to understand what counts as courageous, brave, etc., 
which an understanding limited to empirical claims cannot yield. The position from 
which we understand moral concepts, too, is from within the human community, 
                                                 
80 Now abandoned by Putnam. See Putnam (1994). 
81 While for Kant the distinction depends on the categories. 
82  The idea that to properly understand moral concepts and a moral sensibility one needs to 
participate in it to an extent, rather than merely grasp it intellectually, is part of Murdoch’s idea that 
moral understanding involves the whole individual, and of her internalist conception of ethics. For 
an elaboration on this latter point (in relation to the idea that psychopaths cannot be said to properly 
understand moral claims despite their apparent intellectual competence), see Denham (2012). 
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which is also the perspective of a life with value. From that perspective, moral 
concepts can be perceived, grasped, and deepened. Accepting an 
‘anthropocentricity of an evaluative outlook’, where value is not considered from 
an (impossible) extra-human perspective, ‘makes space’, according to McDowell, 
‘for a realism, of a different sort, about values’ (2001d: 212).83 
The idea that reality is inseparable from the conceptualising evaluat ive 
activity of the human mind does not do away with truth and objectivity. But truth 
and objectivity are placed within human life and activities. Cavell has commented 
that this shift can make us giddy, give us vertigo. But that, as McDowell (2001) 
answers, is only because of the assumption that a concept has been correctly applied 
only if one follows universal rules, independently of human practises and the set of 
responses and attitudes that we typically have as participants in the practises. 
(McDowell, 2001d: 203). This argument extends to all concepts, but it raises 
particular problems when it comes to moral concepts, which are assumed not to 
refer to something ‘in the world’. And yet it is precisely the meaning of ‘in the 
world’ that is being questioned: if it is assumed that what is objectively there has to 
be so outside of the perspective from which we discern things as being there, then 
moral concepts certainly do not pass the test, but it is far from clear that other 
concepts, including empirical ones, do.  
These considerations refer to ordinary human cognition, which is what 
Murdoch is concerned with in her picture of morality. However, as noted above, 
Murdoch does not in this way give up the idea of a mind-independent reality. The 
purpose of maintaining such a notion is not, as it may be supposed, to question the 
ability of ordinary cognition to grasp the world in a truthful and objective manner. 
Nor is the idea of a mind-independent world pointless, given Murdoch’s contention 
that reality is only grasped through human faculties. The importance of the reminder 
that there is a world beyond cognition – as Murdoch calls it, a transcendent reality 
– lies in its acting as constant reminder that our grasp of reality, while capturing in 
better and worse ways something genuinely there, is never complete or perfect. 
                                                 
83 Interestingly, if we now think that Murdoch’s Platonism must be either given up or considerably 
watered down because of the lack of a mind independent world, McDowell suggests that precisely 
the sort of realism he is proposing can be taken as ‘a species of Platonism’ if, as he thinks, Plato 
himself did not believe in the mind-independent reality of values (McDowell 2001d: 215-6). That 
would be consistent with Murdoch’s reminders that Plato wrote in metaphors, and that is how we 
must understand the Forms and the idea of ascent. See also Robjant (2012) for a different  
interpretation of Plato which makes it consistent with Murdoch’s views. 
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Hence the importance of constantly questioning one’s perceptions, trying to 
improve one’s understanding and to ‘deepen’ the concepts that one uses.  
The perfectible quality of cognition is at the centre of Murdoch’s 
perfectionism, which this framework accommodates. According to this view, the 
moral activity is one of constantly improving one’s grasp of reality, testing it both 
against other people’s grasp and understanding, and against ‘the resistant otherness 
of other persons, other things, history, the natural world, the cosmos…’ (MGM 268), 
guided by the principle of the Good. To this extent, reality shares the property of 
the Good of being transcendent, not only beyond the individual, but beyond the 
complete grasp of the human mind, and thus not fully describable either. The 
independence or transcendence of reality, then, is pointed out by Murdoch with two 
purposes: one is to show how difficult it is to see truly, and the sheer distance of the 
ideal; the other, linked with the first, is to remind us that we are always at risk of 
underestimating the distance between our confused cognition and reality, and that 
reality is always beyond our full grasp, and our concepts, however good, are still 
images, ‘pointers’, not ‘resting places’ (MGM 318). Thus, Murdoch’s reminders of 
the ‘otherness’ of reality, transcending not only ourselves but our minds as human 
beings, do not need to be an endorsement of a metaphysical kind of realism, where 
‘facts’ and ‘values’ exist independently of our grasp of them.  
The perfectionism of our understanding of the world is exercised both 
against the world and against our concepts, which we hardly ever fully master, and 
where ‘world’ is itself a concept that we struggle to make sense of. The inherent 
perfectibility of our grasp of reality, rather than suggesting a mind-independent 
world, is in fact suggested as part of an argument for the objectivity of value 
statements. That includes the ability to discard certain concepts in favour of others 
after having observed the situation more closely and more attentively, just like the 
mother in law does in the story of M&D (Cf. SG 17-23). The ability to recognise 
one’s mistaken evaluative outlook and adopt a new one implies a progress from a 
less to a more accurate vision. Attention provides the best epistemic conditions for 
moral progress to be possible and that, since one cannot move beyond the 
conceptualising human condition, is where truth is to be found. Nevertheless, what 
our concepts grasp is not exhausted by the concepts themselves, and that is why 
Murdoch exhorts us, not only to deepen our grasp of concepts, but to keep testing 
them and improving them against the otherness of the world. 
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Conclusions 
Murdoch’s metaphysics revolves around the notion of a ‘moral reality’ whose 
nature, however, appears divided between an ideal Good and ordinary value, each 
of them in turn being divided between being a structuring element of the mind and 
something existing and in the world, outside the mind. This chapter has been an 
attempt to offer a clarification of the idea of moral reality, by analysing in depth the 
tensions in Murdoch's writing and offering, in response, solutions which build on 
and are compatible with her position, but which are not always explicitly articula ted 
in her work. Clarifying the nature and meaning of moral reality and the very 
possibility of its existence is central to any understanding and analysis of attention 
as a moral faculty/attitude with which the subject can apprehend such reality. 
The central concept of Murdoch’s moral metaphysics, the Good, is a ‘single, 
perfect, transcendent, non-representable, necessarily real object of attention’ (SG 
55), which is meant to ‘purify the energy’ of the individual and thus make her 
morally better. The main effect of such purification is the improved quality of one’s 
vision, or the greater clarity of one’s perception. Good operates in individuals by 
increasing their grasp of truth. The examination of the connection between Good 
and truth has yielded a notion of truth as valuable for three related reasons: because 
such attitude includes virtues such as selflessness, honesty and humility; because 
the idea of the Good is discovered through an apprehension of the totality of 
existence itself, truth being inseparable from it; and because by grasping truth one 
is also at the same time able to grasp moral reality. The connection between truth 
and Good establishes attention as the most important faculty of the moral individua l, 
which by revealing truth makes the attentive person morally better.  
In order to understand the role of the Good and value in the mind and the 
world, two distinctions have been necessary. First, Good has been distinguished 
from value, the former being the ideal on which value depends. Second, both have 
been divided between their role in the mind and their role in the world. In the mind, 
Good is the ideal of perfection with reference to which consciousness structures 
itself. In the world, Good appears as something like a property of things which is 
never fully instantiated and which combines with the particular properties of objects 
to create what we perceive as value. 
This clarification still leaves the original tension unsolved, shifting the 
difficulty from Good to value: how can value be both a transcendental condition, 
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and exist in the form of moral facts or properties in the world? My suggestion is 
that understanding value as part of our imaginative concept-making faculties is not 
incompatible with perceiving it as part of reality, if imagination and concepts are 
conceived as human tools that, on the one hand, require certain sensibilit ies 
(including moral sensibilities, which are, according to Murdoch, inherent in human 
life) for their understanding and application, but on the other what grounds concepts 
is the reality they aim at capturing. Conceptualising is a human evaluative activity, 
but that is compatible with considering it as constrained and generated in the first 
place by real features of the world. Observation of ordinary concept use supports 
this account, in the way moral concepts can be applied correctly or incorrectly, 
where the standard for correctness is the reality the concept is meant to capture. 
Moral progress occurs through the improvement of one’s use of moral concepts and 
the deepening of one’s grasp of them, and that takes place in the experience of 
reality, and by comparing one’s grasp of reality with other people’s. The picture 
that I have presented does not claim to constitute an argument for moral realism, 
but to reconcile, in Murdoch, the moral realist strain with that of the transcendenta l, 
and to provide, if Murdoch’s picture is endorsed, a way to understand moral realism.  
Murdoch’s merit, with the apparent tension in her theory, is that she takes 
seriously, and tries to account for, two elements of morality that are part of our 
ordinary experience: the fact that morality depends on how we approach and 
construe situations (which, on its own, could lead to subjectivism); and the fact that 
we consider the moral concepts we employ, and the moral judgments we make, to 
be genuinely about the world, not about our attitude to it. This picture makes the 
faculty of attention crucial to moral being. On the one hand, if morality is an 
inherent part of consciousness, then consciousness needs to be guided by a moral 
faculty, which is openly sensitive to, and seeking, the Good to help structure every 
act of cognition. On the other hand, the faculty that directs consciousness also needs 
to be truth-seeking, because value, and the possibility to perform good actions, are 
to be found in the world, not in the mind. Cognition and evaluation, for Murdoch, 
merge: attention combines the explicitly moral element, its eros or desire for the 
Good with the cognitive activity that aims at seeing the world as it is. 
Having offered an account of the existence of value in the world, which 
attention can make available to perception, it now remains to examine more closely 
the ways in which the mind apprehends the world and the value in it. If 
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consciousness is evaluative, and if value exists in the world, what needs to be 
explained is the specific way in which the mind is able to utilise its evaluat ive 
structures to apprehend the moral reality in the world – in other words, what 
constitutes an attentive and hence morally good consciousness, as opposed to one 
which fails to grasp reality clearly and justly.  
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Chapter 3 
Iris Murdoch’s Concept of Attention 
Introduction 
Having examined and clarified the metaphysical background, developed from 
Murdoch, upon which the importance of attention rests, in this chapter I move on 
to consider the concept of attention itself. The metaphysics just explored provides 
the background which makes claims about attention intelligible, and the constraints 
which the Murdochian idea of attention needs to respect. The solution presented in 
the previous chapter provides the grounding for Murdoch’s central claim: that there 
is a moral reality, which is available to the human mind only through the virtuous 
exercise of various faculties that Murdoch calls attention. If, as argued in the 
metaphysics, reality, including moral reality, is not apprehended passively by the 
mind, but requires the active exercise of the individual’s faculties, then the exercise 
of those faculties – through attention – is central to morality. In this and the 
following chapter I turn to an examination of how the mind operates in 
apprehending moral reality, what faculties are required, how they are exercised, and 
to what extent they lie within the individual’s control. Putting together the 
metaphysical claims of Chapters 1 and 2, with the explorations of the mind of 
chapters 3 and 4, I will then explore how mind and world meet thanks to attention 
in moral perception in Chapter 5. 
The main aim of the present chapter is to introduce and clarify the concept 
of attention as suggested by Murdoch, who uses it throughout her work but does 
not offer a systematic account of it. For that purpose, I begin with an introduction 
of Murdoch’s moral psychology, before analysing attention itself in more detail, 
drawing out its central aspects. That will allow me, finally, to clarify to what extent 
and in what aspects Murdoch’s notion of attention is inherited from Simone Weil. 
Since most of this chapter constitutes an overview of the concept of attention, it 
also introduces some key ideas and problems that will return and be developed in 
the rest of the thesis, as I indicate in the relevant sections. 
The central question to be addressed by moral philosophy is, according to 
Murdoch, ‘how do we make ourselves morally better?’ (SG 52). In the previous 
chapters, we saw that the answer to this question depended on an understanding of 
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the Good, conceived of as the magnetic centre towards which the moral subject 
must tend in order to become better. Analysing the idea of the Good has provided 
some understanding of its nature: something indefinable but real, external to the 
individual, illuminating reality and leading to the truth, and manifest in good things, 
people and actions as the standard of perfection to which everything tends. If Good 
is understood in this way, then moral improvement will proceed along the path of 
knowledge of a reality external to the individual, where ‘reality’ is something that 
can be apprehended with effort and progressively, and with the help of moral and 
imaginative faculties: ‘the good and just life is thus a process of clarification, a 
movement toward selfless lucidity, guided by ideas of perfection which are objects 
of love’ (MGM 14).84 The burden of the moral life lies in learning how to become 
as able as possible to ‘see’ reality as it is. I shall argue that attention, being what 
enables the individual to achieve this end, is the pivot of moral improvement. In 
order to understand how attention works, some observations about the moral 
psychology in which it is embedded are in order. 
1 Murdoch’s Moral Psychology 
While Murdoch’s moral psychology complements her metaphysical picture, it may 
be said that the former is held by her to be of yet more importance. Metaphysics 
can guide morals, but in order for that to be possible the right mental faculties and 
attitudes need to be cultivated. What is needed, Murdoch argues, is ‘a working 
philosophical psychology … which can at least attempt to connect modern 
psychological terminology with a terminology concerned with virtue’ (SG 46). Part 
of her project is to provide such moral psychology. The Good is discovered, 
according to Murdoch, not directly but through what it does; the main role of the 
Good is to guide the individual toward a better – more realistic, truthful, just – 
appreciation of reality. Morality is then played out in the relationship of the 
individual consciousness with reality. Against such a background, it is not 
surprising that Murdoch holds that ‘the central concept of morality is “the 
individual’’’ (SG 30) and that she regards ‘the (daily, hourly, minutely) attempted 
purification of consciousness as the central and fundamental “arena” of morality’ 
(MGM 193). Truthful vision is both the path and the aim of the moral life: the Good 
                                                 
84 These lines are written with reference to Plato, but they can serve well to summarise Murdoch’s 
own ideas, or the main points on which she thinks Plato was right. 
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guides the individual towards clearer perception, as well as being indirect ly 
manifest in the world, in the objects of the individual’s perception. 
The centrality in morality of the individual, considered as a coherent whole, 
is to be understood both by regarding the individual as subject and as object: as 
objects, other individuals are the most important and most difficult ‘transcendent’ 
reality that we have to try to apprehend clearly. As subjects, our moral being 
presents itself in how we engage with reality, being part of the ‘tissue of 
consciousness’ of the person, which Murdoch equates roughly with the self (MGM 
147-8). To morally assess others, as well as oneself, Murdoch holds, one needs to 
look at a highly complex and composite ever changing unity, people’s ‘quality of 
consciousness’: how they think, what they think, their ‘total vision of life, as shown 
in their mode of speech or silence, their choice of words, their assessment of others 
… what they find funny’ (VCM 80-1). 
Murdoch then operates with a notion of human being as a unified entity. On 
the one hand, as her moral epistemology shows, if what we believe depends in part 
on our will, desires and imagination, and in turn what we choose and desire depends 
on what we perceive, then will and belief, cognition and affect, are not separate 
faculties but work together in articulating moral perception. Will can direct 
imagination, for instance, by inviting certain images or possibilities and suppressing 
others. Imagination can be both good, creative, constructive and truthful, or bad 
when fear, anxiety or other ego-driven forces direct it away from reality, a process 
which Murdoch names ‘fantasy’. This means that a change in consciousness – a 
change in moral quality – will have to engage the whole individual, intellect, will, 
desires. Following William James, Murdoch pictures consciousness as a stream, 
which cannot be divided into ‘parts’, but which constitutes an organic whole. 85 
What she refers to as ‘moral character’ is such a comprehensive vision of the 
individual, in which every little detail is telling of a general quality of moral vision, 
with its specific desires and values, which reach in various ways into all thoughts 
and actions. ‘What moves us – motives, desires, reasoning – emerges from a 
constantly changing complex. Moral change is the change of that complex’ (MGM 
300). 
                                                 
85 Hence her rejection of the phenomenological reduction, which purports to isolate one item of 
consciousness for contemplation: cf. MGM 232-4. 
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Often Murdoch describes moral progress using Plato’s parable of the cave: 
purification of consciousness is a turning around (periagoge) of the whole 
individual (the soul) moved by desire for the Good, a desire which gets 
progressively refined as one learns to see more clearly, by desiring better and better 
objects (the ‘degrees of perfection’ argument), and advancing toward what is more 
real and better, which each object, seen in relation to the previous one, points to. 
This idea is expressed by Simone Weil, drawing on the same Platonic source, thus: 
‘the soul cannot turn its eyes in a new direction without turning entirely in that 
direction’ (SN 106). Having reached the vision of the sun (the Good), the soul will 
be able to see the world as it is, rather than through the veil of appearance 
(Murdoch’s selfish fantasy). Such turning around is precisely what attention 
consists in, as we shall see; considered as what occasions moral change, attention 
is too, therefore, something that involves the individual as a whole.  
This understanding of the individual provides at least two reasons to claim 
that thought is moral: one is that value influences our imaginative construction of 
reality – which for Murdoch is also involved in perception - in all its aspects. This 
has the consequence, as she claims, of making the individual’s mind closer to reality 
than on the ‘existentialist’ model, where the will is free to choose among ‘given’ 
facts: on the Murdochian model, the world one sees is partly one’s own 
responsibility. Secondly, thought is moral because we are moral beings – as we saw 
in the ontological argument – who cannot help but think in terms of value and truth, 
and we are unified beings, whose particular thoughts and desires take place on the 
background of our evaluating consciousness (cf. MGM 300).  
Murdoch argues, as we saw in the previous chapter, that Good is ubiquitous, 
and that it is omnipresent in consciousness because the individual’s understand ing 
of the Good shapes her every thought and perception. Individual acts of cognition, 
being part of this whole, are also influenced by such an idea of the Good. Two 
important points follow from this view: firstly, individual acts, or even thoughts 
and intentions, are not to be considered on their own, as most consequentialist and 
deontological theories suggest, but can only be properly understood against the 
background of the individual’s consciousness and its broader relation to morality. 
Secondly, and yet more radically, if morality can be seen as a general orientation 
governed by some values, which determines individual thoughts, perceptions, as 
well as choices, then morality primarily depends on ‘vision’ rather than choice. Not 
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only how, but what one sees depends on one’s values and moral quality of 
consciousness (‘we see different worlds’, VCM 82). To use an example from 
Martha Nussbaum and discussed by Cora Diamond, the person who sees life as an 
adventure will also perceive individual realities in the light of such vision (cf. 
Diamond 1996); she can be said to see, and live in, a different world from the person 
who sees life as, say, a valley of tears. This also means, crucially, that mora l 
disagreement is not a matter of applying different principles to the same facts, nor 
disagreements about the method of application of principles to facts, but of how to 
understand and conceptualise reality (cf. Ch. 5 below). 
Thus Murdoch claims that ‘moral differences are conceptual differences’ 
(VCM 82), insofar as the understanding and applications of concepts are also 
gradually learned in the context of an individual’s moral sensibility. Concepts are, 
in this picture, not impersonal tools, but modes of evaluation with infinite 
modulations: part of the aim of ‘The Idea of Perfection’ in SG is to show how 
individual concepts, and particularly moral concepts, are not determined by ‘the 
impersonal world of language’ working upon a ‘hard objective world of facts’ (SG 
25), but they are learned in contexts by individuals, who then make a partly personal 
use of them and go on to progressively learn their meaning in the light of vision and 
experience (Murdoch uses the example of how the concept of courage changes with 
life experience in SG 29); concepts are then both public and private. This argument 
connects with the observation about the transcendence of reality and its constantly 
perfectible knowledge, adding into the picture the importance of the individua lity 
of the knowing valuing subject.86 
The idea that moral differences are differences in vision, which in turn 
depends on moral consciousness, brings the burden of morality back to the question 
that I started from: how do we ‘purify’, as Murdoch puts it, consciousness so that it 
becomes virtuous, and so also better able to see clearly? In ‘On God and Good’, as 
we saw, Murdoch claims that moral progress and purification of consciousness 
depend on the objects of one’s attention, and suggests that the Good, formerly God, 
is the object that can best lead to moral improvement if attended to. Whether 
attention to the Good is possible, rather than focus or desire, is a question I consider 
below (Ch.4§2-3). For the moment, the idea is helpful to introduce a notion of 
                                                 
86 This is discussed in detail in Chapter 7 through Murdoch’s critique of W ittgensteinian ideas about 
the public nature of concepts. 
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individual consciousness that depends on its objects. Murdoch sees the individua l 
as a ‘system of energy’, the direction and quality of which is determined by the 
objects of one’s thoughts, desires or attachments. Desire, for Murdoch, is what 
directs consciousness to particular objects, so it is first of all desire that needs to be 
controlled and directed properly. Because human beings are ‘naturally attached’ 
and cannot desire nothing, nor can consciousness be without an object, the path to 
improvement or purification of desires does not lie in eradication of desires, but in 
their re-direction.  
Murdoch follows Plato in thinking that what we all really desire is the Good. 
Whatever we want, we want it because we believe it is, rightly or wrongly, 
somehow good. Desires, therefore, depend on the individual’s sense of value. That 
is why, by purifying desires, one also purifies one’s moral consciousness. Desiring 
and occupying oneself with certain objects involves taking up a particular point of 
view, which influences the imaginative construction of the world around one, hence 
also perception. Depending on one’s sense of value or orientation to the Good, 
desires create focal points which arrange consciousness in certain ways. If one 
values being successful in one’s job, for instance, one will be more likely to 
perceive a particular situation in the light of that desire and the possibilities it 
affords for fulfilling one’s aim, overlooking other features. Thus consciousness is 
purified by changing one’s desires as well as the focus of one’s thoughts. So the 
claims about the ubiquity of value in consciousness, observed with reference to 
Murdoch’s metaphysics, are reinstated with reference to desire: value structures 
consciousness, in better and worse ways, and it does so because we desire what we 
value, so the objects of desire become central to our consciousness and we see other 
things in their light. 
However, we can be deeply mistaken about where the Good lies. So our 
values and desires, and in turn our cognition and perception, can be distorted to 
various extents. The main source of this distortion, Murdoch believes, is the self or 
ego. This introduces the last central element of Murdoch’s moral psychology to be 
mentioned, one considered by Murdoch to be an empirical fact, which is that we 
are ‘naturally selfish’. Our primary object of interest is our self, and our desires tend 
to move towards self-gratification – conceived as a good; such tendency is 
considered to be a central aspect of human nature, and although Murdoch 
recognises that Freud may be correct in claiming that some degree of fantasy may 
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be necessary to survive (‘Truth is unbearable’, MGM 130),87 she holds that morality 
– in its ideal form - points in the opposite direction. The egocentric nature of human 
beings includes, on the one hand, the illusion of one’s centrality in the world, 
bringing about an undue preoccupation with oneself which makes other matters – 
and other people and their needs – less salient or even invisible; and on the other, 
and partly as a consequence of the first aspect, it includes the use of ‘bad 
imagination’ to create images and thoughts that satisfy the desires of the ego: this 
inward-directed, falsifying use of the imagination Murdoch calls ‘fantasy’, as 
opposed to the outward directed, truth-making ‘imagination’ proper. The egocentric 
nature of human beings is then connected with a tendency away from the Good, 
because it pulls away from the real. If consciousness depends on what it desires, a 
selfish consciousness, whilst desiring perceived goods, does not desire true goods. 
Conversely, a purified consciousness will be, at the same time, more realistic, less 
selfish, and ‘turned’ or focused outward, towards reality. If Murdoch is right, what 
follows is the controversial idea that most of our moral failings are determined by 
selfishness and egocentricity.88 
The solution to the metaphysical problem presented in Chapter 2, about how 
to combine the idea that morality is played out in the nature of one’s personal vision 
(from the metaphysical statement that value is transcendental) with the idea that 
what is chiefly required of the moral subject is to perceive (moral) reality clearly 
and truthfully (from the metaphysical notion of the existence of moral truths) also 
helps to make sense of Murdoch’s moral psychology. The emphasis on modes of 
consciousness structured by evaluative desires as the arena of moral improvement 
is combined, without tension, with the idea that such moral improvement depends 
on how values (and related desires) orientate consciousness in the direction of just 
and truthful apprehension of reality, including the right apprehension of value.  
                                                 
87 On this point, Murdoch agrees with Eliot’s ‘Human kind cannot bear very much reality’ (‘Burnt 
Norton’, Four Quartets), which she echoes in SG 64: ‘It is true that human beings cannot bear much 
reality’. 
88 This idea is criticised, for example, by Blum (2012). However, Blum takes Murdoch to claim that 
ego-driven fantasy is the only source of distortion and thus of moral flaws; whereas Murdoch is 
proposing an alternative picture to the will-based dominant one, not an exhaustive picture, as she 
repeatedly claims. I discuss the idea that the ego is the main cause of moral failings further in Chapter 
6. 
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2 Murdoch’s Concept of Attention 
Murdoch’s understanding of the way in which the individual can make moral 
progress through a purification of consciousness in the direction of justice and 
realism can be condensed in the concept of attention. Attention, Murdoch writes, is 
‘the characteristic and proper mark of the active moral agent’ (SG 34) (a descriptive 
and normative statement), and she identifies virtue with ‘selfless attention’ (SG 41). 
The concept of attention is thus central to Murdoch’s moral philosophy. It is what 
defines a good person and what is necessary for being good. Although Murdoch 
considers other people to be the main testing ground of morality, she does not 
exclude anything from being a potential object of moral consideration, and thus an 
object of attention: ‘the view which I suggest… connects morality with attention to 
individuals, human individuals or individual realities of other kinds’ (SG 38) which 
can include ‘other things, history, the natural world, the cosmos … ’ (MGM 268). 
So attention is presented in SG as a ‘moral’ concept (albeit not consistently, as we 
shall see in Ch.4§1.1), as a particular way of confronting and apprehending reality  
(SG 37). Murdoch takes the concept of attention, with few modifications, from 
Simone Weil, to whom her whole moral psychology is also heavily indebted.  
2.1 Attention as Vision 
Attention is introduced in SG as a ‘just and loving gaze directed toward an 
individual reality’ (SG 34). Visual metaphors abound in Murdoch’s philosophy and 
attention itself, in this passage and elsewhere, is presented as a visual faculty or 
activity. An ambiguity already presents itself in Murdoch’s characterisation of 
attention, concerning whether it is to be understood as an intellectual faculty, or 
also as a form of perception and specifically visual perception.  
Visual attention is both a metaphor for moral attention and an actual form 
of it. Murdoch indicates the importance of the metaphor of vision with reference to 
Plato: in the myth of the cave, the soul progresses spiritually and morally through 
increasing apprehension of beauty, which presents itself to sight – where beauty is 
not to be understood as physical only, but as something more abstract, and as the 
most clearly visible kind of goodness (MGM 15). At the end of the ‘ascent’, the 
good soul achieves the vision of the Forms. Sight is the most natural metaphor to 
represent apprehension of reality, including moral reality, because, as Plato writes, 
‘sight is the clearest of our physical senses’; however, he continues, ‘it is unable to 
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perceive wisdom’ (Phaedrus 250D, quoted in MGM 15). The fact that wisdom 
cannot be captured by sight indicates not so much the limit of the metaphor of vision, 
but rather the general limitation of human faculties when it comes to apprehending 
‘spiritual truths’, values, absolutes. Like Plato, who ‘is suggesting the naturalness 
of using visual images to express spiritual truths’ (MGM 15), Murdoch takes vision 
to highlight the immediacy of moral knowledge at its best, the fact that, when proper 
attention is exercised, moral knowledge is not a product of deliberation and 
reflection, but of immediate apprehension. Talking of vision also brings to the fore 
one of Murdoch’s main concerns, that of representing morality as not primarily 
dependent on action, but on cognition and consciousness.  
It thus appears that the metaphorical and literal domains cannot be neatly 
separated. The metaphor of vision in moral apprehension cannot be reduced to a 
non-metaphorical description while expressing the same meaning (cf. MGM 177-
8): ‘the largely explicable ambiguity of the word “see” … conveys the essence of 
the concepts of the moral’ (MGM 177).89 We experience this ambiguity when, in 
everyday communication, we ask each other ‘can’t you see that … he is being 
sarcastic, or that the dog is in pain?’ In these cases, it seems as if replacing the visual 
term with an intellectual one would not do. 
A further reason to reject the separation of attention as vision into a literal 
and a metaphorical sense is that, as Diamond (1996: 107-108) notes, given 
Murdoch’s arguments for the evaluative nature of cognition, the model of visual 
awareness that Murdoch is using is one where vision is itself moralised; where, in 
other words, the quality and objects of vision depend on the (moral) quality of 
consciousness of the individual. Visual awareness is itself, for Murdoch, a kind of 
moral awareness, and ‘perception is a mode of evaluation’ (MGM 315). As we have 
seen, Murdoch argues that values influence the individual’s perception of a given 
situation, because perception is not the immediate conveyance of impressions on a 
blank slate, but a matter of ‘organising’ what confronts us through concepts. This 
means that several other faculties participate in visual perception. 
                                                 
89 Cf. Robjant (2012) on the importance of metaphors in Murdoch and the irreducibility, in some 
cases, of metaphorical descriptions to non-metaphorical ones, and Diamond (2001a) on the 
connection between ethical expressions and ‘secondary sense’, the latter in the context of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy. 
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Murdoch’s notion of attention, therefore, is neither only metaphorical nor 
only literal, but swings between the two. Attention, moreover, is not only visual, 
although visual perception is the main model for it, but involves all the senses and 
faculties too. What remains to be clarified is how precisely to articulate this moral 
view of perception, whether moral properties can be ‘seen’ in the same way as 
anything else is, or whether they are a matter of interpreting and arranging 
perceptual properties. I leave these questions for a fuller discussion in Chapter 5.  
2.2 The Role of Emotions in Attention 
The ambiguity and broader significance of ‘vision’ in attention reinforces the idea, 
just noted, that attention does not involve a single faculty, but instead requires the 
collaboration of the whole person – a periagoge or turning around of the individua l 
in her entirety. As Diamond writes, citing Stephen Clark, seeing the world and the 
values within it correctly requires not a specific set of isolated faculties, but on the 
contrary it ‘depends on our coming to attend to the world and what is in it, in a way 
that will involve the exercise of all our faculties’ (Diamond 2001b: 296, emphasis 
added).90 
Among the faculties, another important element of attention which makes 
moral perception or vision possible is emotion or affect. Although the just and 
objective nature of attention appears to be a reason to consider it, as Peta Bowden 
does, as a ‘detached, intellectual sensibility’ (Bowden 1998: 65), attention requires 
the emotions for two reasons. First, if attention allows us to understand reality, and 
that includes other people, with their thoughts, needs and emotions, attention has to 
include an element of empathetic understanding, whereby the recognition of the 
other’s emotions requires an affective response on the individual’s part. 
Compassion is a poignant example, often required by acts of attention, and which 
is sometimes explicitly invoked by Murdoch as an element of attention alongside 
love (SG 66). Compassion, as Blum (1994: Chapter 8) presents it, chimes in almost 
all its aspects with what Murdochian attention requires: compassion is a ‘moral 
emotion’; it goes beyond the mere belief that the other is suffering and requires 
imaginative understanding; it involves concern for the other person’s well-being; it 
                                                 
90 See also Blum (1994) on ‘the multiplicity of psychic processes and capacities involves in moral 
perception and moral judgment’ (Blum 1994: 47). Blum also links moral perception with the ethics 
of care, ‘for care involves attention to and sensitivity to particular persons and their situations in a 
way (it is alleged) not fully recognised by impartialist, principle-based moralities’ (1994: 50ff). 
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requires seeing the other as a fellow human being; it involves the disposition to act, 
if required by the situation. All these elements are also part of attention.  
Secondly, emotions are involved in understanding certain situations and in 
applying certain concepts: as Blum suggests, attention involves ‘concerned 
responsiveness’ (Blum 1994: 12), which is made possible if the attentive subject, 
on the one hand, cares about the object of attention (‘to attend is to care’ MGM 
179) and about perceiving them correctly, and on the other, is prepared to respond 
appropriately to what is presented to her, which includes emotional responses. To 
respond to a friend’s recounting of her grief without any emotion would, in most 
situations, amount to not having properly understood the friend and her situation at 
that moment – which indicates that a failure of attention, as the ability to perceive 
such reality, has occurred.91 
By contrast, in her overview of the idea of ‘ethical attention’, Peta Bowden 
(1998) suggests that Nussbaum is, rather than Weil and Murdoch, the philosopher 
who understands attention as including personal and affective elements. Bowden 
quotes Nussbaum expressing the Aristotelian notion, developed throughout her 
work, that ‘ethical perception is the “keen responsiveness of intellect, imagina t ion 
and feeling to the particulars of a situation”’ (Nussbaum 2001: 101, quoted in 
Bowden 1998: 66). For the reasons above, I believe that such description would 
also fit very well Murdoch’s notion of attention. Moreover, although Nussbaum is 
careful to distinguish her Aristotelian conception from what she refers to as the 
Platonic idea of separation of intellect form the passions (Nussbaum 2001: 15), 
Murdoch’s own reading of Plato is far from intellectualistic or passionless; on the 
contrary, Murdoch admires and follows Plato in understanding ‘intellect as passion’ 
(MGM 17). Eros drives the individual in both intellectual and worldly pursuits, as 
we read in the Symposium, and even when ‘higher’ intellectual understanding is 
achieved, such understanding depends on the individual’s love of the Good. 
Murdoch describes even noesis, the contemplation of the Form of the Good, as 
consisting of ‘passionate stilled attention’ (MGM 319), and virtue as ‘passionate 
attention directed toward what is good’ (MGM 320). 
                                                 
91 Cf. Alice Crary (2007), who aims to articulate a ‘wider conception of rationality’, inspired by 
Wittgenstein, which takes rationality and objectivity to be discernible only from within the practises 
in which the concepts are used. On this model, emotional responses are part of such practises, so 
that certain concepts are internally related to particular responses, in the absence of which it is 
questionable if the concept has been correctly understood. 
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The role of love, both as part of attention and more broadly in Murdoch’s 
philosophy, is difficult to pin down. The definition of attention as ‘loving gaze’ has 
prompted various analyses (for ex. Swanton 2003 and Snow 2005) as well as an 
interest in the concept of love from a Murdochian perspective (Larson 2009, 
Milligan 2013, 2014). The central difficulty involves the tension between the 
emotive and individual aspect of love and the requirement of attention to be 
objective and even detached and impersonal: does a loving gaze involve perceiving 
the object as better than it is, thus clashing with the requirement of realism? Or, if 
attention involves a perfectly objective and detached look, what place does love 
have in it? That is another question I shall discuss in detail below (Ch.4§2). 
2.3 The Two Movements of Attention: Love and Unselfing 
The question of the compatibility of love and emotion with objectivity and 
selflessness in attention introduces the two central elements, or ‘movements’, that 
make up attention, a negative and a positive one. Calling them ‘movements’ 
captures the fact that the two aspects correspond to the direction of the individua l’s 
energies. Love is the positive movement or aspect, providing motivation, moving 
the attentive subject toward the object and sustaining, through desire for the Good, 
attention to reality. The other aspect involves a more passive state of receptivity, 
made possible by the withdrawal of the negative influence of the self or ego, and 
the suppression of self-directed focus, where the energy is involved in keeping a 
state of suspension, which Murdoch calls ‘unselfing’.92 The two movements also 
correspond to two meanings of attention: ‘stretching towards’ (Lat. ad-tendere) and 
‘waiting’.  
The active aspect of attention, love, is understood on the model of Platonic 
eros, but in its purified or best aspects. Eros is desire, which, as we saw, is what 
makes up the individual’s quality of consciousness. Given that, according to 
Murdoch, imagination and values are connected with desires, the good quality of 
consciousness determined by attention involves the direction of desire toward what 
is good. The desires are ‘purified’, and so is consciousness, when the natural self-
directed desires which lead to fantasy make room for other-directed desires, which 
include the wish to see other things as they really are. (I discuss love in attention in 
Ch.4§2). 
                                                 
92 After Weil’s notion of décréation or ‘decreation’. 
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In its ‘negative’ aspect, attention involves the suppression of the self-
gratifying desires which create fantasy. Selfishness directs desire away from reality 
and thus from the Good, towards the self, creating a vision of the world interpreted 
and distorted according to the claims of the self; conversely, ‘attention is the effort 
to counteract such states of illusion’ (SG 37). The concept of unselfing is, again, 
heavily indebted, primarily, to Simone Weil, but also more generally to the tradition 
of negative theology, including Meister Eckhart: in its theological origin, attention 
coincides with the attempt to empty the soul so that it may be filled with God (MGM 
301). In Murdoch’s secular terms, it is the ‘checking of selfishness in the interest 
of seeing the real’ (SG 65), by redirecting desires away from the powerful self 
toward the real via the Good, i.e. by attending to reality and pursuing the Good, 
which results in an approach to reality which is more truthful, honest, and 
unpossessive: ‘the ability to let be, consider, create, understand’ against ‘base 
emotions, anxiety, fear and misery, obsessive imagery. These are changed by 
changes in our desires’ (MGM 347). This is a central idea for Murdoch: selfishness 
is the main obstacle to clear vision, so ‘moral philosophy is properly … the 
discussion of the ego and of the techniques (if any) for its defeat’ (SG 52). 
(Unselfing is discussed further in Chapter 6). 
Love and unselfing are both necessary and inseparable elements of attention. 
On the one hand, the attempt to silence the claims of the ego, although it removes 
the obstacles from correct perception, is not sufficient for just vision, because, for 
Murdoch, perception is not only a matter of being ‘hit’ by the object, but an active 
and personal process, which requires the desire to see the object truly. Conversely, 
desiring to understand someone or something, focusing on them, requires putting 
the ego at least momentarily to a side. 
2.4 Creativity and Waiting 
On Murdoch’s model reality is, as we saw above, not ‘given’ but ‘grasped’. 
Perception and understanding depend on the individual’s imagination and values, 
and that is why moral faculties and attitudes are needed to perceive correctly: 
faculties and attitudes that foster imagination rather than fantasy, and lead to a 
creative and truthful construction of reality. If perception is imaginative and 
therefore creative, what we perceive, in a sense, does not exist before the effort of 
attention: the creative process of the attentive imagination interacts with the object 
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to make it into something understandable to the subject. This does not mean that 
there is no object prior to the conceptualising activity, nor that such activity is ‘free’ 
to make what it likes of the object. There is a truth of the matter about the object, 
and there are various compatible ways of seeing it, and yet more unfitting and 
inappropriate conceptualisations of it. Calling perception ‘creative’ refers to the fact 
that possibilities cannot be fixed in advance, and each object and situation may yield 
countless possible ways of seeing them, and possible responses that are fitting with 
them – and just as many that are not. Here the desire to see the object justly 
suppresses selfish distortions, inhibits certain pictures, and leaps forward by 
imagining possibilities before they are clearly seen. Diamond expresses this point 
beautifully in relation to a particular attitude to life which she calls, after Henry 
James, ‘a sense of adventure’, which can bring out possibilities that require an 
imaginative and keen ‘moral attention’ in order to be seen:  
The sense of adventure … is closely linked to the sense of life, to a sense of life as 
lived in a world of wonderful possibilities, but possibilities to be found only by 
creative response. The possibilities are not lying about on the surface of things. 
Seeing the possibilities in things is a matter of a kind of transforming perception of 
them. (Diamond 2001c: 313) 
The changing and increasing sense of possibilities is then compared to the paths 
that a mountain offers to a mountain climber. This analogy brings to the fore another 
element of the creativity of attention: the fact that skill and competence, with 
particular situations in life and with related concepts, can increase the range of 
possibilities one sees, and the more so the more attentively the situations are 
experienced and observed (what Murdoch calls a ‘deepening’ of concepts). As a 
symphony may be a confused mass of sounds to someone who is a stranger to that 
kind of music, while the expert can readily recognise the different movements and 
component parts, so in life more generally experience changes the nature of what 
is seen. Yet, in all these cases, the possibilities and aspects that come to the surface 
are not made up by the subject, but offered by the objects or situations.  
These considerations help to explain some rather enigmatic statements in 
MGM about the necessity of ‘faith’ in other people, and about the mysterious nature 
of any object of attention: in good (attentive) thinking and artistic creation, 
‘something is apprehended as there which is not yet known’ (MGM 505).93 
                                                 
93 ‘Beliefs about people often proceed … imaginatively and under direct pressure of will: we have 
to attend to people, we may have to have faith in them, and here justice and realism demand the 
inhibition of certain pictures, the promotion of others’ (EM 199). See also the quote by Paul Valéry , 
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Attention is required when the object is as yet not clearly seen; it is an imaginat ive 
and creative tension toward its object, which often presents itself first as obscure, 
and is then progressively known, bringing out aspects and possibilities that at first 
one could at best intuit. Because the possibilities and aspects are not projected in 
attention but discovered, attention involves patience and waiting, particularly in 
cases where comprehension is difficult and it is tempting to force the object into 
one interpretation or other. The model of consciousness as ‘grasping’ presented by 
Murdoch, which pictures the imagination as actively reaching out to the world in 
concept-making and concept-application, needs to be united with the element of 
patience or waiting, where the imagination refrains from imposing an order and 
rather admits its limitations and waits for the correct understanding to become 
available. In this, we can see another modulation of the two movements, of love 
and unselfing, described above. 
2.5 Activity, Attitude, Faculty 
In the discussion so far, I have been talking of attention both as a faculty and as an 
attitude. As a faculty, attention is understood as a general faculty that encompasses 
the exercise of different faculties, because the main feature of attention is that of 
enabling clear perception. As an attitude, attention involves a more general stance 
of the individual towards reality and can be part of one’s character. Furthermore, 
attention can also be understood as an activity or action, because it can be exercised 
voluntarily at particular times by someone who is not generally attentive. Murdoch 
herself does not characterise attention in any of these ways, calling it only ‘task’ or 
‘effort’, yet implying, through her use of the concept in different contexts, the 
possibility of taking it as a faculty, as an attitude, or as an activity. 
As a faculty, attention is understood on the model of vision, because 
attention is what enables the subject to perceive clearly and is available to be 
exercised, in principle, by everyone. Because attention involves the senses, as well 
as the intellect and the emotions, it can be understood as a particular configura t ion 
of all of these faculties, depending on the object attended to (for instance, empathy 
may be less relevant when attending to a landscape, and logical intelligence 
required more in dealing with a mathematical problem, etc.). 
                                                 
repeated more than once in MGM: ‘at its highest point, love is the determination to create the being 
which it has taken for its object’ (MGM 506). 
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However, whether or not one exercises attention, and to what degree, 
depends on other factors. On the one hand, it is possible to develop habits of 
attention, which then give rise to a disposition similar to virtue, so that attention 
becomes spontaneous or part of the individual’s character. In this case, attention 
can be considered an attitude, the predisposition of the virtuous subject to 
apprehend the world attentively. 
Not all acts of attention are spontaneous, the result of an attentive attitude. 
Moreover, attention can generally be exercised for limited periods of time. As 
Simone Weil writes, ‘when we become tired, attention is scarcely possible, unless 
we have already had a good deal of practice’; therefore she recommends ‘to press 
on and loosen up alternately, just as we breathe in and out’ (WG 71). While ideally 
attention would be exercised all the time, in practise it is remarkable if individua ls 
can even attend frequently, both because of the effort involved, and because of the 
natural inclination towards self-concern and fantasy. Attention, thus understood, is 
an act or activity, which has a beginning and end in time – in this sense, it is more 
fitting to use the verb ‘attending’, rather than the noun ‘attention.’ 
Because the two latter characterisations of attention, as attitude and as 
activity, depend on the faculty of attention, I more often characterise attention as a 
faculty. When the faculty becomes habitual or part of the character of the individua l, 
it is fitting to talk of attention as an attitude; when it is exercised, in punctual acts 
of attention, often under the command of the will, attention is considered an action 
or activity. All these meanings are included in the idea of attention, but they are 
dependent upon the capacity, or faculty, to attend. 
2.6 Action, Contemplation and Freedom 
One of the most striking as well as controversial features of a morality which 
revolves around attention is its relation to action. From what has been said so far, it 
should be clear that one of the defining features of Murdoch’s moral philosophy is 
that it makes it possible to be good or bad without any outward action occurring at 
all (to show that this is possible is the main aim of the M and D example). This 
could earn Murdoch’s philosophy the label of ‘contemplative’ ethics, a label which, 
depending on how it is understood, can be either correct or misleading. If by 
‘contemplative’ we mean a view of ethics as primarily revolving around receptivity 
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to reality, as Lovibond (2007: 305) takes it, then Murdoch’s view, and any morality 
that revolves around attention as presented here, is contemplative.94  
On the other hand, the idea of attention does not support a contemplat ive 
view of morality if ‘contemplative’ means that knowledge is the only thing of value 
and that its links to action are irrelevant. This is because, first, while attention is 
good in itself, it also directs itself to specific objects, depending on the requirements 
of the situation, so that the value of the object of attention also matters (See Chapter 
4§3); second, as we saw, attention is itself considered an activity, where the effort 
of ‘looking’ and the change of vision can be considered as ‘inner actions’ (cf. SG 
19-20); third, attention is closely connected to ‘outward action’, creating the 
background upon which actions become possible as well as providing the 
motivation to act.  
Nowhere does Murdoch suggest that action is irrelevant to morality, but 
only that the main burden of morality is moved ‘back’, from action to consciousness, 
or modes of engagement with reality, which precede action. What one does on this 
model is causally connected with what one thinks, desires and sees – a rather 
commonsense idea in fact – so that it is that background that is considered most 
important:95 as Simone Weil writes, ‘action is the pointer of the balance. One must 
not touch the pointer, but the weights’.96 Responsibility, too, in Murdoch’s picture, 
rests not only on what one does, but also in what one ‘sees’, since how and what 
one sees depend on one’s desires and one’s ability to attend to reality. In this sense, 
Murdoch claims, ‘imagining is a doing’ (DPR 199). Choice is therefore not the 
primary concept of morality, because it is now seen to occur upon a world already 
partly constructed by the individual, through the continual imperceptible activity of 
imaginative apprehension of the world, which builds up vision and value.97 While 
                                                 
94 Nor would such a view clash with Anaxagoras’s statement, reported by Aristotle, that what mostly 
makes life valuable is ‘contemplating the heavens and the whole order of the universe’ (Eudemian 
Ethics 1216a11-14, quoted in Lovibond 2007: 309), provided that the value of contemplation is not 
seen to exclude or make irrelevant the value of what is contemplated. 
95 Murdoch holds not only that the inner determines the outer, but also that outward actions also 
influence the inner and ‘release psychic energies that can be released in no other way’ (cf. SG 43): 
inner and outer are therefore in mutual relation. This thought reinforces the idea that attention is not 
mere inner work, but the inner change that attention both determines and is determined by involves 
the whole, embodied individual, and acts of will as well as overt actions can contribute to changes 
in the quality of consciousness. 
96 Quoted by Murdoch in her review of Weil’s Notebooks, ‘Knowing the Void’, EM 158.  
97 Cf. ‘attention imperceptibly builds up structures of value round about us’ (MGM 304) and ‘the 
moral life… is something that goes on continually, not  something that is switched off in between 
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it is true that this view includes the idea that moral change can occur without action, 
it does not make action irrelevant. 
This conception of action has considerable impact on the notion of freedom. 
Contrary to the ‘existentialist’ and analytic views that Murdoch is opposing, on this 
picture morality does not centre around the will, considered as being free to choose 
whatever course it desires within a world from which it is separate.98 Nor is freedom 
seen as an illusion, all the options being closed to the individual, as in determinism. 
Murdoch holds that a more ‘balanced’ view of freedom and necessity can be 
obtained through focusing on the concept of attention (SG 36-44). On the one hand, 
on Murdoch’s model we are freer than on the others, because the idea of attention 
extends freedom to the domain of belief and perception by according an active role 
to the imagination. Not only what one wills, but also what one sees, is partly up to 
the individual.  
On the other hand, however, on this view the individual is less free than on 
the ‘existentialist’ model for two reasons. The first is that the individual, includ ing 
her will, is subject to the mechanical forces of the self or ego, which are likely to 
lead to fantasy rather than to realism. A truly free vision, therefore, is to this extent 
free in a negative sense: it is vision liberated from fantasy, and able to see the world 
clearly. ‘To be free is something like this: to exist sanely without fear and to 
perceive what is real’ (EM 201).99 There is a reality, including a moral reality, 
which is available for the individual to see; but it is possible to ignore it by allowing 
the desire for self-gratification to obscure one’s vision of reality. That would be, 
not only a submission to mechanical fantasy, but also, in a sense, an impossible act, 
where will runs against reality, desiring something that is not and therefore it cannot 
achieve.  
                                                 
the occurrence of explicit moral choices’ (SG 37): it is what happens between those moments that 
is crucial. 
98 As we shall see in Ch.4 §5, the concept of will has a peculiar and ambiguous role in Murdoch, 
both positive and negative. She considers will to be mostly an ‘immediate straining’ against the 
background of consciousness. For a different interpretation of the relation between Murdoch’s view 
of freedom and existentialism, see Richard Moran (2012), who argues that the existentialist’s  
conception of freedom is closer to Murdoch’s own than she acknowledges: existentialist freedom is 
not, for Moran, unbounded choice, as Murdoch claims, but it is deeply constrained by the situation, 
thus bringing it closer to – although still different from – Murdoch’s ‘obedience’. 
99 ‘Freedom (in this sense) is freedom from bad habits and bad desire, and is brought about in all 
sorts of ways by impulses of love, rational reflection, new scenery, conscious ad deliberate formation  
of new attachments and so on’ (MGM 300). 
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This is the second reason why on Murdoch’s model we are less free than on 
her reading of the existentialist one: our overt choices and deliberations can only 
work with the elements of the world that we see – upon the background of our 
consciousness, which determines what we see. In the most successful cases of 
attention, reality will be revealed to the attentive subject, which includes, crucially, 
the responses that such reality calls for or merits:100 ‘if I attend properly I will have 
no choices, and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at’ (SG 40). In this thought, 
Murdoch unites necessity and freedom – a special notion of freedom – in the 
concept of attention, and the ‘obedience’ to reality that successful attention 
engenders. The work of attention, engaging the whole individual, including will 
and desires, reveals a world that the attentive subject, being a lover of the Good and 
thus of truth, cannot will not to be or to be other than what it is. Attention unites the 
recognition of reality with the acceptance of it. Most of us rebel with our will 
against this necessity, but we are not less bound for that (reality is what it is); the 
attentive individual understands and accepts this necessity, and in this way is freer 
than others, because her will conforms to the way things are. 
These thoughts also include a form of motivational internalism: the idea that 
attending properly gives one ‘no choices’ means that once reality is clearly seen by 
the subject, the proper response and action will at the same time become apparent. 
Attention to reality provides not only the correct perception, but also the reasons as 
well as the motivation to act in a certain way. This idea seems to capture a common 
experience, the feeling that one not so much wants to, but has to, respond to 
something in a certain way: that any other course of action appears not so much 
irrational or undesirable, but impossible. Murdoch attempts to explain this 
experience with the Weilian idea of ‘obedience’, as we shall see in §3 below. 
2.7 Attention and Other Concepts 
Lastly, it is important to note that with the idea of attention, and with the 
background on which it rests, Murdoch is not seeking to provide an exhaustive 
model of morality, as she herself acknowledges (SG 43). Her focus is on arguing 
for how evaluation extends much further than judgment and deliberation to almost 
all modes of cognition and perception, and on drawing out the consequences of that 
                                                 
100 ‘The details of our world deserve our respectful and loving attention’ (MGM 377). Cf. McDowell 
(2001c) on the idea of moral reality as ‘meriting’ certain responses, and Chapter 5 below. 
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moral-epistemological claim, including painting a metaphysical picture that serves 
as a background to the experience of goodness as ‘out there’ and absolutely 
important and binding. In this picture, attention is the central mode of moral 
awareness and the basis for moral action. However, it is also recognised that other 
forms of moral thinking, such as the idea of duty and utilitarian considerations, are 
important and even necessary to morality: ‘we do not … have to choose between 
attention and duty. We live with both’ (MGM 119).101 
Despite her acknowledgment that fostering moral perception in the form of 
habits of attention is not the only way to become morally better, Murdoch still 
considers correct perception as primary to duty and consequences, for two reasons: 
on the one hand, clear perception of a situation is required for the application of 
rules; on the other, such perception is itself morally laden, so that duty, for instance, 
does not merely pick out ‘facts’, but is influenced by a vision of a situation which 
itself contains value: ‘the sharp call of unwelcome duty … descends upon a 
countryside that already has its vegetation and contours’ (MGM 141). 
One reason for accommodating other moral theories is that perfect attention 
is an ideal state, and perfect moral perception an ideal achievement. Therefore we 
need, for instance, to heed the call of duty when our perceptual faculties are blunt 
and attention is poor. The weekly call to one’s grandmother, for example, may not 
always be the result of clear perception of her wish or need for that conversation, 
but rather result from intellectually ‘knowing’ what one has to do.102 While it is true 
that duties themselves are understood by the individual against the background of 
the general quality of consciousness, yet they remain discrete commands that can 
be appealed to even when consciousness directs desires elsewhere (MGM 302). 
Even then, however, as Murdoch recognises, it is hard to know when to follow our 
consciousness, and when to follow duty (SG 44).103 Presumably, in a context when 
reasons for action are given by correctly perceived reality, one should follow one’s 
consciousness when one is confident that impediments to clear perception have 
                                                 
101 ‘A realistic morality cannot dispense with the idea of duty … a part of every moral philosophy 
must be utilitarian’, MGM 53). For further observations about the relation between Murdoch’s views 
and other moral theories, see Roger Crisp (2012). 
102 Indeed, acting out of duty despite one’s desires or inclinations is for Kant where the value of the 
good will is most apparent: ‘under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however, 
far from concealing it and making it unrecognisable, rather elevate it by contrast and let it sh ine 
forth all the more brightly’ (Kant 1998, G 4:397).  
103 The question of how to combine attention with duty requires more space than I can devote to it 
here, but it has been addressed by Antonaccio (2000: 155-163). 
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been removed; of course, the possibility of error is not eliminated, only reasonably 
attenuated. 
It is a merit of Murdoch’s picture is that it can explain and to an extent 
incorporate concepts belonging to other theories; the other, arguably greater merit, 
is that it seeks to explain and do justice to the ordinary experience of morality, 
including placing it, in Socratic fashion (not asking ‘What should one do?’ but 
‘How should one live?’), within the whole of the life of the individual. 
3 Simone Weil’s Legacy 
In discussing attention and Murdoch’s philosophy I have made frequent reference 
to Simone Weil. Much of Murdoch’s thought bears the influence of Weil, but it is 
in the concept of attention, with the correlate notions of love and unselfing 
(décréation, also translated as ‘decreation’, but which Murdoch prefers to translate 
in more secular and modern terms as ‘unselfing’), and its consequent idea of 
obedience, that the influence is most obvious. 104  In what follows, I focus on 
attention and obedience, because Weil’s legacy in Murdoch’s concepts of love and 
unselfing is discussed, respectively, in Ch.4§3 and Ch.6. My main reason for 
focusing on Murdoch’s concept of attention rather than on Weil’s is that the present 
work aims to propose a conception of a secular morality, while in Weil attention is 
embedded in the context of a religious metaphysics. Indeed, part of Murdoch’s 
endeavour seems to be to translate the notion of attention introduced by Weil into 
a secular context and a secular metaphysics. Because Weil is such a profound 
influence on Murdoch, and because in Weil it is possible to find further elaborations 
and clarifications concerning the idea of attention and the related concepts, it is 
nonetheless helpful to briefly explore Weil’s concept of attention and to assess to 
what extent Murdoch inherits it or diverges from it.  
Murdoch first acknowledges her debt to Simone Weil in SG, where she 
claims that the word ‘attention’, as she has been using it, is ‘borrowed’ from Weil 
(SG 34). Weil is mentioned at various places in SG and MGM, but never discussed 
at any length, so the work of comparison between them cannot entirely rest on 
                                                 
104 Cf. Sabina Lovibond: ‘Murdoch’s most self-conscious borrowings are centred on the themes of 
attention and obedience’ (Lovibond 2011: 29). Kate Larson (2009) has devoted a study to the 
comparison of Weil and Murdoch on the subject of love, which for Larson comprises the idea of 
attention. In this work, conversely, I consider love to be an aspect of attention, although the relation 
between the two is not straightforward (See Ch.4 §3). 
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Murdoch’s own word. Weil’s influence on Murdoch, however, is obvious and 
pervasive.105 Sissela Bok (2005) has imagined a dialogue between Murdoch and 
Weil, where the moral crux is reached in the agreement on the Weilian idea that 
moral responses follow directly from apprehension of reality; with other people, 
this manifests itself, essentially, in ‘that halt, that interval of hesitation, wherein lies 
all our consideration for our brothers in humanity’ (Weil 1956: 33, quoted in Bok 
2005: 74). The recognition of the other, which both issues in and involves respect, 
is made possible by the truth-revealing faculty of attention: here, the truth of the 
other person’s independent existence and their autonomy, posing themselves as 
obstacles to our own will, as Weil frequently reminds us.106  
In the opening pages of ‘On God and Good’ in SG, Murdoch states that, in 
what follows, her ‘debt to SW will become evident’ (SG 50). After a critique of the 
‘prevalent picture’ of moral philosophy, which divides fact and value and presents 
the will as sole bearer of value and completely independent, Murdoch presents her 
own idea of what morality and moral improvement are like, based on attention, the 
very concept she borrows from Weil. Moral improvement, understood as 
purification of energy, is, as we saw, modelled on prayer or ‘attention to God’ (SG 
55, echoing the title of one of Simone Weil’s best known works). The dense passage 
shows that Murdoch’s very conception of human beings as ‘obscure systems of 
energy’, made up of an energy which is ‘naturally selfish’, is inherited not only 
from Freud, but to a large extent also from Weil. According to Weil, the self has no 
substance, but is a system of forces governed by desire. The energy of the self is 
naturally self-directed, and the result of this is de-realisation: a vision of the world 
distorted according to one’s desires. The ideas that our desires determine our quality 
of consciousness, and that by nature those desires are selfish and thus unrealist ic, 
are central to both Weil and Murdoch. What can purify such selfish desires, 
Murdoch writes following Weil, is attention.  
The difference between Murdoch and Weil lies in their conception of the 
self, which Murdoch considers with a little more benevolence than Weil does. 
Although Murdoch agrees with Weil that the self is the main source of moral error, 
                                                 
105 Murdoch admitted in an interview that her relationship with Weil was ‘total love at first sight’ 
(Griffin 1993: 58). 
106 On the idea of other people and well as objects as obstacles to our will, see Winch (1989: Chapter 
9).  
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she does not wish to completely eliminate all personal perspective.107 Murdoch’s 
notion of attention is similarly slightly less demanding or more ‘human’ than Weil’s, 
taking the shape of a slower, piecemeal exercise, conducted imperfectly in the midst 
of various impediments. As Peta Bowden observes, 
Where Weil portrays attention straining patiently, but inspirationally, against the 
untamed impulses of the ego, Murdoch pictures the continuous drudgery of the 
inexhaustible demand to attend ‘without rigidity’ at the sheer ‘contingent’ and 
infinite detail of the world, and its human personalities. Here the work of attention 
is an everyday, cumulative labour in uncertainty … rather than the revelatory 
gymnastics described by, and familiar to Weil. (Bowden 1998: 64) 
Although Bowden overestimates the extent to which Weil’s notion of attention 
involves an active effort, which for Weil has to be a negative, patient and open kind 
of effort and thus far from the idea of ‘gymnastics’, it is clear that Murdoch’s model, 
for all its perfectionism, is more tolerant of the limitations of human beings, and 
her idea of attention more piecemeal and ordinary. 
Weil sees the universe as deterministic, dominated by the ‘necessity’ 
determined by God in God’s withdrawal (Tzimtzum). 108  Human beings, too, 
partake of necessity, except for one spark of freedom, their autonomy to desire: 
although human beings do not have the power to control how things go in the world, 
they can choose which way to turn their desires. The choices are two: they can 
desire to obey necessity (God’s will), or they can desire not to obey.109 The second 
option is chosen as a result of the human illusion of being positioned at the centre 
of the world, which makes the individual believe that she has more importance, 
power, freedom and autonomy than she really has. Since it is not given to us not to 
obey the laws of necessity, and the illusion of freedom and centrality is itself a form 
of obedience to the laws of necessity (our ‘gravity’, in Weil’s words, which 
                                                 
107  See Ch.6 below for an analysis of Murdoch’s attempt to retain something akin to Weil’s 
‘impersonality’ in attention, combined with an acceptance, unlike Weil, of individual perspective 
and personality. 
108  The idea of Tzimtzum comes from Isaac Luria’s Kabbalistic doctrine. The Hebrew word 
‘Tzimtzum’ has the dual meaning of ‘withdrawal’ and ‘concealment’, and refers to the idea that the 
world exists as a result of the withdrawal of the only true reality, God; thus God is necessarily 
concealed from creation, which has the character of negation.   
109 Weil: ‘man can never escape obedience to God. A creature cannot not obey. The only choice 
offered to man as an intelligent and free creature, is to desire obedience or not to desire it. If he does 
not desire it, he perpetually obeys  nevertheless, as a thing subject to mechanical necessity. If he does 
desire obedience, he remains subject to mechanical necessity, but a new necessity is added on, a 
necessity constituted by the laws that are proper to  supernatural things. Certain actions become 
impossible for him, while others happen through him, sometimes despite him’ (WG 88). Cf. SG 40: 
‘the ideal situation is … to be represented as a sort of necessity … patient loving regard … presents 
the will – as something very much more like “obedience”’. 
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Murdoch rephrases in modern psychological terms as ‘natural self-centredness’), 
the only real exercise of freedom is to desire to obey. Such desire of obedience is 
attention: an attitude of the whole being whereby one is ready and willing to accept 
and acknowledge whatever is presented to one. In other words, attention is openness 
to and desire for the truth, which for Weil is God’s will. It thus becomes evident 
that already in Weil the idea of attention unites intellectual and moral elements (cf. 
Vetö 1994: 41), in making understanding dependent on the exercise of will and 
desire: to grasp the truth is a moral choice depending on one’s desire to obey God’s 
will. 
Murdoch translates these ideas into her own secular metaphysics. Being 
unable to justify the imperative of conforming one’s will to reality by appealing to 
the authority of the real understood as God’s creation, Murdoch returns (even there, 
however, inspired by Weil) to Plato and the value of knowledge, or the idea that to 
be truthful and to see things as they are is good in itself (as we saw in Ch. 2 and 3). 
Inheriting Weil’s moral psychology about the self-centred tendency of human 
beings, and the consequences drawn by Weil as to the de-realising effects of such 
tendency, Murdoch unites these ideas with the moral importance of reality in her 
secular reading of attention. In both, attention requires self-mastery and at the same 
time includes a desire for the Good, which leads to a clearer appreciation of reality. 
To obey, as part of attention, is for Murdoch nothing more than to want to see things 
as they are, without distorting them. 
We can see that the absence in Murdoch of Weil’s idea that one ought to not 
only desire to see reality as it is, but also desire things to be as they are, prevents 
the former from endorsing the disturbing possibility that obedience takes the shape 
of an acceptance which requires the attentive subject to not want to change 
anything; on that view, evil would also have to be desired, being part of creation. 
While it is not clear that Weil endorses such a conclusion,110 Murdoch only argues 
for the importance of knowledge, or wanting to see things as they are. It is 
compatible with this claim that, while seeing what is there, one may want things to 
be other than they are. Indeed, according to Murdoch’s motivational internalism, 
the nature of what is perceived carries within the appropriate reaction, which can 
involve rejection or the attempt to change it.  
                                                 
110 Cf. Weil, NB 38-9. For a different interpretation, which does not take Weil to be advocating a 
passive acceptance of evil, see Winch 1989: 177-8. 
99 
 
The element of patient waiting in attention is also derived from Weil. In 
RRSS Weil recommends the practise of attention as the crucial element to any 
intellectual discipline, necessary if any real progress is to be made.111 In a beautiful 
passage, Weil describes attention thus:  
Attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty and ready 
to be penetrated by the object. It means holding in our minds, within reach of this 
thought, but on a lower level and not in contact with it, the diverse knowledge we 
have acquired which we are forced to make use of. Our thought should be in relation 
to all particular and already formulated thoughts as a man on a mountain who, as he 
looks forward, sees also below him, without actually looking at them, a great many 
forests and plains. Above all our thought should be empty, waiting, not seeking 
anything, but ready to receive in its naked truth the object which is to penetrate it.  
(WG 72) 
Weil’s conception of attention is quoted a few times in MGM as ‘perception without 
reverie’ (MGM 112, 118, 163) and ‘attention: not to think about’ (MGM 118), 
expressing the importance of the element of ‘waiting’ in attention. Thought, 
whatever its object, is inclined to reach out and grasp, hurrying to find a solution 
that may quell the painfulness of uncertainty, or that may satisfy by fitting one’s 
pre-conceived schema, etc. This tendency is part of what Weil and Murdoch see as 
the natural self-centredness and self-protection that lead us into error. Attention 
purifies the energy or the individual by turning it outward, away from the self. Weil: 
‘attention must always be directed toward the object … never toward the self’ (N 
128) and Murdoch: ‘The direction of attention is, contrary to nature, outward, away 
from self’ (SG 66). 
This open waiting is combined, in the idea of attention of both Weil and 
Murdoch, with an eager desire for goodness and truth. Attention is ‘active 
engagement and passive receptivity’ as Bowden puts it (1998: 62). Attention is not 
simply passive contemplation, because it is desire for the Good (or God), but at the 
same time it is waiting and receptive, because its object is – by definition – 
something that one does not yet know. In RRSS, Weil warns that attention should 
not be ‘muscular effort’ and yet she observes that it is, at the same time, the greatest 
of all efforts (RRSS 70-1). The effort of attention is, rather, a ‘negative effort’ or a 
‘passive activity’, led by desire. 
The idea that the desire that makes up attention is to be directed to 
something absolute and perfect is also inherited by Murdoch from Weil, together 
                                                 
111 Cf. Murdoch: ‘All just vision, even in the strictest problems of the intellect … is a moral matter’ 
(SG 70). 
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with the difficult dialectic between attention to God and to God’s creatures, 
reworked by Murdoch in terms of attention to the Good or to the world. Although 
God or Good is the proper and ultimate object of desire – an idea they both take 
from Plato – God and Good are also not objects of perception, which is what 
attention aims at. Given its complexity, I consider the question of whether it is Good 
or the world that we should attend to separately below (Ch.4§3). 
Weil’s concept of attention is a moral concept, and as such it is taken up by 
Murdoch in the context of her own thought. Although I have hinted at the idea that 
Murdoch secularises Weilian attention, the difference between that religious and 
the secular perspective is not clear-cut, given Murdoch’s emphasis on the 
importance of a religious attitude and the idea of a transcendent absolute governing 
human life. What is clear for both philosophers is the centrality of attention in the 
good life. Weil brings it to the fore, drawing its consequences in the practical realm, 
with reference to our recognition of other people, especially those who are suffer ing 
(for which she uses as example the parable of the Good Samaritan). With this 
thought, we return to Bok’s insight quoted at the beginning: attention is the faculty 
or attitude by which we see the world as it is, and that includes other people and 
their situation, as well as the important fact that they are autonomous beings, with 
a will of their own which can contrast with ours – something which is not at all easy 
to do, and which very often does not happen. The Samaritan, in Weil’s reading, is 
able to see in the lump of flesh by the roadside a human being, and by this loving 
and attentive gaze restore his humanity to him. More generally, to be attentive, Weil 
writes, means to ask the sufferer ‘What are you going through?’ which is very 
difficult because it involves opening ourselves up to suffering and ‘decreating’ 
ourselves or putting ourselves to one side, by letting the other make an impression 
on us (WG 75).  
The actions that follow, helping the sufferer, clothing them, taking them 
home, are themselves, according to Weil, a form of obedience that goes together 
with attention. Earlier I spoke of attention as ‘obedience’, because it involves 
wanting to conform one’s thought to the way the world is. There is also a second 
aspect of obedience, which involves not only the mind, but also action, part of the 
motivational internalism mentioned above. Attention can be seen as both 
comprising obedience and as generating it: to attend is to want to see clearly, and 
what is seen will indicate what needs to be done. If attention is understood as 
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revealing reality, including a moral order, then the natural continuation of acts of 
attention will be acts that carry out what the moral order requires. For Murdoch, 
attention reveals a previously unknown reality, and it is within such a reality that 
action takes place. If what one can see includes moral properties, and on the premise 
that we all desire the Good, then ‘one is compelled almost automatically by what 
one can see’ (SG 37). ‘The ultimate condition to be aimed at’ (SG 40), Murdoch 
concludes, is one of ‘having no choices’ and thus one of obedience, in a way that 
need not be sinister: to obey the moral reality one sees is to be moved by the 
perceived good and to act on the possibilities offered. The claim that ‘if I attend 
properly I have no choices’ (SG 40) points to an ideal state, one in which the 
perceived reality dictates the moral requirements. (This point is explored further in 
Chapter 5). 
From this brief comparison of Weil and Murdoch we can see how deeply 
indebted Murdoch is to Weil, even when the debt is not acknowledged. Referring 
to Weil is crucial for understanding the idea of attention as developed by Murdoch, 
not only because that is the context in which Murdoch encountered it, but also 
because Weil on some occasions provides considerations not found in Murdoch that 
can clarify the ideas she borrows. That is why, in this work, I draw from Weil 
whenever it is helpful to do so in order to explain Murdoch’s idea. Most of the time, 
and unless otherwise stated, Weil’s ideas are compatible with and support 
Murdoch’s.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have introduced the notion of attention within the context of 
Murdoch’s moral psychology and against the backdrop of her metaphysical picture 
discussed in the previous chapter. Murdoch suggests a view of the individual as an 
organic unity, where consciousness is the locus of the individual’s morality. The 
subject is responsible for her ‘quality of consciousness’ and can alter it by altering 
her desires and the objects of her thoughts. Murdoch’s idea is that what one desires 
and occupies oneself with, which is determined by one’s values, builds up the 
quality of one’s consciousness. Not only what, but how one desires and thinks, is 
crucial in defining one’s background of consciousness, from which individual acts 
and thoughts emerge. The most powerful force in this picture is the self, seen as a 
centripetal force which turns desires and concerns towards itself, thus altering the 
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individual’s perception of reality in search of self-gratification. To turn the focus 
and concern away from the ego is, for Murdoch, the main task of morality and 
coincides with attention. 
Murdoch sees morality as revolving around the relation of the individua l’s 
mind to reality, whereby goodness consists in ordering consciousness in such a way 
that it grasps reality correctly, and such configuration of consciousness is attention. 
Attention engages the whole individual, senses, intellect and emotions, so that when 
attentive perception is achieved, the motivating and normative qualities of the 
objects also become apparent. Thus, attention is not mere contemplation divorced 
from action, but is itself an active pursuit, closely connected with the nature of what 
is perceived, in that it determines the possibilities and motivations for action. A 
morality based on attention, however, does not need to exclude moral concepts and 
practises that derive from other theories. Murdoch is proposing an alternative, but 
not an exhaustive picture. While attention is here presented as the central faculty in 
morality, it cannot do all the moral work. There is space, therefore, for acting out 
of duty, or for consequentialist considerations, alongside or in the absence of the 
moral perception that attention enables. 
Murdoch’s notion of attention draws heavily on that of Simone Weil, who, 
however, develops the concept in the context of a religious metaphys ics. 
Nonetheless, Weil’s specification of the idea of attention as one of self-withdrawal 
or emptying, and her delineation of a motivational internalist conception, where full 
attention leaves the individual with no choice, are helpful to understand Murdoch’s 
own thought in places where Murdoch herself does not elaborate further.  
Having introduced the concept of attention on the background of Murdoch’s 
moral psychology, and justified its importance through an account of her 
metaphysics, it is possible to move on in the next chapters to explore further what 
attention involves and how it operates. I shall begin, in Chapter 4, by addressing 
three central questions that arise if attention is considered as a moral concept: how 
attention can be both a loving and a truthful gaze; whether the proper object of 
attention is the Good or reality, or both; and to what extent attention can be willed , 
and thus something one can be responsible for.  
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Chapter 4 
Attention as a Moral Concept: Love, Objects, Will 
Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed Murdoch’s concept of attention. In what follows, I 
address three questions central to the importance of attention in morality: first, how 
attention can be at the same time, as Murdoch describes it, loving and accurate; 
second, whether Murdoch’s claim that attention is directed at the Good can be 
combined with the idea that attention is what discloses moral reality, and is 
therefore directed at the world rather than at the ideal; lastly, whether there is a 
tension between attention as a concept that can challenge the centrality of the will 
in morality and the exercise of the will in directing attention. 
The questions are introduced by explaining why the concept of attention 
that I am investigating is a specifically moral concept, and to what extent, as such, 
it departs from its use in ordinary language and in empirical psychology. The 
exposition also aims at defining the concept of attention by selecting specific 
aspects from Murdoch’s sometimes inconsistent usage. The clarification of the  
moral aspects of attention also links together the three questions introduced above, 
according to the requirements that will emerge for classifying attention as a moral 
concept: the requirement to include the desire to be and do good (love); to aim at 
and make available the truth about the object of attention (reality); and to be 
something one can be responsible for (which can be easily justified if attention is 
under the control of the will).  
Murdoch does not explicitly address the above questions, so the analysis in 
this chapter is a development and exploration of the ideas that can be found in her 
work, trying to solve difficulties and fill gaps in a way that is compatible with 
Murdoch’s account, but not explicitly suggested in it. The aim is to achieve a more 
coherent and thorough understanding of attention as a moral concept. 
1 Attention as a Moral Concept 
The moral concept of attention is derived from the concept as used in ordinary 
language and coincides with it in most respects. However, as the ordinary concept 
of attention tends to be morally neutral, there are also some important differences 
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which make the concept as presented here a specifically moral one. Similarly, the 
concept of attention in empirical psychology overlaps to a large extent both with 
the ordinary language concept and with the present understanding, so that 
psychological studies are useful to understand the moral nature of attention, but the 
psychological concept also departs from the moral one in some respects that need 
to be highlighted. 
In psychology, attention is generally defined as something which a) 
excludes to a certain extent other stimuli, and b) is generally under the control of 
the subject (although this is not uncontroversial): ‘attention has been used to refer 
to all those aspects of human cognition that the subject can control … and to all 
aspects of cognition having to do with limited resources or capacity, and methods 
of dealing with such constraints’ (Shiffrin 1988: 739, quoted in Styles 2006: 1). 
These two aspects are also part of the ordinary language concept. Under this 
definition, the meaning of attention is compatible with some cases of what I am 
exploring. Examples of virtuous attention that fit the above definition include : 
voluntarily focusing on a conversation with a friend who is asking for advice on an 
important matter, excluding other thoughts and stimuli to be able to attend to the 
other person (on the assumption that that is the most relevant element of the current 
situation); attending to a work of art, where the subject is consciously engaged with 
the artwork to the exclusion of all the rest (assuming she is not neglecting something 
important), so as to be able to gain an increasingly accurate and insightful 
appreciation of it. 
However, the moral concept also differs both from its ordinary language 
and its psychological counterparts in a number of ways. Although psychologis ts 
describe attention as something that is under the subject’s control, that can also 
include potential or very slight control. Therefore, in psychology, differently from 
ordinary language, attention is also considered as something that takes place even 
in extremely ‘distracted’ states of consciousness – including ‘reverie’ and 
daydreaming – where attention is not absent but short-lived and divided among 
various stimuli.112 By contrast, daydreams and reverie, on the present account, are 
precisely the opposite of attention. This aspect is not found in the ordinary language 
concept, where attention is contrasted with distraction. The moral concept of 
                                                 
112 See for ex. Ward (1918: Chapter 3) and Evans (1970: 91), who hold that attention is omnipresent 
because it is necessary for consciousness. 
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attention, too, does not refer to something that everyone naturally does, but it also 
differentiates itself from the ordinary language concept because, being a normative 
concept, it refers to something one ought to do (cf. EM 199); hence, it is something 
that one can – to an extent, as we shall see – either avoid or choose to practise, and 
therefore something one can be held responsible for. But it is also something that 
can be trained, so that the deliberate aspect of attention is either moved back to the 
building of habit, or significantly weakened (as we shall see below). 
The moral concept of attention is both broader and narrower than both its 
ordinary language and its scientific counterpart in relation to the two criteria 
specified at the start of this section, namely the exclusion of other stimuli and the 
ability to control it. It is broader because, while sometimes attention involves 
selectivity and resulting exclusivity, in other cases it is precisely the opposite. In 
psychology attention is the explanatory factor for the ‘selective directedness of our 
mental lives’ (see Mole 2012: 201), what makes us focus on one thing (or more 
than one, in ‘divided attention’) to the exclusion of others, along the lines of the 
famous ‘bottleneck model’ (Broadbent 1958).113 There, it is essential that attention 
has a specific object or a limited number of objects. Murdoch and Weil’s notion, 
on the other hand, includes the idea of waiting and the possibility for ‘open’ 
attention, which is held in suspension and not fixed on any particular object until 
the salience of the various objects has become manifest (as we saw in Ch.3§2.3).114 
For Weil, attention also includes attending to God, which includes emptying the 
mind of all thoughts (cf. Ch.3§3). The open and receptive state that Weil and 
Murdoch describe is, fittingly with their shared interest in Buddhist thought, rather 
akin to the meditative state (called by neuroscientists ‘open monitoring’), which 
involves ‘the non-reactive monitoring of experience’ and an attempt not to control 
or influence whatever may present itself to consciousness (Lutz et al. 2008: 163). 
Another reason to consider the normative concept of attention as broader than the 
scientific one is that the normative concept involves the whole individual (cf. 
                                                 
113 D.E. Broadbent (1958) suggested that attention depends on ‘capacity limitations’ which form a 
‘bottleneck’ through which selection occurs. The model, however, is recently being challenged. On 
selectivity, cf. also Johnson and Proctor (2004). 
114 The idea of waiting is also present in the ordinary use of ‘attendre’ in French, where it means ‘to 
wait’, and only secondarily ‘to pay attention’, although the French noun ‘attention’ translates as 
‘attention’. 
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Ch.3§2.2), while psychologists and cognitive scientists normally study attention in 
relation to particular senses.  
The normative concept of attention is also narrower than the ordinary 
language and psychological one, for two reasons. One is that moral attention is 
limited to its truth-revealing capacity (the capacity to put the subject in the most 
receptive state to be able to grasp truth); the other is that moral attention is 
motivated by a desire for the Good or, more generally, because it includes the 
intention and attitude behind it. It is possible, for example, ordinarily to talk about 
a sadist paying close attention to the sufferings of someone else in order to augment 
them. Such use of the concept is not appropriate on the understanding of attention 
that, drawing on Murdoch, I present here. Two fundamental features of the present 
concept of attention are that, on the one hand, it is not directed by selfish concerns, 
manifest in this case in the self-gratifying desire of watching someone suffer, and 
on the other, it is driven by eros or desire for the Good, manifest in the desire to be 
just to its object. 
1.1 Clarifying Murdoch’s Usage  
Although the present clarification of the concept of attention is conducted in 
accordance with Murdoch’s ideas, her own use of the word ‘attention’ is not 
consistent. Blum (2012) has observed the inconsistencies in relation to Murdoch’s 
varying use of visual metaphors.115  Blum attempts to disentangle the different 
visual metaphors in order to differentiate between three notions: perception 
considered neutrally as to its moral quality and its truthfulness; successful, i.e. clear 
and just, perception; and the attempt to achieve such perception.  
As Blum notes, Murdoch sometimes refers to the first notion by using 
‘seeing’ and ‘vision’, taken as activities that present to us the world we have partly 
created for ourselves through the use (either good or bad) of the imagination. Blum 
calls this the ‘subjectively perceived’. This idea is also expressed in verb form by 
the use of ‘looking’, which Murdoch contrasts directly with attention: ‘I would like 
on the whole to use ‘attention’ as a good word and use some more general term like 
‘looking’ as the neutral word’ (SG 37). Elsewhere, however, Murdoch uses 
                                                 
115 Although Murdoch uses ‘attention’ in the context of visual metaphors, it needs to be remembered 
that attention is not only a visual phenomenon, but can apply to other senses as well, indeed to the 
whole person. Cf. Ch.3§2.1. 
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‘looking’ in the same ‘morally good’ sense as attention: ‘can we not give a more 
balanced and illuminating account (of freedom and choice)? … We can if we simply 
introduce into the picture the idea of attention, or looking’ (SG 36).116  
Yet more confusingly, ‘attention’ is also, conversely, used by Murdoch to 
refer to the same general activity which ‘looking’, ‘vision’ and ‘seeing’ various ly 
refer to, considered neutrally as to its moral character: ‘if we consider what the work 
of attention is like, how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round about 
us … ’ (SG 37). In those passages, Murdoch’s is arguing that our epistemic attitudes 
determine the world we live in: what we see – what concepts we use to describe 
something – depends on how we approach it, what matters to us, what interests we 
have, what we want, etc. Since attention is normally presented by Murdoch as the 
epistemic attitude that yields a truthful apprehension of reality, it becomes apparent 
that in the quote above Murdoch is slipping from her normal usage of the word, and 
using it in the ordinary sense. As we saw above, in contrast with the psychologica l 
concept of attention, while we are all the time building up structures of value, 
because all the time we are ‘looking’, engaging in some way with reality, it cannot 
be said, in the moral sense of attention, that ‘attention goes on all the time’, because 
it is not the case that we are always perceiving justly and truthfully, nor attempting 
to do so (cf. Blum 2012: 312-3, fn.9).  
What is indeed constant is not truthful apprehension (attention), but the 
requirement to attend: ‘the task of attention goes on all the time and at apparently 
empty and everyday moments we are “looking”, making those little peering efforts 
of imagination that have such important cumulative results’ (SG 43). The task is 
omnipresent. Our fulfilment of it, however, is not. Therefore, as Murdoch writes, 
what goes on all the time is either attention or its lack: ‘at every moment we are 
“attending” or failing to attend’ (MGM 296).117  
The recommendation to constantly attempt to see justly takes us to the third 
kind of visual metaphor isolated by Blum, distinguishing between attention as 
successful perception of reality, and attention as the attempt to see clearly. Murdoch 
sometimes uses ‘attention’, as well as ‘looking’ and ‘vision’, to refer to both. Blum 
suggests that such inconsistent use can be harmonised by considering the 
                                                 
116 Cf. also MGM 24. 
117 Blum (2012) does not seem to notice the importance of the word ‘task’ in this passage, and quotes 
it instead as another example of Murdoch’s use of ‘attention’ in a neutral sense. 
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‘magnetic’ role of the Good in Murdoch’s philosophy: given that Murdoch believes 
that the Good exerts a ‘magnetic pull’ on every individual, Blum concludes that 
‘there is a sort of tendency … for outward focus to become attention – to 
successfully grasp another’s reality’ (Blum 2012: 311). Given Murdoch’s equally 
strong arguments about the tendency to fantasise, this solution fails to have 
conclusive appeal. Moreover, Blum is talking about the tendency of ‘outward 
focus’ to become attention, where ‘outward focus’ is ambiguous: if it means only 
focus on something external to the individual, it is still possible that the object of 
focus is seen through a self-gratifying lens; on the other hand, genuine outward 
focus, without self-interest, is already akin to attention, so it does not need to 
become attention. A more plausible solution is to tolerate the inconsistency, and 
explain it, more simply, by the fact that ‘attention’ is an ordinary word, and 
Murdoch’s oscillation between the two meanings indicates her use of the word 
sometimes in the ordinary sense, sometimes in the moral one inherited from Weil. 
That also helps to explain why sometimes she qualifies ‘attention’, to yield the 
specialised meaning I am discussing: ‘just attention’ (SG 38), ‘animal attentiveness  
… vigilance’ (MGM 246), ‘concentrated attention (loving care)’ (MGM 505), 
‘(virtuous) attention’ (MGM 39), ‘attentive waiting’ (MGM 323), etc.  
Moreover, the requirements for attention as a moral concept that Blum sets 
up are themselves debatable: its ‘success’ in bringing about clear vision, and its 
being deliberate. Blum sees the distinction between ‘attention’ and ‘looking’ as 
hinging on the success of the former in yielding clear perception, while, at the same 
time, he holds them both to be deliberate. I shall now focus on the success 
requirement, and discuss the role of the will in attention in a separate section below 
(§5). Murdoch, however, does not claim that if we attend then we will see clearly; 
at most, she claims that clear vision is the natural result of attention (MGM 52). 
But attention cannot guarantee success: it is the necessary condition for clear vision, 
but not sufficient. Attention consists in putting oneself in the best possible receptive 
state for grasping reality correctly. Whether clear vision ensues is also determined 
by other factors, for example the overall background of consciousness prior to the 
act of attention, including one’s epistemic habits, as well as mere chance and 
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unspecifiable factors – what Murdoch calls ‘grace’, understood as the mysterious 
answer to the call that is attention (MGM 23).118  
Another reason for not considering attention as an entirely successful 
activity comes from Murdoch’s metaphysics and her perfectionistic idea of the 
transcendence of reality: if knowing something is a constantly perfectible 
endeavour, as Murdoch claims, because the concepts through which we grasp the 
world can always be grasped more fully or ‘deeply’, and because some object (most 
objects, but chief among them are, for Murdoch, human beings and human 
situations) are so complex that it is unrealistic to imagine a complete understand ing 
of them, then the knowledge that attention enables can only be partial, and so can 
the success of attention. Murdoch takes attention as being a concrete requirement 
for every moral subject, and as such having degrees of success and constant 
perfectibility: ‘the attempt (usually only partially successful) to attend … purely, 
without self, brings with it an increasing awareness’ (SG 70).119 Thus Murdoch 
calls attention an ‘effort’ (SG 37) and puts forth the requirement to ‘try to see justly’ 
(SG 40, emphasis added). With these caveats, it is of course true that attention is 
distinguished from looking or focusing because it is both the necessary endeavour, 
and the likeliest of all, to bring about clear vision. Some degree of success, 
therefore, is embedded in the idea of attention, particularly in contrast with other 
cognitive states and activity. What is too demanding is to claim that attention can 
be completely successful. 
The relative success of attention does not regard only the knowledge it 
makes available, but also the improvement of the attentive subject’s consciousness. 
Attention is instrumental in making the individual virtuous, in which respect it is 
more likely to be successful, because every attempt at attention leaves a trace in 
consciousness and ‘trains’ it. As Weil writes, in relation to attention in school 
studies, ‘it does not even matter much whether we succeed in finding the solution 
or understanding the proof, although it is important to try really hard to do so. Never 
in any case whatever is a genuine effort of the attention wasted … Without our 
knowing or feeling it, this apparently barren effort has brought more light into the 
                                                 
118 Grace is an important element in the success of attention for Weil, who, however, can explain 
the concept more easily within her religious metaphysics. In Murdoch, grace looks, to a certain 
extent, similar to chance. 
119  Nussbaum (1990a) is concerned with the necessarily flawed nature of consciousness and 
attention itself, as presented by Henry James’s novel The Golden Bough.  
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soul’ (RRSS 67). Every act of attention is worthwhile, even if its object is but dimly 
perceived, because cultivating attention makes the subject better – more selfless, 
more concerned with others, and also more likely to continue attending and to see 
clearly on other occasions.  
As the consciousness- improving element of attention indicates, besides the 
relative success, the main difference between attention and ‘looking’ lies, I suggest, 
in the intention. The effort to attend is motivated and accompanied by a ‘real desire’ 
for Good in relation to the object, which includes wanting to be good to the object: 
hence the ‘just and loving gaze’. The desire for goodness includes, and indeed starts 
from, the desire to see the object truly, as it is. When one only looks, on the other 
hand, one may be moved by various other motives: one can, as Blum suggests, be 
seeking out the weaknesses of the other in order to use them to harm her (Blum 
1994: 311); or one may be moved by one’s desire to find approval in the other’s 
face; or by economic interest to seek out possible building sites in a natural 
landscape, etc. Attention seeks first of all to perceive justly and selflessly. 
2 Attention as a Loving Gaze 
Murdoch calls the general motivation behind attention ‘love’, and describes 
attention as a ‘loving gaze’. The inclusion of love in attention has given rise to some 
difficulties, so I shall consider it at some length. The idea of ‘loving gaze’ has been 
explored, among others, by Nancy Snow (2005) and Christine Swanton (2003). 
Both Snow and Swanton attempt to address the worry that a loving gaze may 
prevent the subject from seeing the negative aspects of the object of attention, or 
may cause the subject to perceive its positive features as more salient than the 
negative ones without justification. This worry arises partly because of the 
psychology and phenomenology of love, where the lover can overlook the flaws of 
the beloved, as is frequently observed in the early stages of romantic relationships 
or in parents’ assessment of their children (a much-studied phenomenon in 
empirical psychology under the name of ‘love is blind bias’).120 Yet if an attentive 
gaze is, as in Murdoch’s definition, also just and truthful, it must reveal the object 
as it truly is, including its flaws. So for instance, as many have noted, the notion of 
attention should make room for M (in the famous M and D example, in SG 17-8) 
                                                 
120 See Swami et al. (2009). 
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to perceive D as juvenile and vulgar, if that were how she really was.121 The fact 
that M’s revised view of D is more positive can mislead into thinking that a loving 
gaze will always yield a positive view, but that is never implied by Murdoch. In the 
example, in fact, we are told that ‘when M is just and loving she sees D as she really 
is’ (SG 37).122  
Like attention, love is partly used by Murdoch as a specialised concept, 
following Weil; this means that the concept of love does not entirely match its 
ordinary and psychological use. As with attention, in certain contexts, Murdoch 
uses ‘love’ normatively. This also explains why the requirement to love in Murdoch 
is not – like the requirement to attend – limited to other people, but rather can 
encompass in principle anything. Characterising the loving gaze in the context of 
attention involves being able to combine the clarity and realism that attention 
involves, which is not ordinarily attributed to love, with the positive contribution 
that love makes. In contrast to this, Sabina Lovibond sees a dichotomy between 
accurate perception and loving vision when considering M’s case: 
Either D really is faultless, in which case M’s new, wholly positive or ‘loving’, 
picture is the outcome of accurate perception in a sense that would be accepted by 
anyone who thinks particular moral properties can be accurately ascribed to 
individuals; or alternatively – and this I believe is closer to the spirit of Murdoch’s 
discussion – we are meant to credit M’s new picture with an ‘accuracy’ of a special, 
non-empirical kind, anticipating Murdoch’s later self-identification as a ‘Christian 
fellow-traveller’. (Lovibond 2011: 26) 
Much hinges here on the understanding of ‘accuracy’. As Murdoch writes, ‘What 
M is ex hypothesi attempting to do is not just to see D accurately but to see her 
justly or lovingly … “love” and “justice” … introduce … the idea of progress’ (SG 
23). While a loving gaze does not yield ‘accurate’ perception, if accurate means 
scientifically empirical and thus impersonal, it does yield a kind of perception that 
                                                 
121 Noted by Swanton (2003: 113), Snow (2005: 488), Altorf (2008: 70), and Lovibond (2011: 25-
6). 
122  This passage is referred to by Robjant (2011b: 1022) against Altorf’s statement, quoted by 
Lovibond, that ‘Murdoch does not explain whether D is really “vulgar” or “refreshingly simple”’ 
(Altorf 2008: 70, quoted in Lovibond 2011: 26). Lovibond herself only partly endorses Altorf’s 
statement, admitting that Murdoch gives reasons to believe that M’s redescription of D is the correct 
one (see Lovibond 2011: 26, fn. 154). It is true that Murdoch does not provide, at first and separately, 
a description of D from an impersonal ‘God’s eye’ perspective. But that is hardly surprising, given 
her observations, in the same pages, about the idiosyncratic character of perception, the partly 
private nature of concepts and how much learning the right descriptions for things depends on 
contexts (for ex SG 29, 32-33). On this view, a ‘God’s eye view’ description of D would hardly 
make sense, as if someone could provide the standard to which M’s thoughts should conform. Much 
of Murdoch’s message is precisely that this is not possible, and that striving for the right description 
is a partly individual task which is by its nature constantly perfectible (SG 23). 
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is true to the reality it observes, and does not clash with the idea ‘that particular 
moral properties can be accurately ascribed to individuals’ (Lovibond 2011: 26). 
The perception yielded by the loving gaze is also empirically correct, if we follow 
Murdoch in broadening the scope of empiricism to include ordinary imaginat ive 
perception; it is, in fact, truer, because in Murdoch’s theory impersonal scientific 
apprehension, especially when it comes to complicated human realities, it is overly 
narrow and partial. As I shall argue, a loving gaze, far from distorting its object, is 
precisely the means by which the most truthful and correct perception is achieved.  
To explain this claim, I shall start by clarifying the idea of love inherent in attention, 
as Murdoch conceives of it, under the influence of Simone Weil and Plato. 
2.1 Eros as Desiring Energy 
In both Murdoch and Weil, it often appears that the concepts of love and attention 
are very similar, to the point of identification. For Murdoch, love and attention share 
not only the central role in morality, but also the specific way in which they are 
central: the fact that, in their proper manifestations, they are directed toward reality 
and make it available to the subject (Weil: ‘love needs reality’, GG 65). They both, 
moreover, involve a desire for the Good, which is what makes for their truth-
seeking nature. Murdoch defines love in terms very similar to attention, as ‘the 
faculty which is supposed to relate us to what is real and thus bring us to what is 
good’ (SG 66). Both love and attention are also connected with a rejection of 
egoistic thoughts and thus of fantasy, corresponding to the effort to be just to what 
one is presented with, which means to really ‘see’ it: 
It is in the capacity to love, that is to see, that the liberation of the soul from fantasy 
consists … what counteracts the system is attention to reality inspired by, consisting 
of, love. (SG 66-7) 
This passage shows the ambivalence in Murdoch about the relation of love and 
attention: attention ‘consisting of’ love is not the same as attention ‘inspired by’ 
love. While the similarities between love and attention can point to an identifica t ion 
of the two, the introduction of attention in SG in terms of a ‘loving gaze’ suggests 
that love is an element of attention, rather than another name for it. In SG attention 
appears as a way of looking at things qualified by love. So attention appears as a 
way of approaching the world moved by, or drawing on, love, where love is also a 
normative concept. Love then provides something to attention without which it 
could not be the central moral concept that Murdoch wants.  
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To understand what that something is we need to look more closely at 
Murdoch’s concept of love. Her understanding of love has its roots in Plato’s eros. 
Murdoch believes that the intended aim of all human action is the Good. This idea 
is central to Murdoch’s theory of love, desire and motivation, and she inherits it 
from Plato, but also from Weil’s reading of Plato, who takes from the Republic and 
the Symposium the idea that ‘the good is what every soul seeks and why it acts’ 
(Republic 505e in SN 102), and Murdoch similarly stresses that ‘Good is not a god, 
but an Idea which inspires love. Good is what all men love and wish to possess for 
ever (Symposium 206a)’ (MGM 343).123 For both Weil and Murdoch, love is a form 
of desire and a constitutive element of attention: Murdoch’s loving gaze echoes 
Weil’s idea that attention can be directed only by desire (WG 71), where the nature 
of ‘desire’ is also idiosyncratic, as we shall see.  
On this understanding, far from its ordinary meaning, love is not primarily 
a positive sentiment for a particular person or object, although it can be that too, but 
something more akin to energy or motivation, which can be negative as well as 
positive. Such energy can also address itself to anything, people being an object 
among many: as in the story told by Diotima in the Symposium, the lover can pass 
through various objects of love, people, arts, intellectual disciplines, to reach the 
true object of love, the Form of the Good. Drawing from this idea, Murdoch sees 
eros as a ‘fundamental life-force’ that drives human beings in all their actions and 
provides motivation. She compares eros to Freud’s libido, the energy coming from 
the sexual drive, which informs other, non-sexual activities. 
If love is understood as eros or energy, a first answer can be offered to the 
question of the contribution of love to attention: love is a motivating factor behind 
attention, it is ‘tension, exertion, zeal’ (MGM 343, with reference to Symposium 
206B). It is the (erotic) desire that, as Bowden observes (1998: 65), inspires ethical 
attention. 
2.2 Love as a Normative Concept 
Because eros is the ambiguous ‘demon’ or force that motivates human beings, it is 
very different from the Good it aims at, as Murdoch stresses: ‘Good is the magnetic 
centre towards which love naturally moves’ (SG 102, emphasis added). While ‘the 
                                                 
123 Cf. also: ‘For human beings, there is no other object of love if not the good’ (Symposium 205d, 
206a in Weil 1957: 130). 
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goal, the end, the absolute, is transcendent, impersonal, pure’, ‘the energy is 
something more mixed and personal, godlike yet not divine, capable of corruption’ 
(MGM 343). Because what everyone desires is what one apprehends as Good, and 
because one can be much mistaken about what things are good, love as desire for 
the Good can be both a positive and a negative kind of desire.124 In Murdoch’s 
words, although ‘what is desired is desired as, genuinely, good’, it is also the case 
that ‘many desires reach only distorted shadows of goodness’ (MGM 343). Love 
does not necessarily lead to moral improvement. Therefore, the concept of love 
needs to be further qualified, if it is to be an element of attention. Murdoch indicates 
the kind of qualification required, in the concluding pages of SG, where she 
highlights the centrality of love in morality: 
Love is the general name of the quality of attachment and capable of infinite 
degradation and it is the source of our greatest errors; but when it is even partially 
refined it is the energy and passion of the soul in its search for the Good, the force 
that joins us to Good and joins us to the world through Good. Its existence is the 
unmistakable sign that we are spiritual creatures, attracted by excellence and made 
for the Good. It is a reflection of the warmth and light of the sun. (SG 103)  
What is part of attention, then, is a ‘purified’ sort of love, like the love that reaches 
the higher stages of the ascent in the Symposium, which involves the purification of 
the desire that constitutes it.125 The idea of love that is required for attention is thus 
not descriptive but normative.126 What is still unclear is how love becomes pure, 
and how pure love achieves the suggested aim of ‘joining us to the world through 
the Good’ – in other word, how love can help with achieving correct perception, 
which is the question asked at the start of this section.  
Murdoch suggests what appear as two distinct ways to purify love: i) one 
way is to love, even imperfectly, truly good things, because ‘when true good is 
loved … the quality of the love is automatically refined’ (SG 102); ii) the other way 
is to try, as she puts it, ‘perfectly’ to love, even when the object itself is not truly 
good: ‘and when we try perfectly to love what is imperfect our love goes to its 
                                                 
124  Murdoch is aware of the manifold manifestations of love, and its destructive potential, 
particularly evident in love for people: ‘human love, the love of persons for other persons, is sui 
generis, and among our natural faculties and impulses the one which is potentially nearest to the 
highest divine attributes … though in practice often remote from them’ (MGM 346). See also MGM 
17. 
125 It may be more accurate to talk of ‘purer love’, since in Murdoch’s perfectionistic framework 
perfectly purified love, like perfect attention and perfect knowledge of any object, is not achievable. 
The goal is ever receding. So by ‘pure love’, I mean the ideal to which love should tend, as well as 
the improved love that is achieved after purification of desire. 
126 ‘Here we use the world love as a normative term’ (MGM 345). 
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object via the Good to be thus purified and made unselfish and just’ (SG 103). Let 
us look at each way in turn. 
2.2.1 Love of Good Things 
The first way of purifying love is more familiar, and found in the Symposium, where 
Diotima defines love as ‘desire for the everlasting possession of the Good’ (206b). 
The lover is improved by loving objects which manifest goodness in various 
degrees; the better the object, the more the lover will be improved by loving them. 
This is in accordance with Murdoch’s idea that what we desire and thus what 
occupies our minds becomes part of the fabric of our consciousness: spending time 
concocting revenge plans or browsing celebrity magazines will build up a different 
quality of consciousness from occupying oneself with T.S. Eliot’s verse, or taking 
a stroll to contemplate nature in the countryside. 
Plato depicts improvement as an ascent toward the form of the Good via 
various things that embody goodness in increasing degree. Carnal love is the lowest, 
followed by love of other souls, then love of poetry, political institutions, science, 
and philosophy. Simone Weil explains this progression with her theory of desire, 
which chimes with Murdoch’s observations, the latter being however less fully 
spelled out. For Weil, desire is a paradoxical force, unlimited in principle but 
limited in its application (NB 100): desire, as we saw, is always desire for the 
absolute (for Weil God, for Murdoch and Plato the Good), but as finite beings in a 
finite world, we attach our desires to finite things. These cannot, however, satisfy 
the unlimited nature of desire, which as a result turns into a possessive and negative 
force. The Good is both the only proper object of desire and the only proper object 
of possession, where possessing Good means being good. With objects in the world, 
the desire to possess is both illusory and destructive, because it goes against their 
reality: objects of desire are ultimately independent of our will.127 This issues in 
dissatisfaction which, for Weil, coincides with the degrading possessiveness of 
worldly desire, and at the same time leads us to seek new objects. 
Since desire is natural to human beings, what is required is not an uprooting 
of desire, but a purification of its possessive illusory element. Because the Good 
itself is not an object of perception, and because apprehension of the Good is 
achieved through a progressively refined perception of goodness in worldly objects, 
                                                 
127 This is one of many instances in which Weil’s thought displays its Stoic influence. 
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the purification of desire must take place through attachment to objects which 
defeat possession and inspire pure love. Beautiful objects appear as the best 
candidates, because they inspire detached contemplation and the desire for them to 
be what they are. Good objects and good people are also manifestations of the 
Good, but they are less likely to defeat possessiveness. By defeating possessiveness, 
beauty encourages the pure love which constitutes attention. As Murdoch writes:  
The beautiful in nature (and we would wish to add in art) demands and rewards 
attention to something grasped as entirely external and indifferent to the greedy ego. 
We cannot acquire and assimilate the beautiful. (FS 417)128 
Similarly Weil, in a beautiful and clarifying passage: 
Beauty attracts the attention and yet does nothing to sustain it. Beauty always 
promises, but never gives anything. There is nothing to be desired, because the one 
thing we want is that it should not change … if one does not seek means to evade 
the exquisite anguish it inflicts, then desire is gradually transformed into love and 
one begins to acquire the faculty of pure and disinterested attention. (HP 28-9) 
So one way to purify desire, and be inspired by the love that motivates attention, is 
to direct one’s desires to good objects, beautiful ones in particular.  
2.2.2 Love of the Good 
However, while beautiful objects attract attention and defeat possession more than 
others, they do not guarantee that pure love and attention will be achieved. Weil 
indicates that the lover needs to be active, by sustaining the pain of the impossib le 
possession: if such truth is acknowledged, not only intellectually but in every way, 
then the possessive desire, deprived of possession, will be held in suspension, and 
become desire proper, which for Weil is ‘desire without an object … desire without 
wish.’ (N 421) Such open, suspended desire can only have as its object something 
equally infinite. That is, as Murdoch and Weil write, God / the Good, in which alone 
apprehension and desire coincide with possession.129  
Beautiful and good objects help in getting closer to the Good by defeating 
desire and thus revealing the Good as the true object of love and desire. They also, 
as Murdoch argues with the ‘degree of perfection’ argument, act as intimations of 
perfection, thus improving one’s grasp of the Good. Love of good objects, 
therefore, is not the end point of love, but a way to purify love’s desire and improve 
                                                 
128 Here the influence of Kant on Murdoch’s idea of beauty is evident. 
129 Weil: ‘It is with respect to false goods that desire and possession are different; with respect to the 
true good, there is no difference’ (1970: 157) and Murdoch, referring to Moore abou t the Good with  
approval: ‘to be able to see it as in some sense to have it’ (SG 3). 
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apprehension of the Good. Love of the Good, too, is not the end point of the moral 
pilgrim’s quest, because the Good by itself cannot be an object of perception. What 
loving the Good in a purified way means, therefore, is to love any object in the 
world in a way that is inspired by the Good, i.e. ‘to love via the Good’ – Murdoch’s 
second way, which now appears as issuing directly from the first.  
Loving purely or via the Good consists in loving unselfishly, 
unpossessively, and justly, but also in being willing and prepared to discover value 
in the object, because the object is seen in the light of the Good. In the same way 
as the pilgrim in Plato’s myth returns to the cave and sees more clearly the objects 
that she once saw dimly, so ‘our love goes to its object via the Good to be thus 
purified and made unselfish and just’ (SG 103). In other words, to love the Good, 
and the world via the Good, signifies being in a state of mind inspired by one’s best 
grasp of the ideal, or having an attitude disposed in such a way, resisting possessive 
and de-realising temptations. 
It is important that love thus understood can fasten itself to any object, not 
only good or beautiful ones. Being inspired by the Good sets no limit on the worldly 
object of love, because the love itself, moved by the purified desire of the lover, is 
good love – it is, therefore, the love that is required for attention. Such love can 
attend to its object, purified of the claims of the ego that result in distortion and 
possession.130 When it comes to other people, this involves respect for their separate 
reality and autonomy, fundamental in both Weil and Murdoch.131 Love should be 
able to take anything as its object, moreover, because the possibility to try ‘perfectly 
to love what is imperfect’ (SG 103) is central to attention. As the ability to see the 
world justly, attention needs to be able to take anything as its object, because it is a 
faculty that must be exercised in any situation. To see a situation justly often 
involves seeing what is deeply imperfect in it. 
The requirement to see justly whatever is salient, together with the 
importance of seeing the object in its wholeness, without picking out its positive 
                                                 
130 This is one way in which Murdoch can explain what is known as the ‘confirmation bias’, the 
tendency to see the beloved differently (better) from what they really are in order to maintain one’s 
positive self-image, for instance as someone who can choose a partner well (cf. Tavris and Aronson 
2007: Chapter 6). 
131 Murdoch explicitly nods in Kant’s direction here, although for Kant love and respect are very 
different. Velleman (1999), however, has tried to reconcile Kant’s idea of respect with Murdoch’s 
notion of love as part of attention, but at the cost of making Murdochian love into an impersonal 
kind of emotion. 
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features, means that love, as part of attention, cannot be construed as being 
motivated only by an ‘appraisal’ of value in the object.132 The purified loving gaze 
is neither partial (imperfect objects are not loved in part, insofar as they possess 
some good, but in their entirety) nor instrumental (the object of love is not loved 
because it can benefit the lover). Rather, the love in attention is entirely 
gratuitous.133  
2.3 Love as Clear Vision 
We are now in a better position to answer the question: what does love contribute 
to attention? The discussion of purified love in Weil and Murdoch has highlighted 
two central features: its selfless and unpossessive quality, combined with a desire 
to be just to its object and to see the good in it. Rather than an appraisal, this kind 
of love is ‘creative’, because seeing things as they are requires, by Murdoch’s lights, 
the exercise of the imagination as well as the active removal of obstacles to 
vision.134  
The discussion of love has also provided an answer to the initial question: 
how can a loving gaze be also accurate? First, the loving gaze of attention is free 
from the possessive attachment and involvement of the ego, which is the primary 
element of distortion in unpurified love. Second, the ability of the loving gaze to 
reveal goodness in the object does not consist in a projection: what is revealed must 
be there in the object, waiting to be discovered. That is also why this concept of 
love is also not ‘bestowal’ of value on the object.135 Thus Snow (2001) is correct in 
claiming that a loving gaze does not require us to downplay the bad features of the 
object, requiring instead an ‘openness to personality conceived of as a complex 
intermixture of flexible, dynamic traits and tendencies’ (Snow 2001: 495). But the 
loving gaze also requires the imagination to play an active role in allowing for a 
charitable vision of the object of attention:136 when attending to other people, a 
                                                 
132 The appraisal view of love is defended, among others, by Velleman (1999) and Kolodny (2003). 
133  Because of this, as Milligan has remarked (2014: 2), Murdoch’s idea of love lacks the 
intentionality that is typical of most accounts of love in analytic philosophy. 
134 ‘At its highest point, love is the determination to create the being which it has taken for its object’ 
(Paul Valéry, quoted in MGM 506). Cf. Ch.3§2.5 on this point. 
135 According to the bestowal view, love is an attitude which confers value to the beloved even when 
value is not there. As Singer (1991: 273) writes, ‘love … confers importance no matter what the 
object is worth’. 
136 Although Murdoch is mostly inspired by love as eros rather than agape, her concept of love also 
contains elements of the latter: in particular, if agape or charity is understood in the  terms set by 
Aquinas, as ‘the virtue whereby we love God for his own sake … an appetitive state whereby our 
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loving gaze can imagine what it is like for the other, suggest possible interpretat ions 
of their behaviour which can make it understandable or justifiable, look for possible 
reasons for certain actions (a difficult childhood, say), and it is maximally receptive 
to what is good in the other, looking for value that may otherwise be missed. None 
of these activities are projections or falsifications: the positive interpretations of the 
other need to be possible, based on the evidence available.137 As Troy Jollimore 
writes, ‘the lover is especially determined to find value in the beloved and to 
appreciate the values that are there’ (Jollimore 2011: 68). The loving attitude is 
receptive to value, but love does not consist merely in an appraisal of value, because 
love needs to be in place already for the value in the object to be fully appreciated.138  
It is true that the kind of epistemic attitude just described is more likely to 
be found among people bound by a tie of love in the ordinary sense, but only in 
cases when the love is at least partially ‘pure’, i.e. just and selfless. Keller (2004) 
considers this special loving receptivity towards people we love an epistemic fault. 
But, as Jollimore (2011) argues, the main reason for taking such a view is the 
assumption that the default state in which we make judgments about what we are 
indifferent to is epistemically ideal. Whereas, in the appreciation of complex 
objects such as human beings and human situations, the loving gaze may not only 
not be distorting, but it can be epistemically optimal, because by being maximally 
open and receptive it reveals features that may otherwise remain hidden. Should we 
not then, Jollimore asks, rather apply the loving way of looking – ideally – to 
everyone and everything? That seems just what Murdoch is suggesting with the 
idea of attention as a loving gaze. Therefore, the love which constitutes attention, 
providing motivation in the form of love of the Good, is not only compatible with 
                                                 
appetites are uniformly ordered to God’ (STIIaIIae 23.3), a love of God which at the same time is 
love of our neighbour (‘we cannot love God unless  we also love our neighbour’, STIIaIIae 25.1 and 
44.7), we can clearly see the similarities with Murdoch’s idea of love directed to the Good and at 
the same time to the world. 
137 In the case of M and D, as noted at the start, it is possible to imagine a different story where D is 
really vulgar, noisy, etc. Far from requiring to ignore these features, a loving gaze needs to be 
sensitive to them too: noticing them would make it poss ible, for example, for M to gently make D 
aware of behaviours that she may be able alter and which may alienate other people to her. 
Furthermore, as Sabina Lovibond points out (2011: 26) it would generally be morally irresponsible 
to ignore vices or evil, so a gaze moved by desire for the good cannot be meant to do that. 
138 As noted above, it is possible to recognise value and especially salience in some instances without 
having a loving gaze. The reason is that it is unlikely that someone’s perception is co mpletely  
clouded by self-concern; likewise, a loving gaze comes in degrees, and while there is an ideal to be 
aimed at, in practise there are degrees of love and correspondent degrees of just vision.  
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accurate vision of its object, but it contributes positively to a better appreciation of 
it. 
3 The Objects of Attention 
3.1 Good or World? 
Attention has been described as the moral faculty that enables just, truthful and 
loving perception of reality. This description implies that the proper object of 
attention is the world (cf. SG 67, MGM 218, 339). Why, then, does Murdoch also 
claim that attention needs to be directed to the Good itself? (SG 55) Although 
Murdoch talks of attention to the Good, she also raises the question: ‘can good itself 
be an object of attention?’ (SG 68), and answers: ‘while it seems proper to represent 
the Good as a centre or focus of attention, yet it cannot quite be thought of as a 
“visible” one in that it cannot be experienced or represented or defined’ (SG 70). 
This problem can be addressed by considering the discussion of love and its objects.  
While Good is not an object of perception, it is intimated or suggested as a 
standard of perfection by all good things. That is how, as we have seen, love as 
desire for the Good can approximate itself to its true object by ascending through 
various goods in the world. Having purified itself and achieved a better grasp of the 
Good, love can be the sort of force that animates attention. Then, purified love can 
inform attention to any object in the world. Against this background, we can 
understand how attention works in relation to the Good: the attentive person needs 
to refine her understanding of the Good, moved by love or eros and by 
contemplating various good objects, but the purpose of attention is to reveal reality 
as it is. Its object needs to be the world. However, having love as a constitut ive 
element, attention is constantly moved in its apprehension of the world by desire 
for the Good: attention is directed at reality, but reality is observed through 
compassion, justice, and the idea of perfection or the Good.  
My suggestion, then, is that we explain the ambiguity between the Good 
and the world as objects of attention by modifying Murdoch’s formulation about 
the requirement to attend to the Good thus: the proper object of attention is reality; 
but attention to reality is informed by desire for the Good, given by love. Attention 
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can be understood as a gaze directed to reality, but through, or via, the Good.139 
This solution chimes with several of Murdoch’s remarks, where she states that ‘the 
direction of attention is … towards the great surprising variety of the world, and the 
ability so to direct attention is love’ (SG 66), or her definition of (moral) freedom 
as ‘that which in us attends to the real and is attracted by the good’ (SG 75). In its 
engagement with reality, which is complex and contingent, together with its desire 
for the Good, single and perfect, attention is the link between the two aspects of the 
moral life, and indeed of human life in general, mentioned at the start of the 
discussion of Murdoch’s metaphysics (Ch.1§1): unity and 
particularity/multiplicity, order and chaos, etc. Attention shapes the good 
consciousness by combining the intuition of unity and desire for perfection with a 
grasp of the complexity of the world. Like Plato’s Demiurge in the Timaeus, the 
attentive person must keep her eyes on reality and at the same time on the Good 
(MGM 107), but in two different ways. Attention sees particulars on the 
background provided by the intuition of the Good, where loving the Good and 
attending to an individual are part of the same activity.140  
3.2 Objects within the World 
Even if attention has the world as its object, the scope of attention remains very 
broad. Given the inherent limitations in our ability to attend, in most cases it is 
necessary to select some objects at the expense of others. Therefore, the question 
that remains to be asked is whether there are objects within the world that merit 
attention, and if so, whether there are criteria to identify them. The question can be 
divided between whether some objects are legitimate objects of attention and others 
                                                 
139 As Chappell (2014) notes, to conclude that ‘we only get a clear grip on what talk about “the Good” 
might mean when we are considering how “the Good” might be applied to contemplating spe cific 
cases’ may require us to give up ‘the last vestige of what seems to be Plato’s idea, in the Republic, 
that the contemplation of the Good itself, all on its own, is somehow the acme and the goal of 
contemplation’ (2014, p. 319). However, as Chappell s uggests, this conclusion can, in fact, 
compatible with Plato’s own ideas: ‘when we remember the famous line about the philosopher’s 
redescent from Republic 520c2 – καταβατέον οὖν – perhaps we will conclude that this conjunction 
of necessary separation and necessary involvement is what Plato himself really had in mind anyway’ 
(Chappell 2014, p. 319) What seems clear is that, in Murdoch’s reading, Plato does not wish to 
disconnect the Good from the world. 
140 In a beautiful piece, Janet Soskice (1992) has argued for ordinary life as proper object of attention 
in the context of spiritual life: against Augustine’s model, whereby the world is to be ‘used, not 
enjoyed’ (1992: 64) as a passing place on the path to a more fulfilling one, Soskice argues that our 
everyday experience as physical beings in a transient world – her example is maternity – can provide 
objects of attention that lead us out of ourselves and give us as true a sense of spirituality as the 
monastic, contemplative life. 
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are not, and whether among legitimate objects of attention some take precedence  
over others. 
If the task of attention is to reveal reality, including moral reality, then, as 
we have seen, it would be contradictory to claim that we should as a rule ignore 
certain objects, or not attend to them. Whatever is part of reality has in principle a 
claim to attention. So the real question to be answered is the latter: are there objects 
that deserve attention more than others? Or: can we have criteria to determine the 
salience of particular objects for attention?141 
One possible answer is ‘no’, because attention is valuable in its own right, 
so being attentive, no matter what the object, is itself a good. Chappell (2014) 
remarks that contemplation (by which he means, I take it, something very similar 
to attention) can be, as long as it is true contemplation, directed at ‘absolutely 
anything’. For it to be true contemplation, or attention, it needs to be recognition of 
something beyond oneself (Murdoch’s ‘authority of reality’), animated by justice 
and compassion, which results in unselfing and self-discipline. Is it possible that 
any object can serve this purpose, even ‘hard-core pornography, or Nazi 
memorabilia, or excrement, or celebrity magazines?’ (Chappell 2014: 305). 
Chappell responds affirmatively. Although it is in principle possible to properly 
attend, with a just and loving gaze, to such things, it is in practise rather unlikely; it 
is unusual, say, for someone to engage with hard core pornography or celebrity 
magazines with the intention of achieving a clear eyed comprehension of another 
reality. One reason is that, as opposed to art and nature, Murdoch’s favourite 
examples, these objects tend to encourage self-gratifying purposes, and tend to be 
approached with such aims in mind. 
Even allowing for the possibility that any object is a legitimate object of 
attention, and even if, therefore, attending to any object is a valuable activity, the 
value of attention is not exhausted by being an exercise of selfless contemplat ion. 
As Murdoch writes, there is tending to one’s soul and there is helping one’s 
neighbour, and ‘one must no doubt do both, and is likely to be tending soul if 
helping neighbour and vice versa’ (MGM 360): attention has value, not only 
because it improves our consciousness, but also because it allows us to see the world 
clearly, and that includes the various modulations of salience. Therefore, even if 
                                                 
141 In the next chapter I address the question of how not only salience, but also specific moral 
properties, are made available to the subject. 
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attention is always good, it also requires attending to some things rather than others, 
because some things merit attention more than others. Chappell continues:  
‘Joining the world as it really is’ necessarily involves recognizing that, even if 
everything is interesting, still it is part of the way the world ‘really is’ that some 
things are more important, and so more worthy of contemplation, than others. Under 
this heading Murdoch notes three things, or kinds of thing, in particular. The first is 
other people; the second is beauty; the third is what she calls ‘the Good’. (Chappell 
2004: 309) 
Should the recommendation to attend to other people, beauty and the Good be 
followed? As for the Good, I have suggested that, in itself, the Good is more 
helpfully considered as an animating or inspiring principle, rather than a direct 
object of attention. What about the embodied Good, or good things? Murdoch 
writes: 
There are good modes of attention and good objects of attention. ‘Whatsoever things 
are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things 
are lovely, whatsoever things be of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any 
praise, think on these things’ (St. Paul, Philippians, 4.8.) … These ‘things’ which are 
just and good assist our attention when we try to make just and compassionate 
judgments of others or to judge and correct ourselves. (MGM 301) 
Good things are indeed good objects of attention, and can be more appropriate than 
others, because they help one’s moral development, in two ways: on the one hand, 
they provide inspiration by pointing to a standard for our own moral improvement; 
on the other (like beauty), they themselves encourage (‘assist’) or create attention, 
by defeating possessiveness, as we saw in relation to love. However, good things 
can be recommended as an object of attention above other objects only when all 
other things are equal, i.e. when other objects don’t have a greater claim on our 
attention. Nor can attention be limited to good things: even if we consider good 
things as worthy of attention because of their inherent value, as we saw above, 
attention needs to encompass more than goodness, because clear perception of 
reality includes things that are not good. Difficulties and suffering and all sorts of 
things that have little goodness in them are in many cases what merit attention most 
urgently. 142  It is true that one needs to have learnt, and continue to learn, to 
distinguish what is good from what is not and in what degree, through a constant 
and renewed sense of what the Good involves. But what the Good does is to help 
to apprehend clearly a multifarious reality. The same considerations apply to the 
                                                 
142  Cf. MGM 73. In Weil attention to what is not good, in particular attention to suffering, is 
extremely important: cf. ‘The Love of God and Affliction’ in WG. 
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other candidate, beauty, which, although it trains consciousness, is even less 
important than good things: 
Art, though it demands moral effort and teaches quiet attention (as any serious study 
can do) is a kind of treat … we have to make moral choices, we do not have to enjoy 
great art and doubtless many good people never do. But surely great art points in the 
direction of the good. (FS 453-4) 
To preserve the realism of attention, we must conclude that what merits or requires 
attention is not what is itself valuable, but what is most salient. Beauty and goodness 
may not be always the most salient element of a situation. Let us explore other 
possibilities, including other people, the last candidate that Chappell (2014) 
suggests, with an ordinary situation as example:  
I am walking down the avenue from university to home, wearing cheap 
leather trainers. It is a beautiful autumn day and the leaves on the trees are various 
shades of red and brown. I am absorbed by a philosophical problem which has been 
exercising me for the past few weeks. At the same time, a close old relative, many 
miles away, is unwell. In this situation, my attention is focused on the philosophica l 
problem to the exclusion, to a great extent, of almost everything else. Let us also 
assume that I am attending to the problem with a desire to see its aspects justly and 
trying to exclude self-directed influences, like my eagerness to find a solution 
quickly or my fear of not being able to. Is this a case of ‘morally good attention’, 
or does my selection of the object of attention present a problem? Should I be 
attending, for example, to the colourful trees around me, because they are present, 
thus attempting to ‘be in the moment’? Or should I think about my relative, because 
I care about her, and because thinking about her may prompt me to telephone her, 
which would make her happy? Or should I worry, if I have not yet done so, about 
the shoes I am wearing, because they are the result of suffering and exploitat ion, 
something that by buying them I participate in perpetrating?  
One possibility that Murdoch suggests is that attention should be devoted to 
what is there, being a form of ‘presence’. 
Should we not endeavour to see and attend to what surrounds and concerns us, 
because it is there and is interesting, beautiful, strange, worth experiencing, and 
because it demands (and needs) our attention, rather than living in a vague haze of 
private anxiety and fantasy? (MGM 218) 
A Chapter in MGM opens with a lyrical passage by Pater, exalting the joy and value 
of being fully present and of living in a sort of ‘perpetual ecstasy’, which, although 
problematic because potentially narcissistic, suggests something that Murdoch 
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believes philosophy has unduly neglected: the importance of ‘presence and 
encounter’ (MGM 112): ‘living in the present: I really see the face of my friend, the 
playing dog, Piero's picture’ (MGM 301).  
But, as Murdoch recognises, we are creatures who live in time, and the 
things we do are shaped by the past and will have consequences in the future, to 
which we also need to attend. Attention to what is present is challenged by the 
importance and in some cases necessity to attend to what is temporally and spatially 
not present: the relative many miles away who can be cheered up by a phone call, 
or the animals and labourers who are harmed by my purchasing habits. Moreover, 
the distinction between presence and absence is problematised by the difficulty of 
assigning to one or the other category objects like philosophical problems, or any 
more abstract concern which has no physical and temporal location. 
While what is present cannot, for these reasons, have exclusive claim on 
attention, it seems reasonable to suggest that presence provides at least a prima facie 
reason to attend to something rather than something else. ‘Presence and encounter’ 
are where thoughts about other things in time first develop. The present is what 
forms the memories or ideas that we go back to in thought, and without being 
present none of them would be created. What is present, moreover, is also what is 
normally best able to draw us out of ourselves, to make immediate and pressing 
demands on us, in a way that thought alone, being what relates us to other times, 
does not. So the autumnal trees on my way have a special claim on my attention. 
However, yet again, not an exclusive one, nor one that cannot be overridden by 
other claims. 
Then, there is ‘other people’, the first candidate for being an especially apt 
object of contemplation as mentioned by Chappell (2014) in the quote above. It is 
a fact that Murdoch often returns to the importance of other people, and places the 
moral importance of people above art (FS 417), yet she does not claim that other 
people are always the most salient object of attention. Nor does Murdoch offer 
reasons for placing other people at the centre of attention, apart from the unargued -
for but apparently obvious idea that other people just do matter, and often matter 
more than anything else. However, this intuition cannot be discarded, and it may be 
that the best object of attention in the example is the ill relation, just because, for 
most of us, other people do matter above anything else. Nevertheless, these 
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considerations do not make other people the only object of attention, so it is still 
possible that other objects may be, in different contexts, more salient. 
One last suggestion for identifying what merits attention is to consider what 
constitutes ‘what demands (and needs) our attention’ (MGM 218). Something that 
‘needs’ attention may be something that we can influence, help, or change. So ‘what 
surrounds and concerns us’ (MGM 218) can refer to something that one can be 
considered responsible for, or less demandingly something that one is in a position 
to affect: the animals in the choice of shoes in the example, the students in the 
seminar room, the friend who may need our company– all the individuals and 
realities that depend on us and our choices in some way.  
That seems like a reasonable suggestion, but it is again not clear that it can 
exhaust the scope of salient objects of attention: are we always required to attend 
only to what we can be responsible for, to what we can help or hinder? A view of 
morality which requires one only to attend to what one is causally linked to appears 
not only overly demanding, but also to exclude much of what is experienced as 
making life valuable and worthwhile: the contemplation of nature and the red leaves 
on the pavement, but also of art, and of the little pointless but interesting details of 
one’s surroundings and indeed, abstract or philosophical problems. These things 
can also be something we are responsible for, and attending to them may bring us 
to act in certain ways, but attending to them seems worthwhile even when that is 
not the case. 
In conclusion, it seems that, although presence and responsibility and 
goodness and humanity are all prima facie elements of what has a claim on our 
attention, there are no reasons to exclude one in favour of the other, nor to priorit ise 
one of those elements over others in advance of the situation in which a choice 
needs to be made. The above elements may be the more salient ones in a situation 
ceteris paribus, but that cannot be determined in advance. Compatibly with 
Murdoch’s insistence that morality is to be understood in individual contexts, the 
relative salience of objects of attention cannot be spelled out beforehand by 
providing universal criteria. This also helps to explain why Murdoch herself does 
not provide any. The concept of attention as moral perception includes the 
particularity that only reveals itself in the moment of perception. Moreover, the 
situation I sketched is too vague to provide an indication, leaving open, for instance, 
what the problem I am thinking of is, its role in my life, when I heard of my 
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relative’s illness and whether I had called her before, etc. A skilled novelist might 
have provided a description where relative salience is manifest, but in that case, the 
criteria would have become unnecessary, because the salience would have been 
there to see, and specific to that situation.  
If different claims and considerations operate at different times, then the 
ability to discern their relative role and salience is what is required. Attention can 
fulfil this role, being a composite of various faculties and attitudes which make 
possible clear and just perception, and that includes perception of salience. Instead 
of criteria for determining the proper objects of attention, therefore, attention itself 
can reveal salience, in the particular context and not beforehand. This is possible if 
we consider that attention is not only the standard ‘focused’ attention that can be 
directed at individual objects, as discussed in this section, but it also operates at the 
level of ‘open’, waiting and receptive perception (as we saw in Ch.3§2.3). Attention, 
in its open aspect, is able to be held in suspension and scan a situation without fixing 
on anything in particular, and then perceive the salient components on which 
focused attention should fasten itself.143 
Moral attention involves both open receptivity as well as focus on a 
particular object. In its open aspect, it is the selfless, open and receptive gaze that 
discloses the relative salience of particular objects, and is able to ‘see’ which objects 
demand focused attention, and which are less relevant. In this sense, attention 
presents itself as an attitude, a way of looking at the world independent of the object 
– the closest approximation to the ‘objectless’ and unattainable attention to the 
Good. Open attention may signal, on my walk home, that at that a particular 
moment it is appropriate for me to try to solve my philosophical problem, and 
perhaps ignore the beauty of nature, and not think of other people – but whether 
this particular allocation of attention is correct cannot be claimed in abstraction 
from the particular situation. 
4 Attention and the Will  
The discussion about the proper objects of attention leaves it unspecified in what 
way ‘focused’ attention is directed to specific object, after ‘open’ attention has 
                                                 
143 Incorporating this aspect of attention may address Nussbaum’s (1990a) thought that attention is 
inherently flawed, because it is limited to some objects, to the exclusion of others. The claim is valid  
as far as focused attention is concerned, but not about attention in general. 
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revealed the relative salience. For instance, attention allocation can be an automatic 
process, or an active choice directed by the will. In this section I consider the role 
of the will in attention. Doing so will not only provide a better understanding of 
what is required of the attentive subject, but it will also help to clarify how the 
subject can be held responsible for attending. As we saw in §1 above, one of the 
features of attention as a moral concept is that one can be praised and blamed for it. 
Thus we come to what is the second requirement for attention set out by Blum 
(2012), its being deliberate (§1.1). The question I shall explore is to what extent 
attention is the effect of a willed exertion, and if it is not, whether it can still be 
something for which the subject is responsible: if the moral life depends to a large 
extent on whether we attend and what we attend to, or if attention is both a sign and 
a result of virtue, then it is important to know how that can be achieved and to what 
extent it is under the subject’s conscious control. 
It is tempting to consider attention as a direct result of the exercise of the 
will, because that yields an easy way to hold the subject accountable for her exercise 
of attention, or lack thereof. Murdoch herself often talks about attention as 
something that requires will, describing it as ‘moral effort’ and ‘moral discipline’ 
(SG 38), and in some passages she explicitly urges an exercise of the will in 
directing our mental lives: ‘as moral agents we have to try to see justly, to overcome 
prejudice, to avoid temptation, to control and curb imagination, to direct reflect ion’ 
and we can do so because we have ‘continual slight control over the direction and 
focus of (our) vision’ (SG 40), where ‘passing moments have a positive controllab le 
content’ (MGM 260). In understanding or in the creative process, for example, 
attention is exercised when the effort to understand, perceive, or truthfully create, 
needs to be pressed a little harder, staying in the difficult world-grasping present 
without letting it pass ‘in vagueness and lassitude’: ‘this’, Murdoch writes, ‘is a 
place for the notion of an effort of will’ (MGM 179-80). On this understanding, the 
good person is the one who chooses or wills to attend, and wills to attend to the 
right things. Being able to will attention means that clear vision, or lack thereof, is 
something that is up to us, so something we can be praised or blamed for:  
And if any of our important beliefs are and have to be products of a willed attention, 
then realism about the world is seen to require qualities of character (virtues) other 
than a professedly neutral and simple ability for detached thought. (DPR 201) 
However, as Blum (2012) notes, criticising Murdoch, this picture is incomplete and 
problematic: incomplete, because attention is not always under the control of the 
129 
 
will; problematic, because at the heart of Murdoch’s philosophy is an attack on the 
notion of the will as central to morality: yet, from what has been said so far, it may 
seem as if with the idea of attention Murdoch is simply taking the same concept of 
the will that she opposes, and moving it back from directing action to directing 
attention.  
Contrary to this claim, (although it is true that her use of the concept is not 
entirely consistent), I argue that Murdoch is not contradicting herself, but that she 
is to some extent reshaping the notion of will within the context of her thought. The 
main meaning of the concept of will, Murdoch writes, is the one inherited from the 
analytic tradition she is engaging with. There, will is ‘immediate straining … 
against a large part of preformed consciousness’ (MGM 300), like when duty 
clashes against desire, with the will fighting against a consciousness which inclines 
toward vice and fantasy. Will, in this picture, is partly separate from the background 
of consciousness, and always involves effort and an active opposition to the self.  
Murdoch does not entirely discard this notion of the will, and claims that 
sometimes an effort of will of that kind is required for attention, when the habit to 
attend is not engrained in one’s character: moments of reverie or brooding can be 
interrupted by a wilful effort to pay attention to what is in front of one.144 However, 
more often in Murdoch the will plays a rather different role: it is not an extraneous 
element moving against consciousness, but an integral part of it, within a 
conception of the individual in which the various elements and faculties are in 
mutual relation (cf. MGM 330). On the one hand, the will does direct attention and 
imagination, thus contributing to the formation not only of individual beliefs and 
thoughts, but also of the general background of consciousness of the individua l. On 
the other, will also emerges from the background of consciousness: central to 
Murdoch’s thought is the idea that the quality of the individual’s consciousness 
influences and constrains the world she sees, and ‘will cannot run very far ahead of 
knowledge’ (SG 44) – which reinforces the necessity to purify consciousness and 
make it adhere to reality through attention. On the ‘holistic’ picture of humanity 
drawn by Murdoch, the will is less like a single and independent faculty, and more 
                                                 
144 On this point, Murdoch sees herself as departing from Weil: ‘Simone Weil says that will does 
not lead us to moral improvements … moral change comes from an attention to the world … Such 
a view accords with oriental wisdom (and with Schopenhauer) to the effect that ultimately we ought 
to have no will … But a realistic morality cannot dispense with the idea of will’ (MGM 52-3). 
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closely connected with the rest of the individual, not rising free from the rest of the 
inner life, but inextricably connected with it: ‘will and reason then are not entirely 
separate faculties in the moral agent. Will continually influences belief … and is 
ideally able to influence it though a sustained attention to reality’ (SG 40). It is on 
this point that Murdoch’s concept of the will clearly diverges from the 
‘existentialist’ unbridled free will that she opposes, where the will can rise against 
the consciousness of the individual and is free to choose anything at all.145 
Attention, rather than being merely a product of the will, allows will and 
vision to be unified, because the will to see justly (to attend) is foremost in coming 
to understand the object, and in turn, once the object has been properly attended to, 
the will is to a large extent (if not wholly) determined by the content of the just 
vision. Here we return, under a different light, to the motivational interna lism 
observed in the previous chapter: ‘man is not a combination of impersonal rational 
thinker and personal will. He is a unified being who sees, and who desires in 
accordance with what he sees’ (SG 40). What we can will, in other words, depends 
on what we see. In the case of attention, the link is even stronger: attention, in the 
best instances, presents situations in such a way that the response is embedded in 
what is perceived, so that the will finds itself entirely constrained by that reality. 
This is the idea of ‘obedience’ inherited from Weil, where the will is exercised, 
paradoxically, in conforming to what appears as necessary. The experience is rare, 
made possible by exceptionally sharp and keen attention. 
Murdoch’s notion of the will, then, is not completely ‘free’, but dependent, 
like any other faculty, on the ‘quality of consciousness’ of the individual; such 
consciousness is, however, partly influenced by the will itself at various moments. 
What we have, then, is what Antonaccio calls a ‘reciprocal’ relation of willing and 
vision or consciousness, where one influences and constrains the other, and vice 
versa (Antonaccio 2000: 145-153).146 Moreover, willed acts of attention can, like 
                                                 
145 Whether that is a fair description of the existentialist will, is not something that concerns me at 
present: what matters is to clarify what Murdoch’s conception of the will is like, and what it is not. 
See Ch.2 fn.113. 
146 Antonaccio (2000: 145-53) sees Murdoch as positioned between a Socratic and an Augustinian 
view of the relation between vision or knowledge and will, which she calls, following Taylor (1989: 
136-9), ‘linear’ and ‘circular’, respectively. On the Socratic linear view, the will depends entirely 
on knowledge, so ignorance of the Good is the only cause for moral error; on the Aug ustinian 
circular view, will and vision influence each other, but the will has some degree of freedom from 
the background of consciousness, and can pull the individual against the Good even when the Good 
is recognised. While this position is largely compatible with the one I have presented, I position 
Murdoch closer to the Socratic view because, while she acknowledges that the will can rise against 
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many other activities, become habitual, attention becoming more spontaneous the 
more it is exercised. In this respect, attention is not very different to a skill that one 
can learn, like swimming or following the story in a book, where one is not always, 
but sometimes is, making a conscious decision. ‘Love is desire for good, virtue 
being in love with good’ (MGM 343): love of the Good is part of attention, and, as 
being ‘in love’ suggests, the virtuous person is the one who has made attention into 
a habit. Attention can thus be considered as part of a virtuous training, where will 
creates habit, which then no longer requires the exercise of the will: virtuous 
patterns of attention are cultivated, until the individual finds that attention occurs 
spontaneously, where spontaneous attention is not conceived in opposition to willed 
attention.147 
It is still possible, on Murdoch’s understanding of the will as partly 
determined by consciousness, to be held responsible for one’s attention or failure 
to attend. The difference is that the control one has upon attention is not ‘direct’, 
but rather a matter of continual piecemeal habituation and steering of consciousness 
in a particular direction, upon particular objects, which will then yield spontaneous 
attention. Here we can see how the different conceptions of attention (as faculty, 
attitude, activity, cf. Ch.3§2.5) are linked: while attending is the activity of 
exercising the faculty of attention, such activity can become habitual, and attention 
turns into something more like an attitude or state of mind. 
There is, however, one last aspect of the relation between attention and will 
which goes beyond the picture just drawn and makes it more difficult to claim 
responsibility for the agent: the cases in which attention is ‘caught’ by an external 
reality, as in the case of the brooding philosopher who is distracted by the presence 
of a kestrel outside her window (SG 84), or when someone else tries to direct our 
attention to something they think we should be (more) aware of, but we are too 
complacent or resistant or even ignorant to see.148 In these cases, attention is not the 
                                                 
(ordinary) consciousness, she remains faithful to the idea that, if true Good is recognised, the will 
cannot but desire it and automatically conforms itself to it. Hence the idea of obedience. 
147 Traditionally, in psychology, the distinction is between spontaneous and voluntary attention, one 
being natural, the other ‘artificial’, effortful and only lasting for a few moments (cf. Ribot 1890: 8 
and James 1891: 416, quoted in Evans 1970: 92ff). Evans (1970) questions the simplicity of the 
distinction, as does implicitly Murdoch, on the present reading, by establishing a mutual relation  
between willed and spontaneous attention. 
148 On the problem of how to correct one’s moral perception when the individual herself may be 
lacking the resources to do so, see Clarke (2012), who suggests that what she calls the problem of 
‘wherewithal’ can be avoided by comparing one’s percep tions with those of others, on the model 
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product of the will, nor dependent upon the background of consciousness of the 
individual. Yet, even in the case where attention is neither willed, nor spontaneous 
in the sense described above, it can still play its morally purifying role by removing 
concern from the self and directing it to something external. These examples 
introduce the important idea, rarely found in Murdoch (but not absent), that 
sometimes the individual alone cannot do all the moral work required. Attention 
can be aided by external stimuli and explicit exhortations from others, by being 
alerted by others to something one is unable to see, or by comparing one’s view 
with that of other people. Even in these cases, when attention is involuntary and 
claimed by something external, however, personal responsibility is not absent: the 
kestrel’s claim for attention can be only a momentary jolt one out of one’s reverie  
and then the brooding can recommence, and the friendly advice can be entertained 
briefly and quickly discarded. For such external stimuli to become sources of 
attention in a fruitful way, the subject needs to collaborate: to be willing or make 
oneself available to sustain the attention, in order for the significance and truth of 
the object to be fully disclosed. Either habit or will can accomplish that.  
Lastly, it needs to be remembered that neither will nor habit, for which the 
subject can claim responsibility, guarantee that attention is properly exercised and 
yields clear vision. In other words, attention is an effort or an attempt, and as such 
in itself valuable, and also likely to improve one’s grasp of reality, but clear vision 
may not ensue. This is the idea we encountered above in relation to the mysterious 
factors in achieving attention (§1.1). That includes, among other things, the 
possibility of ‘moral luck’, and is sometimes expressed by Murdoch when she talks 
about ‘grace’:  
Plato tells us in the Meno that virtue cannot be taught, neither is it natural, it comes 
by divine gift. This does not of course mean accidentally or without effort. Help from 
God or the unconscious mind must normally be thought of as arriving in a context 
of attending and trying. (MGM 178) 
What we can do is do our best and put ourselves in a position where reality is 
visible; but that does not guarantee success.149  
                                                 
for example of feminist consciousness-raising groups, which in turn help the individual to identify  
patterns by which she can correct or amend her perceptions. 
149 To avoid an unreasonable over-demandingness, it needs to be observed that responsibility in 
attention has limits. While it is to a large extent possible for one to control the direction and quality 
of one’s consciousness, through will and discipline, there are factors that influence attention and that 
are not within one’s control. Think for example of some cases of mental disorders, such as paranoia 
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Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter has been to analyse the concept of attention, as 
presented by Murdoch, and to bring out the elements that make it a specifica l ly 
moral concept. Three elements have been singled out: its desire for goodness, its 
truth-revealing capacity, and its link with personal responsibility. The desire for 
goodness, which manifests itself as the desire to attend justly and see clearly, is the 
central element of Murdoch’s normative concept of love. Love is desire for the 
Good, where the aspiration towards the ideal standard animates the relationship 
between the lover and the object of love. Integral to such aspiration is the dual desire 
to discover value in the object, and to see the object justly, which is what happens 
when attention is animated by desire for the Good. The fact that love is essentia lly 
desire for the Good and thus an attitude that can be applied to any object dispels the 
worry that love may be in conflict with the clear vision that attention is supposed 
to bring about. On the contrary, by defeating possessiveness and motivat ing 
attention, love contributes positively to clarifying perception. 
The idea that attention includes desire for the Good, manifest as a loving 
attitude, clarifies the problem of how to make sense of Murdoch’s idea that attention 
is directed to the Good. What I have suggested is that attention is not directly fixed 
on the Good, because the Good is not an object of perception, but that the idea of 
the Good, formed through perception of good objects in the world, is the guiding 
light, or inspiration, of attention.  
Thus inspired, attention can focus itself on various objects. Two questions 
arise in relation to the objects of attention: whether anything is a legitimate object 
of attention, and whether there are criteria for identifying the most salient objects 
of attention. The first question is answered positively, because attention is valuable 
in itself, but also because attention needs to be in principle open to focusing on any 
object that may require it. As for the second question, Murdoch suggests, both 
implicitly and explicitly, various possibilities: beauty, goodness, presence, 
responsibility, humanity. None of these, however, can constitute the sole object of 
attention, or the most salient, before the particular situation has been appraised. The 
suggestion is that, instead of providing criteria for object selection, attention itself, 
                                                 
or delusion, where it seems out of place to put moral blame on the subject for not exercising proper 
attention. 
134 
 
at the level of ‘open’ or suspended attention, can survey a situation and select the 
objects to which ‘focused’ attention should be devoted. 
Lastly, the requirement of responsibility for attention as a moral concept has 
been examined in relation to the possibility of willing attention. While attention can 
be the result of a will that strains against the background of consciousness, Murdoch 
sees the will as something integrated in consciousness, with which it has a circular 
relation: will shapes consciousness by directing thought, and consciousness 
delimits perception, thus shaping the will as well as presenting it with limited 
objects to choose among. One’s responsibility, in this picture, lies not only in willed 
and punctual acts of attention, but also and mostly in the piecemeal training of 
consciousness to develop virtuous habits of attention. 
This chapter concludes the exposition and analysis of the moral concept of 
attention begun in Chapter 3. The chapters have explored the role of the mind in 
attention and the importance of having a particular quality of consciousness or 
states of mind in order to perceive clearly. Specifically, I have emphasised the role 
of intrinsically moral or virtuous states of mind, including love, in the perception 
of reality. As argued in Chapter 2, reality for Murdoch includes moral reality. In 
the following chapter, the role of virtuous states of mind is combined with the 
existence of a moral reality in the analysis of moral perception. What is still missing 
from the justification of the importance of attention in morality is the explanation 
of why clear perception – which is supposed to be the central outcome of attention 
– is of primary moral importance, as opposed to action on the one hand, and to the 
application of principles on the other. That is the goal of Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 
Moral Perception 
Introduction  
The discussion of attention so far has proceeded along two lines: on the one hand, 
Murdoch’s metaphysical commitment to the existence of a moral reality in the 
world, which is not created or projected by the mind (Chapter 2); on the other, 
Murdoch’s insistence on the evaluative nature of consciousness, and on the ways in 
which values structure cognition and yield apprehensions of the world with varying 
degrees of correctness (Chapters 3-4). On the face of it, these two aspects of 
Murdoch’s philosophy seem incompatible, but in Chapter 2 I offered a potential 
resolution which, whilst not explicitly endorsed by Murdoch, nevertheless outlined 
a way in which her seemingly incompatible desiderata, of moral facts and 
evaluative cognition, might be met. 
The idea, in brief, is that the world possesses features which the mind latches 
on to in apprehending it, but apprehension can only occur through the structures 
and ‘tools’ of the mind, including, primarily, an evaluating imagination which 
operates through concepts. On the one hand, therefore, something is genuine ly 
there, including features of reality that are correctly conceptualised as value; on the 
other, because consciousness is inherently evaluative, apprehension of the world 
proceeds through evaluation, but the standard of correctness of the concepts through 
which apprehension takes place depends on the real features of the world. Because 
apprehension of reality necessarily takes place through an inherently evaluat ive 
cognition, the optimal state of mind for correct apprehension is itself a moral one. 
That state is what I have been calling ‘attention’.  
Imagination, which uses concepts and is structured by value, Murdoch 
argues, is involved in any interaction of the mind with the world, including the most 
basic interaction that is perception. Because Murdoch also holds that values are 
features of reality, perception is both an evaluative and a value-apprehend ing 
faculty. Instead of being projected or inferred, value is discovered as part of the 
world by attentive perception. This chapter draws the threads of the previous four 
together, by exploring how the encounter of an evaluative mind with a moral reality 
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occurs, in the most basic way, through moral perception, and how that is made 
possible by the correct state of mind, which is attention.150 
Attention is the faculty or attitude of moral perception: its central feature is 
the ability to yield clear perception of what confronts the subject. The attentive 
subject is ideally placed to perceive, or ‘see’, clearly. The object of moral 
perception is moral reality. In the previous chapter I have suggested that attention 
itself can reveal what it salient within the scope of one’s perception (Ch.4§3.2). 
Moral perception does not need to be conceived as stopping at the discovery of 
what is salient, but it can also include the perception of specific moral properties. I 
shall argue that both moral salience and moral properties are revealed by the 
attentive perception of moral reality. 
The only example Murdoch gives of the activity of moral perception is that 
of M and D, where no details are provided as to how the mother’s perception 
changes. Did she construe the situations involving D differently, so that the same 
facts were given a different interpretation? Or did something new strike her, which 
did not come into her awareness before, so that her new judgment included new 
perception and new facts? Using different examples, I am going to argue for the 
second alternative, and for the idea that, for Murdoch, value is found in reality and 
directly perceived. 
1 The Morality of Perception 
Moral perception, particularly in the context of Murdoch’s philosophy, can be 
understood in two ways, as noted by Scott Clifton (2013). One relates to the object 
of perception, the other to the instrument or means. First, moral perception refers 
to the idea that clear perception reveals a morally relevant reality, and is thus 
essential to having appropriate moral understanding and responses; 151  second, 
moral perception refers to the notion that one’s perceptions are expressive of one’s 
                                                 
150 Unless explicitly stated, I here use ‘moral perception’ as a success phrase, indicating accurate 
perception or perception of what is the case, and made possible by attention. In this use I differ from 
Margaret Holland (1998) who distinguishes moral perception from attention, insofar as she 
considers the former to be neutral as to its correctness, and takes it to mean, more broadly, ‘one's 
awareness of, or one’s “take” on, a moral situation’ (Holland 1998: 310). In this respect, her use of 
moral perception is akin to what I have called (with Blum (2012: 309) and following Murdoch) 
‘looking’ in Ch.4§1.1. But this is only a terminological difference: I agree with Holland on the 
substantive point that ‘moral attention might be described as inner moral work which seeks to 
improve the quality of perception of independent reality’ (Holland 1998: 310). 
151 The formulation ‘morally relevant reality’ is neutral as to the existence of a moral reality, and 
also as to whether moral properties are perceived or inferred. 
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moral quality, and that therefore clear or correct perception depends on a morally 
good quality of consciousness, virtuous attitudes and states of mind. Murdoch’s 
notion of attention includes both these understandings of moral perception.  
According to Scott Clifton (2013), however, the main meaning of moral 
perception in Murdoch is the latter, referring to the moral importance of states of 
mind, rather than in the moral importance of what those states of mind are about. 
The ability to perceive correctly or clearly, he argues, is inherently valuable, being 
a ‘moral achievement’ whatever its object (Scott Clifton 2013: 211). This claim is, 
on the one hand, only true to an extent and, on the other, it is itself made true by the 
value of truth and what truthful perception entails. It is not entirely true because, 
while clear vision always involves, on Murdoch’s view, the direction of concern to 
the real and thus at least momentary selflessness, it also matters what one focuses 
one’s attention on, and what one consequently neglects (cf. Ch.4§3.2): the moral 
achievement of attention also involves being able to apprehend the relative salience 
of things, and thus to focus on what requires or merits attention most. Secondly, the 
value of seeing rightly and exercising the related virtues would be harder to 
understand if the reality that we were attending to were not valuable (cf. Ch.2§3). 
Virtue, in other words, is not a matter of making sure we are in a virtuous state, but 
of making sure that we are seeing what is really there, not for our sake, but for the 
sake of whatever it is that we are seeing. Both points emerge, for instance, in 
Murdoch’s comments on the Zen practise of meditation. Seeing stones and insects 
lovingly, justly and accurately is an exercise of virtue and, as such, it is a good thing 
to do. But part of its value depends, on the one hand, on the value of truth and 
reality, and on the other, on the fact that meditation is good training for seeing 
clearly things that matter more: one needs to return to the world and to other people. 
The real importance of observing stones and insects lovingly lies partly in its ability 
to train oneself to thus see other people and situations (MGM 244).152 It seems like 
a striking inversion of priority to claim, instead, that ‘what makes attention … a 
moral achievement is not found in the specific cases in which an agent is able to 
see the suffering of others, but in all cases in which the agent sees the world aright 
                                                 
152 In this respect the Zen sage is similar to the person who, having contemplated the Good, returns 
to the cave in Plato’s myth in the Republic. Murdoch makes similar remarks about the contemplation 
or creation of art, which she considers as an exercise of virtue and an image of virtue, while adding 
that morality is mainly played out in our dealings with other people, in whether we respond 
appropriately to them and their needs. 
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as a result of the ‘‘suppression of self’’’ (Scott Clifton 2013: 211-12). Adopting this 
view would, besides obscuring the reasons why the virtues involved in attention are 
considered such, shift the focus of attention onto the subject, at the expense of the 
reality outside the subject, which, as Murdoch stresses, is the proper object of 
attention. 
While Murdoch does insist on the importance of the moral quality of the 
psychological states involved in perception, the moral importance of perception 
cannot be separated from the importance of the object perceived, which is in fact 
primary: while, on the one hand, attention occasions the ‘moral purification’ of the 
subject and requires a good quality of consciousness to be successful (this is the 
evaluative nature of consciousness as discussed in Ch.3-4), on the other, that is 
achieved by directing the focus on, and making possible the perception of, a reality 
outside the subject which is morally important in its own right (this is main idea of 
Murdochian moral realism, as proposed in Ch.2). The importance of the latter is 
central to what follows, where I focus on how a reality which is morally relevant in 
its own right can be apprehended as such by the moral activity of consciousness.  
2 Weak and Strong Moral Perception 
The idea that reality is morally relevant, and that therefore correct perception is 
crucial to moral understanding, can be interpreted in two ways. As we saw in 
relation to the value of truth in Chapter 2§3, reality can be morally relevant in a 
purely instrumental way, as the basis for the application of moral principle; or it 
can be morally relevant in itself. In the first case, the idea is that correct perception 
of the facts is a necessary step in the application of principles: the content of 
perception has no moral relevance in itself, but derives it from being the subject 
matter of moral judgment. Neither the faculty nor the object of perception have 
moral qualities in themselves, but clear perception is necessary in order to judge 
correctly, apply principles to the right facts, deliberate having the right information. 
If perception is considered as a morally neutral presentation of morally neutral facts, 
however, it does not seem appropriate to speak of moral perception, but only of 
(accurate) perception. 
The notion of moral perception involves, minimally, the idea that perception 
reveals something that is morally relevant in its own right. Therefore, only the 
second understanding of the importance of correct perception refers to moral 
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perception. That can itself be understood in two ways. On the first, ‘weak’ 
conception, perception has a preparatory role for moral understanding, but does not 
by itself yield a moral judgment, nor is it sufficient to provide motivation. Princip le -
based theories can also endorse this view of moral perception, as Blum (1994) has 
argued. Although most principle-based theories have underestimated the role of 
moral perception (and thus endorse only the first aspect of the value of perception 
above), principle application requires a faculty that presents the situation as a moral 
one – as a situation in which moral considerations and principles are called for – as 
well as indicating when or how to apply the principles, which is something the 
principles themselves cannot do.153 
Blum’s analysis shows how principle-based theories can make room for 
moral perception by weakening, but not essentially eroding, the centrality of 
principles. Moral perception here is the faculty that, by latching onto features of 
reality, presents the situation as a moral one, identifies the relevant aspects, selects 
the relevant principles, and shows how those principles are to be applied and 
through what course of action. All this could be said of attention, as enabling 
successful moral perception: on this understanding, attention can have a limited but 
fundamental role in principle application. If that were all that attention did, then one 
would not be committed to the idea that perception reveals a moral (and motivat ing) 
reality, but only a reality that is morally relevant, and the perception that results 
from attention would function as a basis for moral understanding.  
However, Blum also indicates ways in which moral perception is more than 
a bridge between facts and principles, and in doing so gives reasons to question the 
correctness of principle-based theories: the moral perception of the situation 
includes moral salience. Moral perception construes the situation as the situation 
that it is, prior to the operation of judgment. And crucially, on some occasions, the 
individuated moral situation itself contains reasons for action, in which case 
principles are not even required. Lastly, moral perception (unlike judgment) can 
provide proper moral understanding, but such that it does not entail reasons or 
                                                 
153 Kant addressed this problem by introducing ‘judgment’ as the bridge between rules or principles 
and particular situations: judgment shows to what circumstances a given rule applies, what counts 
as applying it, how it needs to be applied. Moreover, judgment is required to recognise certain 
features of a situation as morally significant. Blum (1994) sees the role of judgment, to this extent, 
as akin to that of moral perception. His criticism is that most deontological theories fail to recognise 
that judgment involves specifically moral capacities that go beyond what the principles can provide. 
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motivation to act. With these consideration, Blum moves towards a ‘stronger’ view 
of moral perception, 154  where moral perception is not only instrumental in 
implementing principles, but it also includes the possibility of bypassing them 
altogether and thus of providing, by itself, moral understanding as well as reasons 
and motivation.155 On the ‘strong’ conception of moral perception, perception is not 
only preparatory for judgment and deliberation, but it also reveals a reality which 
on its own carries moral information or content: a moral reality which includes 
moral properties, providing reasons and motivation. I shall argue that the concept 
of attention, in the context of Murdoch’s philosophy, refers to the latter, most 
demanding, understanding of moral perception. Attention involves morally lad en 
perception of moral reality.156 
3 Moral Differences are Conceptual Differences 
Attention is the virtuous attitude or faculty which enables perception of reality, 
including moral reality. Moral reality, in Murdoch’s thought, divides into two 
kinds: the Good or guiding ideal, of which she says that ‘there exists a moral reality: 
a real though infinitely distant standard’ (SG 31); and what she has called ‘moral 
facts’ (VCM 95), considered as instantiations of moral properties in the world. This 
distinction runs along the lines of thin and thick moral concepts. The thin ‘Good’ 
is, as Murdoch observes, not itself perceptible, due to its nature as an ideal. A 
limited grasp of the Good is made possible through the perception of moral 
properties in the world, which act as ‘hints’ or assembled suggestions of the idea of 
the Good: on Murdoch’s ‘degree of perfection’ argument, the Good is what we 
intuit by recognising recurrences and patterns among perceptible instances of 
                                                 
154 While Blum (1994) is gesturing towards the understanding of moral perception whereby the 
object of perception is itself reason giving and motivating, he does not claim that perception can 
always play this role, nor does he want to deny the importance of judgment and deliberation.  
155 As Chappell (2008) observes, there is a distinction between the two that the Platonic idea of ‘to 
be pursuedness’, on which Murdoch relies, does not account for; moreover, one can lead to the other, 
and motivation itself may not always lead to action. While the distinction is important, the present 
account of moral perception is meant to include both reasons and motivation.  
156 The labels of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ come from Scott Clifton (2013: 208). Scott Clifton claims  that 
Murdoch is only committed to the weak view, although she considers the strong view as an ideal. In 
this chapter, instead, I present Murdoch as arguing for the strong view: even if it was the case that 
the necessity that Murdoch sees as created by attentive perception were an ideal – and it is not clear 
that it is: think of Martin Luther’s ‘here I stand’ – that would not be a reason to exclude it. In fact, 
the notion of an ideal is very important in Murdoch’s philosophy, where the ideal of perfection is 
the main provider of inspiration and moral energy.  
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‘goodness’, which can be manifest as compassion, justice, benevolence, etc. We 
start from what we perceive and reach up to the ideal.  
Value in the world is, therefore, epistemically primary. That is why moral 
perception refers primarily to value in the world, and why that is the main outcome 
of attention. For these reasons, in this section I discuss moral perception not as 
perception of the Good, which is not possible, but of moral properties, such as the 
kindness of a smile, or the injustice of a sentence. The idea that value can be 
perceived directly and therefore is real, which Murdoch calls an ‘argument from 
perception’, is better described as a phenomenological account of moral perception, 
which is often, as we saw in Chapter 1, Murdoch’s starting point. Not the last word, 
but the first, is said by human experience of morality. What needs to be done is to 
take a closer look at such experience and search for explanations. Let us begin the 
exploration with two examples. 
On April 17, 2015, The Sun columnist Katie Hopkins published a piece in 
response to the sinking of a refugees’ vessel off the Libyan coast resulting in over 
400 deaths. Under the headline ‘Rescue boats? I’d use gunships to stop migrants’, 
Hopkins wrote: ‘No, I don’t care. Show me pictures of coffins, show me bodies 
floating in water, play violins and show me skinny people looking sad. I still don’t 
care … These migrants are like cockroaches … Drilling a few holes in the bottom 
of anything suspiciously resembling a boat would be a good idea, too’ (Hopkins 
2015). This contemporary example can be put side by side with a parable, used by 
Simone Weil to illustrate attention and moral perception (WG 103): the parable of 
the Good Samaritan (introduced in Chapter 3§3). While the Levite and the priest 
walk past with only a glance, the Samaritan stops to help the injured man by the 
side of the road (Luke 10:29-37). Both are cases where something seems to go 
wrong in some of the participants’ moral responses. What goes wrong and why – 
specifically, whether the moral failure can be understood as a failure of attention, 
which in turn causes an incorrect perception – are the questions at hand.  
On one model, advocated among others by R.M. Hare (1952), one of the 
main targets of Murdoch’s critique, the examples are analysed in terms of 
perception of non-evaluative facts (‘people attempting to illegally migrate to 
Europe and drowning while doing so’, ‘an injured man lying by the side of the road’, 
etc.) plus the application of principles to those facts (‘immigration to one’s country 
must be prevented’ or ‘the necessity to prevent crime caused by immigrants in one’s 
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country trumps all other considerations’, or ‘one is not morally required to stop and 
help a stranger’, etc. etc.), which yield moral conclusions – in Hare’s case, in the 
form of a prescription (‘do what you can to stop immigration regardless of other 
circumstances’, ‘do not stop to help a stranger’, etc.). Assuming for the sake of 
argument that the conclusions presented in these two cases are morally problematic, 
Hare’s model would presumably explain the flaw as arising from incorrect basic 
principles, or from the application of inappropriate principles to the specific 
situation, resulting in incorrect prescriptions. 
The alternative to this view begins by questioning the idea that the ‘facts’ 
perceived, upon which deliberation takes place, are the same for all involved: for 
example, whether Hopkins has the same perception of the refugees’ situation as 
someone who takes it as imperative to rescue and help them. In the Hopkins 
example, two elements can be taken as signs that the disagreement rests on 
perception, or the way the situation is present to the agent. First, the concepts used 
to characterise the people involved in the shipwreck are clearly evaluative: the 
migrants are ‘cockroaches’, ‘spreading like norovirus’; second, what much of the 
column presents is not so much a conclusion yielded by rational deliberation, but 
an affective-evaluative response, determined by a particular perception of the facts: 
‘I don’t care’, where the suggestion is that the events at hand merit such response. 
Perhaps more clearly than in the case of the Samaritan, where the perception is to 
be evinced by the actions, Hopkins’s case makes explicit the way in which the 
situation and the people involved are constructed and conceptualised, and indicates 
the responses that she finds appropriate. The suggestion here is that the difference 
in perception depends on the different concepts deployed. This is central to 
Murdoch’s view of the morality of perception, as we shall see. 
To these considerations, Hare and the philosophers inspired by him might 
reply that ‘cockroach’ is a metaphor for which a literal term can be substituted, and 
that because the whole description is of a ‘thick’ kind, it can be analysed into 
evaluative and descriptive components. What is left when the evaluative element is 
removed are the ‘facts’, which are the same for everyone. This objection leads into 
a familiar debate about thick concepts, the ‘inseparability’ of which was origina l ly 
defended by McDowell (2001d). McDowell argues against non-cognitivism and the 
separability of fact and value in thick concepts by exposing, inspired by 
Wittgenstein, a hidden assumption that the non-cognitivist makes: that the correct 
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application of concepts requires rules which are specifiable independent of any 
perspective and of the responses that the reality which some concepts refer to tends 
to elicit. McDowell replaces this metaphysical conception of rules underlying 
concept use – which stands in need of justification – with a less rigid conception 
where the correct application of concepts is established from within the community 
of concept users, as well as with reference to the world: 
If the disentangling manoeuvre is always possible, that implies that the extension of 
the associated term, as it would be used by someone who belonged to the community, 
could be mastered independently of the special concerns which, in the community, 
would show themselves in admiration or emulation of actions seen as falling under 
the concept. (McDowell 2001d: 201) 
Like Murdoch, McDowell acknowledges that concepts, while referring to reality, 
are also human tools, and as such need to be understood in the context of human 
responses and concerns. This model for understanding concepts appears like a 
development of Murdoch’s stress on the development of language and concepts as 
occurring within human contexts and in reference to a common object of attention: 
‘we learn through attending to contexts, vocabulary develops through close 
attention to objects, and we can only understand others if we can to some extent 
share their contexts’ (SG 32). Thus Murdoch ties the evaluative nature of human 
cognition, of which concepts are a product, with the epistemological primacy of the 
reality (including human reality) that concepts are meant to capture, without 
sacrificing one to the other.  
The individual’s moral understanding of particular facts, therefore, shows 
itself in the concepts that she employs in relation to them. As Murdoch puts it, 
‘moral differences are conceptual differences’ (VCM 82). While some concept 
schemes are compatible with others, in relation to a specific situation or object, 
others are not, because not all conceptualisations of particular facts are correct, i.e. 
fitting with reality. The further step that we need to take, with Murdoch, involves 
the presence of concepts in perception: if concepts are part of perception, then moral 
differences are also differences in perception.  
3.1 Concepts in Perception 
The possibility of considering concepts as penetrating all the way down to 
perception begins to appear with the idea that concepts determine not only how 
something should be construed, but what something is. If perception is to reveal 
particular objects, rather than a mass of sense data, it will require concepts to do so. 
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By conceptualising the situation in different ways, the Samaritan and the Levite, for 
example, can be said to perceive something different.  
The idea that perception itself operates through concepts is supported by 
McDowell, who can be considered the contemporary philosopher who most 
effectively develops Murdoch’s views about cognitivism. McDowell (2006) argues 
that the possibility of having perception-based beliefs, taken as manifestations of 
rationality, is explained by appealing to the rationality of the perception itself. In 
order to take perceptual experience as a reason in belief formation, the perception 
has to be rational. To be rational, on McDowell’s definition, is to be able to respond 
to reasons as such (it is not required that we always do so, but only that we have the 
capacity to do so). And in order to do so, one must be able to deploy conceptual 
capacities. Therefore, to take perception as grounds for belief, perception needs to 
be, potentially, an exercise of conceptual capacities. 
This argument is not present in Murdoch, but the conclusion it argues for is 
what she wants for her picture of perception. Rather than talking about rationality 
and responses to reasons as such, Murdoch invokes the imagination as a moral and 
concept-deploying activity inherent in perception. 157  Central to Murdoch’s 
epistemology is the idea that perception does not only provide the material for moral 
thinking, but is itself a form of evaluation: ‘our deepest imaginings which structure 
the world in which “moral judgments” occur are already evaluations. Perception 
itself is a mode of evaluation’ (MGM 314-5). The encounter between the evaluat ing 
mind and value in the world occurs, as I have suggested, thus: the evaluating mind 
approaches the world and makes sense of it through its faculties. Such faculties are 
structured by value and operate through concepts. Even in perception, which is the 
most basic encounter between mind and world, the world does not presents itself to 
us brutely as unconceptualised sense-data, but via the imaginative evaluat ive 
concept-using activity just described.158  
                                                 
157 Commenting on Kant’s notion of the imagination, Murdoch argues that it should be extended or 
modified thus: ‘…the world around us is constantly being modified or “presented” (made or made 
up) by a spontaneous creative free faculty which is not that of “reason” thought of as “beaming in” 
upon purely empirical situations not otherwise evaluated’ (MGM 314). Note the distinction between 
‘made’ and ‘made up’: that corresponds to the distinction between imagination ‘proper’ and that 
corrupted form of imagination, fantasy. 
158 Strikingly, this move also puts moral and non-moral reality on the same epistemological level: 
they are both real and discovered by an active concept-using evaluative imaginative faculty. To 
claim that perception, and more generally consciousness, is evaluative, means that every situation 
is approached in an evaluative way. Since individuals have only partial access to reality, as opposed 
to a God’s eye perspective, apprehension is inevitably perspectival, and value partly determines such 
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4 Motivational Internalism 
The reality that moral perception discloses, on the ‘strong’ conception of moral 
perception, is a moral reality. As such, it involves moral properties, the correct 
perception of which also includes appropriate responses and attitudes. In other 
words, strong moral perception involves motivational internalism, a notion 
introduced in previous chapters and that we can now examine in more detail. 
Murdoch’s motivational internalism can range from certain responses being 
suggested to the subject by correct perception, up to an extremely close correlation 
of perception and response, where the most successful acts of attention reveal the 
situation so clearly and vividly that the perceiving subject will feel compelled to act 
as (she perceives) the situation demands.  
The idea that concepts (as well as perception and cognition, of which they 
are the instruments) reach both ways, to the world and to the mind, has important 
implications for justifying this idea. The first implication is drawn out by 
McDowell: concepts are human ways of grasping the world, and as such they 
participate in the ‘form of life’ in which they are developed, which includes 
particular desires, concerns and responses.159 It follows that some concepts include 
certain attitudes and responses: correctly grasping a concept involves having the 
response that is appropriate to that concept, in the same way that going to see King 
Lear and sitting through it with a sense of light amusement may indicate failure not 
just to respond, but also (through the lack of response) to understand the play.160 
                                                 
perspective (hence the possibility of various compatible but different perceptions of the same 
situation). This does not imply, however, that every concept is a moral concept, because within an 
evaluatively perceived situation, moral perception picks out which elements of reality are moral and 
which are not. While anything can in principle be morally relevant, depending on the context, not 
everything always is. While for Murdoch, as Diamond puts it, ‘we are  perpetually moralists’, that 
only means that ‘our thought about anything is the thought of a morally live consciousness, a 
consciousness with its own moral character’ (Diamond 1996: 102), but not that everything that such 
morally live consciousness perceives is perceived as moral. Thus, the evaluative nature of 
consciousness is combined with the existence of a moral reality that consciousness picks out, by 
deploying the appropriate concepts. 
159 While the idea of community of concept users, or ‘forms of life’ following Wittgenstein, can 
refer to a relatively small community, and thus pose the threat of cultural relativism, it can also refer 
broadly to the human community. Reading Wittgenstein, Conway (1989) distinguishes between a 
broad and a narrow meaning of ‘form of life’, the former referring to patterns of human behaviour, 
the latter to specific cultures. The former interpretation is endorsed, for example, by Hanfling (2002). 
The present argument is limited to the broader sense. 
160 For these reasons, McDowell has famously compared values, being concepts which bear an 
internal relation to certain responses, to dispositional or secondary properties such as colours  (2001c: 
146). While the analogy with colour helps to bring out Murdoch’s ideas about the interac tion 
between mind and world that determines concept-formation and hence perception, differently from 
McDowell, Murdoch holds that not only moral concepts, but all concepts stand in such relation  
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Murdoch supplements this idea by specifying that the ‘magnetic centre’ of 
the desires that animate the concept-using human beings is the Good: ‘Good is the 
magnetic centre towards which love naturally moves’ (SG 102). The role of love in 
attention, explored in the previous chapter, becomes now relevant to understand 
Murdoch’s motivational internalism. Love, understood as eros or energy, is 
constantly pulled by the idea of perfection. Murdoch conceives of human beings as 
being moved by an inexhaustible and omnipresent energy, manifest as desire, which 
attaches itself to whatever is apprehended as good. All concepts, therefore, 
participate in this web of energy or desire, determining, as Diamond puts it, 
‘magnetic fields’ in reality, which either fits reality or not, depending on whether 
they depend on correct or distorted perception:  
The world in which we act is not motivationally inert but is rather characterised by 
magnetic fields, as it were, in which actions can be attractive to us, through the kind 
of place they have in the world as shaped already by perception and by fantasy or 
imagination. (Diamond 2010: 72) 
Because of the dual nature of concepts, tying together mind and world, the 
motivation or ‘magnetism’ is not dependent on human desire alone, as if it was a 
projection on an inert reality, but it is also elicited by different objects in different 
ways. Desiring or being magnetically attracted by the Good, as we have seen, does 
not mean being attached to an abstract entity in isolation from reality, but perceiving 
reality in the light of the Good, which contributes motivation, a sense of perfection, 
and, crucially, the desire and ability to see reality as it is. Therefore, when true Good 
is desired, or desire is ‘purified’, the motivation that is associated with a particular 
concept is exactly of the kind that is appropriate, elicited or merited, by the object  
which the concept captures. Such responses include, therefore, not only attraction 
to what is good, but more generally whatever is appropriate or required by the 
situation, which can include a range of attitudes and actions. The right concepts are 
deployed when reality is perceived correctly, in its real features. That is made 
possible by the exercise of attention.  
4.1 Central Features of a Concept 
Moral concepts and the relative responses seem to range between being basic and 
innate, and sophisticated and developed with experience over time. There are two 
                                                 
between mind and world, because value and desire are never absent from consciousness. Thus, the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities collapses in Murdoch, for whom all qualities 
are perceived through imaginative-conceptual faculties.  
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aspects to this idea: on the one hand, some concepts are innate and others learned, 
and therefore some are easier to deploy than others; on the other, the same concept 
can have more obvious aspects which are picked out immediately, and less salient 
ones that require time and experience to grasp. The second aspect, concerning the 
various levels within one concept, is more interesting for my purposes, and it is also 
something on which Murdoch insists.  
An example of basic innate response through the spontaneous deployment 
of a concept (which can also be vastly deepened) is provided by Weil’s analysis of 
our primitive responses to those we recognise as ‘human beings’. Weil argues that, 
in the presence of other human beings, our recognition shows itself in ‘the interva l 
of hesitation’, which is at the same time the recognition of the other as an 
autonomous being, and therefore a limitation to our own will (Weil 1956: 33).161 
While the concept ‘human being’ can be infinitely deepened and includes a 
multitude of aspects, autonomy is what Weil identifies as the ‘kernel’ of the concept, 
being the most salient aspect of it and the first one to be picked out in our encounters 
with others. As Weil presents it, the concept appears innate and the reaction, in the 
absence of distracting and distorting elements, follows automatically.162 
The recognition of someone as a human being manifests itself, primarily, 
through our hesitation, signalling the recognition of the fact that they are also living 
and autonomous beings. Our concept of human being, Weil argues, develops out of 
this reaction, not the other way around, which indicates that a sense of value – of 
the other as someone to whom I cannot do certain things – is embedded in the very 
concept.163 Commenting on Weil and on the parable of the Good Samaritan, Peter 
                                                 
161 Interestingly, as observed in Ch.3§3, this is the point on which Bok thinks that Weil and Murdoch 
most clearly agree (Bok 2005: 74). 
162 Motivational internalism, particularly about basic concepts or aspects thereof, is supported by 
what can be called ‘the evolutionary argument’ (cf. Chappell 2008: 434), whereby the first and most 
important concepts that human beings formed were in relation to objects and situations which  
required specific responses or actions: ‘something to flee from’, ‘something to eat’, etc. (Chappell 
provides this argument as one response that the moral realist can give to the Mackie-inspired puzzle 
about how any property can be intrinsically motivating: ‘the general schema for such motivating  
representations will be: Pattern P in context C mandates response R from X’ (Chappell 2006: 434)). 
An example of innate concepts that are manifest through the automatic response that they are tied 
to comes from the vervet monkeys, whose three calls, relating to the presence of eagles, leopards, 
and snakes, generate the response of fleeing in specific ways and directions. See Cosmides and 
Tooby (1994). 
163 Peter Winch draws a parallel between Weil and Wittgenstein on this point, in relation to the 
latter’s rejection, in PI, of the idea that pain is a matter of inference from behaviour; rather, the 
recognition of pain in another person is revealed by one’s reaction to them, which is an ‘attitude 
towards a soul’ (PI, p.178, quoted in Winch 1989: 105, endnote 6). 
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Winch (1980) makes the Murdochian and McDowellian point that we can talk of 
an internal relation between the attitude of a person and the object of his attitude. 
The attitude or response, in other words, is an integral part of the concept: 
Because of the way concepts are formed, and because of their connection with action 
and the aspirations and values that go with action, the world of which we are aware 
is one that is impregnated with values. That is to say, our concepts, which give the 
world its shape, are unintelligible except as concepts exercised by beings whose 
common life exhibits certain aspirations and values. (Winch 1989: 115) 
In the examples above, the indifference accorded to the drowned human beings and 
the injured person by the road may signify a failure, on the part of those who display 
it, to clearly perceive what confronts them.164 Presumably Hopkins, the Levite and 
the priest would not refuse to call what is in front of them ‘human being’; but that 
would seem like a superficial acknowledgment, as they do not seem to be fully 
deploying the concept in the particular instances: lacking the ‘interval of hesitation’, 
or the minimal ‘care’ that are internally related to the concepts individuating other 
people and their misfortunes, means, in these particular cases, lacking a full 
appreciation of the concept ‘human being’; it means an incomplete grasp of what 
other people and their misfortunes are. If attention promotes a clear understand ing 
of what confronts one, these failures can be understood as failures of attention. The 
conceptualisation that Hopkins, the priest and the Levite have of the people 
involved, it can be suggested, occurs precisely in the opposite direction to what 
attention determines: rather than being grounded on the world, they are grounded 
on the desires, fears, etc. with which they approach the world. The exercise of 
attention, on the other hand, is sufficient to provide the appropriate response:  
True vision occasions right conduct … The more the separateness and differentness 
of other people is realised, and the fact that another man has needs and wishes as 
demanding as one’s own, the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing. (SG 66)  
Correct perception of the refugees as human beings would, following Murdoch, 
prevent one from responding to them as if they were things, which is what the 
proposal to drill holes in their boats, and describing them as ‘viruses’, suggests. 
It may be objected, against considering such primitive reactions and 
hesitations as morally good ones, that ego-driven reactions are also primitive, since 
for Murdoch selfishness is ‘natural’ to human beings. There is, however, a crucial 
difference between the morally good or appropriate spontaneous responses 
                                                 
164 Cf. Gaita: ‘absence of such responses are … moral failings and … fundamental to our sense of 
what is an intelligible object of moral response’ (Gaita 2004: 145). 
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generated by attention and those created by self-interest: while in the first case the 
reaction depends on real features of the world, appropriately conceptualised, in the 
second case that is precisely what is lacking: the reaction is not one that comes from 
the world, but from a conceptualisation of it that distorts or obscures its real features.  
Failures of attention are failures of moral perception, because, according to 
Murdoch, self-interest blocks full and clear perception of what confronts one: in 
relation to the examples above, we can imagine, for instance, nationalistic self-
protection in the case of Hopkins, and self-interested desire to arrive at one’s 
destination without inconvenience in the case of the priest and the Levite, or in both 
cases, the desire to avoid being confronted with the reality of suffering. In the latter 
case, the wilful ignorance or denial may be motivated precisely by the awareness 
that deploying the right concepts in the right way would make a claim on one, 
coupled with the desire to avoid having to respond to such claim. The exercise of 
attention, by contrast, purifies the self of these distorting factors, and makes reality 
maximally available to the subject: if the normative concept of human being, as 
Weil holds, comes from an encounter with reality, then restoring the meaning of 
the concept in the cases under consideration involves the exercise of attention, 
which would let the suppressed or distorted reality of other people emerge, or 
emerge more fully. Reality can exercise a normative pull on the perceiver, but that 
happens only when reality is perceived clearly and vividly, through the right 
concepts, which is what attention makes possible.  
4.2 Deepening Concepts 
Failures of attention can be of two kinds in relation to concepts; on the one hand, a 
failure to apply the appropriate concept to the situation; on the other, a failure to 
fully grasp the concept that one applies.165 Almost all concepts, Murdoch claims, 
are not something we grasp once and for all (as on the model that McDowell 
opposes), but, as human tools and parts of human practises, something ‘infinite ly 
to be learned’, and moral concepts especially so. The meaning of ‘human being’ – 
                                                 
165 Blum (1994: 34-5) provides three examples as different cases of moral perception. His second 
example is close to the second one that I am discussing here: Julio, an employee, has a leg condition 
that causes him pain and asks Theresa, the administrator of his department to make arrangements to 
accommodate his disability. Theresa meets some of Julio’s demands but constantly falls short of 
them and makes him feel uncomfortable about asking. As Theresa ‘knows’ about the disability, so 
Hopkins ‘knows’ about the deaths, so. What they fail to see is the significance, respectively, of the 
disability and of those deaths. The failure may be said to amount to a lack of full understanding of 
what death and disability mean, in the contexts in which they encounter them. 
150 
 
although it has a kernel of meaning described by Weil as the hesitation that 
encounters with other people cause – develops for each of us over time, changes 
according to experience, and gets refined the more we pay attention to its use and 
to the realities in relation to which it is used. This also shows that correct perception, 
made possible by attention, often requires time and conceptual ‘training’.166 
While some aspects of a concept are more salient than others, appearing as 
innate and resulting in automatic responses, like the hesitation in the case of ‘human 
being’, other aspects are less evident and require effort, time, and training to grasp 
them. Hence the ‘deepening’ of concepts that Murdoch recommends as part of 
successful moral perception. While the immediate exercise of attention toward a 
person may disclose a kernel of meaning which is the same for everybody, manifest 
for instance in the recognition of their autonomous existence, other elements of the 
content of the perception vary, depending on individual experience with the concept.  
Concepts may require ‘deepening’ principally for three reasons, all 
connected with Murdoch’s idea that reality is ‘transcendent’ (beyond our selves and 
not immediately available): first, reality is complex, and some realities are infinite ly 
so (human beings being a case in point, as Murdoch stresses), so our grasp of reality 
will necessarily be slow and gradual, given the limitations of the human mind. 
Secondly, concepts are also complex, not only in relation to the complexity of 
reality, but also in relation to the complexity of the attitudes, responses and thoughts 
of the human beings who use them. Thirdly, as perception is not immediate but 
mediated by the imagination, which develops with time and experience, so the 
ability to perceive clearly may require knowledge or training. Therefore, accurate 
and clear perception of reality through concepts can be a very long process, where 
experience and the use of a concept in various situations play an important part. All 
this also means that attention itself, while it can be exercised in individua l 
circumstances and for limited periods of time, is more effective in yielding moral 
perception when it is trained, and transformed into a habit or attitude. 
                                                 
166 That is why, as Raimond Gaita puts it, ‘there are no moral whizz-kids’ (2004: 265). On this point, 
the present view is very close to virtue ethics  and the idea that moral excellence is connected more 
properly with ‘wisdom’ than ‘knowledge’.  
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4.3 Testing Perception, Testing Concepts 
In both cases, while attention enables correct perception, it is also possible to be 
mistakenly convinced that one is being attentive. It is possible, for example, to take 
a response originating from self-concerned distortion to be a response to a correctly 
perceived moral reality, or to believe that one’s set of concepts adequately 
represents a situation. This leads to perceptions that can be distorted in various ways 
and degrees: we can be blind to some features of the situation, we can perceive the 
situation in its wholeness but fail to take in its significance, we can apply some 
completely unfitting concepts to it, or some concepts that are similar to those 
required but not the correct ones, and so on. If moral concepts are interna lly 
connected with motivation, distorted perception also affects responses and action, 
because a situation perceived in a distorted manner also presents the wrong 
possibilities for choice, since ‘I can only choose within the world I can see, in the 
moral sense of “see”, which implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagina t ion 
and moral effort’ (SG 37). This highlights the importance of exercising attention 
and correcting one’s perception. 
To increase the accuracy of moral perception, perception and concepts can 
be tested in various ways. First, by self-examination, to make sure that one has no 
self-concerned reason to perceive things in a certain way. However, given the 
possibility of self-deception, of which Murdoch is keenly aware, perception and 
concepts also need to be measured against a reality external to the individual. Thus 
a second way to improve moral perception is by triangulating one’s perception with 
that of other people. This is particularly important in relation to the deepening of 
concepts or in relation to more sophisticated concepts, where, as in most cases, the 
automatic response does not exhaust the concept, and it is necessary to learn and 
develop the use of the concept through how others deploy it as well as how others 
respond to the reality the concept is meant to capture.  
Moral perception can also change in response to similar prompts to those 
that change visual perception more generally: as we can be brought to see a duck in 
what we thought was a rabbit by being told that it could be thus seen, so what 
seemed like a cold attitude can be read as a protective attempt to conceal emotion, 
if we are alerted to that possibility. In these examples, we can also see the role of 
the imagination stressed by Murdoch: in both cases, perception changes by 
broadening one’s conception of possibilities.  
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These are helpful ways to justify and test the perception of value, but the 
authority lies with the reality the concepts aim to capture. All the tests, 
improvements and triangulation depend on their fittingness to the moral reality that 
is their object. As we saw at the start of the previous section, concepts link mind 
with reality, but reality provides the starting point for concept creation and 
deployment (concepts and words develop, as Murdoch puts it, ‘through close 
attention to objects’, SG 32). These are not tests which establish once and for all 
the fittingness of the perception to the situation; they are, rather, ways of working 
on the perception, to change it or refine it. 
4.4 Obedience 
The kind of response occasioned by perception, as we have seen, can vary between 
automaticity and responses that require a slower and more sophisticated grasp of 
concepts. Both in the case of basic or kernel concept deployment and in the case of 
less evident or more sophisticated aspects of concepts, however, it is possible to 
perceive so clearly and vividly that the response follows as if by necessity. This is 
the goal of moral perception, and the acme of attention: ‘if I attend properly I will 
have no choices and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at’ (SG 40). This is 
the idea of ‘obedience’ that, as we saw Murdoch borrows from Weil (Ch.3§3). The 
Good Samaritan, Weil writes, has a different perception from the Levite and the 
priest, he sees something different, thanks to his bestowal of attention on the injured 
man; the attention of the Samaritan is such that, having ‘renounced himself’ through 
the unselfing required by love and attention, he is compelled by the reality that 
presents itself to him, which includes the need of the man and his own ability to 
help: 
Christ taught us that the supernatural love of our neighbour is the exchange of 
compassion and gratitude which happens in a flash between two beings … only one 
stops and turns his attention towards it. The actions that follow are just the automatic 
effect of this moment of attention. The attention is creative. But at the moment when 
it is engaged it is a renunciation. (WG 103) 
Attention, or clear perception of reality inspired by the Good, can be all that 
morality requires, including understanding, judgment, and action. This is one sense 
in which, as Murdoch writes, reality is normative (SG 37). This is also the meaning 
of Murdoch’s ‘strong’ moral perception, where ‘true vision occasions right conduct’ 
(SG 66). In most cases, moral perception is only successful to an extent, because it 
is very difficult to attend and free oneself from the demands of the ego, thus yielding 
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more tentative responses, or only the recognition of the reasons to respond and of 
the possibility to do so. But when attention is fully exercised, and perception 
successful, the recognition of reasons turns into direct motivation, being pulled by 
the object or situation, as if by necessity. 
5 Against Supervenience 
Murdoch’s moral perception, as we have seen, combines the morality of the 
perceiving faculties with the morality of the perceived reality. On her model, a 
moral faculty is required to perceive both moral and non-moral reality. Like any 
other reality, moral reality is perceived as ‘there’. This contrasts with the view that, 
while morally neutral facts or properties can be objects of perception, moral ones 
cannot, being instead derived, in various ways, from the perception of morally 
neutral ones. On Murdoch’s view, instead, there is no need to explain moral 
properties or facts in terms of non-moral ones, for the reasons above. This radical 
view is not fully accommodated even by most theories of moral perception, where 
often the attempt is to explain the perception of moral properties in terms of their 
relation to non-moral ones, for example in terms of supervenience. A.E. Denham 
(2001) understands Murdochian moral perception in such a way. On Murdoch’s 
model, Denham argues, moral properties are supervenient or ‘aspectual properties’: 
they represent ways of seeing a particular situation. Aspectual or supervenient 
properties are experienced as direct objects of perception, although upon analys is 
they can be found to supervene on other properties, which Denham identifies, in 
the moral case, with, primarily, ‘other people’s concerns and interests’ (2001: 
613).167 On this model, while moral properties supervene on non-moral ones, they 
are not fully analysable in terms of the non-moral or base properties because, 
Denham writes, moral properties are phenomenological, dependent on ‘what it is 
like’ to perceive them, while the base facts are not, and can be analysed in other 
ways. Therefore, for Denham, moral properties are placed on a different ontologica l 
level from non moral ones. 
                                                 
167 In relation to Wittgens tein’s notion of aspect-perception (PI part 2 section xi), it is not obvious 
that it is possible to identify an object which is then seen in one way or another: the duck-rabbit can 
be seen either as a duck or as a rabbit, but what is the ‘it’ that can be s een as either? Aspect perception 
is perception of supervenient properties only if we hold that there is such a thing as a primary object 
that can be seen in one way or another, but Wittgenstein suggests instead that perception of aspects 
is primary. See Mulhall (1990) and Baz (2000); also Baz (2010) and Mulhall’s (2010) reply. 
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Denham’s account represents an attempt to combine the idea that moral 
properties are not primary with the possibility of perceiving them, thus avoiding 
inference: where there is inference, there is no perception. This is the idea that is at 
the centre of supervenience theories of moral perception generally: although moral 
properties supervene on non-moral ones, the moral properties are not inferred from 
the non-moral one. This kind of theory of moral perception has been more fully 
developed by Robert Audi (2013) who, similarly to Denham, holds that we perceive 
moral properties via the perception of their ‘grounds’, which are non-moral.168 That 
is because, according to Audi, moral properties are not ‘perceptual’, but 
‘perceptible’: while they are available to perception, they are so not ‘brutely’ via 
the senses only, but via an intellectual ability to represent something as a moral 
property. Murdoch would agree that the senses are not enough to perceive moral 
properties, but, given her account of the penetration of imagination and concepts in 
perception, she would argue that the senses alone are likely not enough to perceive 
anything. 
It is a merit of Audi’s theory that it makes moral properties not at all ‘queer’, 
equating them with other properties which Audi calls ‘perceptible’, like anger or 
intelligence or freedom or relations. Limiting perception to what the senses deliver 
brutely would deny that all sorts of beliefs that we generally consider as derived 
from perception – like the belief that water is coming out of the tap, on Audi’s 
example – are a matter of perception at all. Likewise, as in Wittgenstein’s example 
of the smiling face (Z §225), it would appear odd to say that when we see a smile, 
what we really perceive are the upward curve of the line of the mouth, slight 
wrinkles around the eyes, etc. What we see is a smiling face.169 
While it is possible to infer that water is coming out of tap, or that a face is 
smiling, that usually happens when someone is not competent with the concepts; 
for instance, if someone does not know what a smile is. But generally, we do not 
need to. In fact, the description of the lines in one’s face would not necessarily lead 
one easily to conclude that the face is smiling. Goldie (2007) preserves these 
                                                 
168 ‘Moral perception always comes by way of non-moral perception’ (Audi 2013: 35). 
169  ‘“We see emotion.” – As opposed to what? – We do not see facial contortions and make 
inferences from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face 
immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other descriptions of the 
features. – Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face. This belongs to the concept of 
emotion’ (Wittgenstein 1967: §225. See also §220-223). 
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intuitions while keeping the possibility of inference together with moral perception 
by comparing moral perception to a skill: while at first the chess player needs to 
infer what the right moves are, with time and expertise she will be able to just ‘see’ 
how to beat her opponent. The idea that moral perception requires, to a certain 
extent, experience, trial and error, and refinement of one’s faculties and conceptual 
capacities, is also part of Murdoch’s model. However, this process does not exhaust 
moral perception, which can be more primitive, as Murdoch shows, and in some 
cases does not need to go through any inferential route at all (as in the handshake 
example, arguably, or as in the primitive reaction to human beings – and perhaps to 
some other animals too). 
There is, however, another explanation of what happens in the tap and face 
examples, different from the one offered by Denham and Audi, and which is more 
fitting with Murdoch’s model of perception. On the supervenience model, we 
perceive a face or a smile, but only in virtue of perceiving the lines that make them 
up: the lines are still primary. The same can be said of the ‘skill’ model. By 
Murdoch’s lights, however, whereby concepts enter perception in virtue of being 
‘deep moral configurations of the world’ (VCM 95), there is no reason to suppose 
that the concept of line is primary relative to the concept of face. Jonathan Dancy 
has criticised Audi along similar lines, challenging the idea that only that of which 
we have sensory phenomenal representation, without intrusion of other faculties or 
of experience, can count as something perceived. A car mechanic, to use Dancy’s 
example, can be properly represented as hearing the malfunctioning of the water 
pump, rather than as hearing a particular pattern of sounds; something similar can 
be said about listening to a song, or to a conversation. The insistence that in these 
cases there must be a more basic level of description, for Dancy, 
is likely to be built upon what I take to be a fundamental mistake in the philosophy 
of perception, namely the view that the primary, or basic object of perceptual 
awareness must be things for the sensing of which no training, knowledge or 
experience is necessary. Those tempted by this view suppose that training, 
knowledge and experience cannot alter the way in which things look, sound or feel 
to us. All they can do is to enable us to notice things we would not have noticed 
before, and no doubt when we are able to do that, our attention may be distracted 
from the more basic features that are still the primary and proper objects of sensation. 
Now I think of this view as a mistake. (Dancy 2010: 111) 
Murdoch’s view of concepts involves the possibility, as we have seen, of 
‘deepening’ the concepts that we use in perception, or at least some of them, so that 
in many cases perception can be altered by a better grasp of a concept, occasioned 
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for example by experience and reflection. Besides a basic level of perception, 
reality is so complex that we can always improve our understanding of what 
something is, and subsequent perceptions will reflect such progress.  
There are further reasons to describe the above examples as cases of 
perception rather than inference. To begin with, it is not always even possible to 
explain the contents of one’s perception in any other terms. The warmth of a 
handshake, for instance, may not, or at least not always, be satisfactorily defined in 
terms of the duration or the firmness of the grasp (here we return to the observations 
concerning thick concepts). In cases like those, the best or only way to explain one’s 
perception to someone unconvinced is – ‘look (or try) and see’. Murdoch’s 
conception of moral perception, then, involves the possibility, in moral 
disagreement, of just seeing different things. Hence the importance of being in a 
state of attention, which gives the subject the best chance of seeing things as they 
really are. Two attentive individuals, while they may not have exactly the same 
perception, are at least likely to have compatible perceptions of the same 
situation.170 
For these reasons, the supervenience model, often presented as the best 
description of Murdoch’s view of moral perception, fails to do justice to her view 
of perception as conceptual through and through, where the moral difference lies in 
what we see, and not only what we see things as. On the supervenience model there 
are non-moral facts upon which moral facts can be said to supervene. For Murdoch, 
however, it is not always possible to identify any underlying non-moral fact, 
because there may not be any. Perception can be perception of moral facts.  
There would, indeed, scarcely be an objection to saying that there were ‘moral facts’ 
in the sense of moral interpretations of situations where the moral concept in 
question determines what the situation is, and if the concept is withdrawn we are not 
left with the same situation or the same facts. In short, if moral concepts are regarded 
as deep moral configurations of the world, rather than as lines drawn round separable 
factual areas, then there will be no facts ‘behind them’ for them to be erroneously 
defined in terms of. (VCM 95, emphasis added) 
Murdoch is clear: on her view of concepts, there are no neutral facts ‘behind’ moral 
concepts. The use of the word ‘interpretation’ in the quote should not mislead : 
Murdoch is not suggesting that we can identify non-moral situations, and then 
                                                 
170 Cf. Weil (1946: 16-19), who notes that, while only God can have the absolutely correct view of 
a situation (which she calls ‘readings’), human beings can achieve at least partially correct views, 
so that it makes sense of think of possible criteria of correctness, however difficult the attempt to 
find them is. 
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interpret them according to moral categories. As the second half of the sentence 
shows, if concepts are regarded as configurations or interpretations, they are 
configurations of a reality which is not given independently of them. 
Conclusions 
In moral perception the central ideas of Murdoch’s philosophy come together and 
the importance of attention for morality becomes evident. Moral perception 
involves, on the one hand, the evaluative nature of consciousness, which presents 
reality in a moral light in all its activities, including the fundamental one of 
perception; on the other, it involves the existence of a moral reality, which Murdoch 
argues for with the Ontological Argument, which starts from the observation of the 
perception of moral properties in reality. Moral perception, therefore, refers both to 
the moral quality of the perceiving mind, and to the moral quality of the perceived 
reality.  
The identification of moral properties, which are out there in reality, is 
dependent on the subject’s possessing the relevant capacities, including not just 
sense faculties, but moral imagination and concept-competency, with the difference 
that the recognition of moral properties is far more difficult and often takes time 
and practise. Attention, as the faculty of moral perception, thus reveals something 
that the inattentive person just does not see: ‘the selfish self-interestedly casual or 
callous man sees a different world from that which the careful scrupulous 
benevolent just man sees’ (MGM 177). So the Samaritan, as Weil claims, sees 
something different lying by the side of the road from what the priest and the Levite 
see, and the ‘cockroaches’ that Hopkins sees are the result of a different perception 
from that which reveals human beings in need. There is no infallible rule to establish 
whose perception is correct. But through attention, one can put oneself in the best 
possible position, examining one’s biases and aiming at ‘love’ and justice, for 
perceiving correctly.  
Because perception operates through concepts, which link mind and world, 
the correct deployment of moral concepts also involves the appropriate responses. 
As concepts or aspects thereof can be more or less basic, innate or learned, so the 
responses that concepts are related to can vary. In all cases, however, because of 
the internal relation of concept and response, in the most successful cases of moral 
perception, when a moral reality has been perceived clearly through the appropriate 
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deployment of the right concepts, the response is automatic. Part of Murdoch’s 
central idea, that ‘morality is connected with knowledge’ (SG 38), is that correct 
perception occasions the appropriate responses. There is no need, in these cases, for  
choosing, deliberating, or applying principles. Correct perception of reality is 
sufficient for moral understanding and moral action. It follows that the faculty that 
enables such perception, attention, is central to morality, and attending is the most 
important habit to cultivate. 
The discussion of moral perception establishes the importance of attention 
in morality. In doing so, it unites the moral importance of the individual’s states of 
mind, where virtue coincides with attention (as argued in Chapters 3 and 4), with 
the existence of moral properties in the world (Chapter 2). These two ideas of 
Murdoch’s have been presented through a proposed framework which attempts to 
reconcile her transcendental claims (consciousness in inherently evaluative) with 
the realist ones (there exists a moral reality). 
Attention enables moral perception by desiring the Good and removing 
obstacles to clear perception, primarily, the distortions that come from the self. The 
meaning of desire for the Good has been examined in Chapter 4. Why the self is 
such a negative influence, and how, in what ways, and to what extent the obstacles 
coming from it are to be removed, is the subject matter of the last two chapters. 
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Chapter 6 
The Self in Attention 
Introduction 
While the first five chapters of the thesis have demonstrated the importance of 
attention in morality, based upon Murdoch’s framework, the last two chapters 
explore the ways in which attention is achieved and, more specifically, the role of 
the self in attention. The discussion of attention in Chapters 3 and 4 has highlighted 
the role of the self in achieving correct perception: the importance of love in 
discovering value whilst removing attachment and the possibility of attention being 
directed by the will, the operations of which depend on the specific background of 
consciousness of which it is part. In Chapter 5 I have also indicated how objective 
perception of reality through correct concept deployment can partly depend on a 
personal ‘deepening’ of concepts, which is at the same time necessarily perspectival 
and tested against the reality of the objects that the concepts are meant to capture. 
These considerations about the role of the self in attention are problematised 
not only by the requirement of objectivity in moral knowledge and perception, but 
also and more specifically by Murdoch’s remarks about the self being the main 
obstacle to attention and hence to moral goodness. If the self is the main impediment 
to clear perception, and if clear perception is the central requirement of morality, 
then the self is the main impediment to goodness. If this is true, it appears that what 
attention and hence morality require is a state of mind which is not only objective, 
but entirely impersonal. That is one possible understanding of the requirement of 
‘unselfing’, as Murdoch calls it. 
In this chapter and the next I attempt to make sense of these considerations 
in connection with the apparently contrasting positive contribution of the self in 
attention. Chapter 7 continues the discussion begun here by questioning the 
possibility of self-knowledge, both necessary to attention but also apparently 
opposed to it in its self-directed nature. The aim of the present chapter is to examine 
whether and how the sense of the importance of the self in attention can be retained 
without compromising the truth-discovering nature of attention, and thus mainta in 
the possibility of the individual’s moral improvement through an appropriate 
configuration of the self. This involves analysing the concept of ‘unselfing’ (one of 
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the two central aspects of attention, with love or eros) and asking whether it 
involves eliminating the self, or simply reconfiguring it. The discussion will clarify 
what the moral task of the attentive individual in relation to the self involves: in 
what ways, and to what extent, the negative influence of the self ought to be 
eliminated. The questions addressed in this chapter are, therefore: why is the self 
the main enemy of moral excellence, and can its negative influence be removed 
while keeping its positive role?  
1 Unselfing as Suppressing the Self 
After having introduced, in ‘The Idea of Perfection’ (SG), the idea of moral effort 
as an effort of attention aimed at seeing the real, in ‘On God and Good’ (SG) 
Murdoch explains further what such effort requires. More specifically, the second 
essay examines the impediments to be overcome in order to achieve a correct 
perception of reality, which is the path of moral improvement. ‘In the moral life’, 
Murdoch writes in a much-quoted passage, ‘the enemy is the fat relentless ego. 
Moral philosophy is properly … the discussion of this ego and of the techniques (if 
any) for its defeat’ (SG 52). While attention is essential to the moral life, the ego 
works against it. It follows that, if attention is the effort to see clearly, the ego is 
connected with distorted perception. And indeed Murdoch continues by introduc ing 
another obstacle to goodness, presented as the natural outcome of the equally 
natural activity of the ego: ‘the enemy of excellence in morality … is personal 
fantasy: the tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which 
prevents one from seeing what is there outside one’ (SG 59). Fantasy, spun by the 
ego, is contrasted with reality, made perceptible by attention. The latter constitutes 
the road to moral excellence: ‘virtue is the attempt to pierce the veil of selfish 
consciousness and join the world as it really is’ (SG 93). The justification of this 
view of morality and virtue has been the subject matter of the previous chapters. 
What remains to be done is to look a little closer at the way in which clear vision 
can be achieved or in which one can fail, and the moral psychology behind it. 
While in the quotes above it is the ego that is seen as responsible for fantasy 
and hence for lack of attention and moral failure, elsewhere Murdoch talks about 
‘self’ and ‘psyche’ as operating in the same way. Murdoch does not always 
distinguish between ‘self’, ‘ego’ and ‘psyche’ for the purposes of identifying what 
creates fantasies and this, as we shall see, is part of the difficulty in understand ing 
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what the obstacles to attention are. While ‘self’ appears to be a more comprehens ive 
notion, ‘ego’ has a narrower focus, and ‘psyche’ has more technical psychologica l 
connotations. In Chapter 6 of MGM, however, Murdoch presents them as if they 
were the same concept: ‘“The self” sounds like the name of something, soul, ego 
psyche, essential person’ (MGM 147). For the moment, let us follow Murdoch on 
this, and use these words to refer to the individual subject of consciousness, which, 
according to her, includes the tendency to engage in creating illusions: ‘the self, the 
place where we live, is a place of illusion’ (SG 93). The claims about the self-
protective and distorting nature of the mind are presented as empirical claims, partly 
meant to conform to ordinary observation, and partly derived from Freud. 
Appealing to what she sees as ‘true and important’ in Freud, Murdoch paints a 
picture of humanity as moved by ‘quasi-mechanical’ forces, with the overall aim of 
protecting the self and with the consequence of obscuring reality:171 
He [Freud] sees the psyche as an egocentric system of quasi-mechanical energy, 
largely determined by its own individual history, whose natural attachments are 
sexual, ambiguous, and hard for the subject to understand or control. Introspection 
reveals only the deep tissue of ambivalent motive, and fantasy is a stronger force 
than reason. Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to human beings. (SG 51) 
Creating fantasy is, in this picture, the main tendency of the psyche. Describing the 
psyche as a ‘mechanism’ highlights that the fantasy-making process is almost 
automatic and not entirely under one’s conscious control, and thus very difficult to 
avoid.172 It is crucial to the present argument, however, that avoiding fantasy, while 
very difficult, is not entirely impossible: first, some degree of conscious control is 
possible; second, direct conscious control is not always necessary to avoid fantasy, 
the control being deferred, as we saw in Chapters 4 and 5, to the training of 
consciousness and the creation of virtuous habits of attention. Therefore, as 
Murdoch claims, fantasy, defined as ‘the proliferation of blinding self-centred aims 
and images’, is contrasted with ‘attention to reality’, which is instead ‘what 
                                                 
171 This idea can also be referred back to Simone Weil, who sees the universe, and therefore also 
human life, as governed by the mechanical forces of necessity – which she calls ‘gravity’. In the 
case of human beings, gravity manifests itself in the illusions and acquisitive desires that derive 
from taking one’s position in the universe as central and most important, which de-realises 
everything else. The opposite of gravity is ‘grace’, which is made possible (but not secured) by 
attention and obedience. 
172 Two kinds of automatic processes have emerged in this and the previous chapter: on the one hand, 
the automaticity of responses arising from attentive correct perception; on the other, the automaticity  
of fantasy. In both cases, however, the automatic process is also under the subject’s control, through 
the constant redirection of psychic energies which create the quality of consciousness from which 
these processes emerge (cf. Ch.5§4.4). 
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counteracts the system’ (SG 67). The strong tendency to fantasise is directly related 
to the importance of attention: the more pervasive distorted perception, the more 
pressing the requirement to attend. To put the burden of morality on the possibility 
to counter the ‘dear self’ is not original to Murdoch.173 Her main point, however, is 
that the self is not only something that we tend to unduly favour, but also that such 
privileging creates an epistemic failure, distorting our perception and understand ing 
of the world, and there is where moral problems begin. 
If the aim of morality is to perceive correctly, and if fantasies impede such 
perception, then the ultimate aim of the subject aspiring to moral improvement must 
be to eliminate fantasies and to attend to reality and try to perceive it truthful ly. 
This is indeed Murdoch’s suggestion. But by claiming that the enemy of the moral 
life is the self (or ego or psyche), she seems to take the idea further, claiming that 
it is the self itself, and not just the fantasies it produces, that has to be suppressed: 
‘the realism (ability to perceive reality) required for goodness is a kind of 
intellectual ability to perceive what is true, which is automatically at the same time 
a suppression of self’ (SG 66); ‘to silence and expel self, to contemplate and 
delineate nature with a clear eye, is not easy and demands a moral discipline’ (SG 
64). This requirement is condensed in the concept of ‘unselfing’, which recurs 
particularly in MGM. The concept is borrowed, like attention, from Simone Weil, 
a debt which is, as in the case of attention, acknowledged but not fully discussed.174  
There can be several reasons to talk about unselfing or suppressing the self, 
rather than just the elimination of fantasy. One is that focusing on fantasy as the 
target of moral criticism could appear to externalise the source of the problem, 
making the subject’s responsibility less clear. For this reason it is important to 
delimit the scope of fantasy as a morally pernicious element in terms of its cause. 
Fantasy is morally problematic primarily because it is understood as a distortion 
that one can be held responsible for – as in the parallel case of attention, where one 
of the reasons for calling it a moral concept is that one can be responsible for it (cf. 
Ch.4§1). For these reasons, what is understood here by fantasy is something limited 
                                                 
173 In fact, almost all moral theories warn against the natural tendency for self-concern: Aristotle 
urges to keep care for the self or ‘philautia’ (in itself potentially virtuous) within the limits of 
moderation; Kant recognise the claims of the ‘dear self’ as the main impediment to following duty: 
and most forms of utilitarianism, in the principle of equal consideration of interests, cut across the 
natural tendency to regard one’s own interests as special. 
174 Cf. MGM 245: ‘the mind is alert but emptied of self … the disciplined practice of various skills 
may promote a similar unselfing, or “decreation” to use Simone Weil’s vocabulary’. 
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to the operations of the self. As Murdoch understands it, fantasy is not only about 
imagining or indeed believing what is not the case, but it is also characterised by 
the involvement of the self (what kind of involvement is the problem I conside r 
below) in bringing about the false images or beliefs. Conversely, forms of 
misperception or false belief which are not caused by some particular feature or 
state of the self, and thus for which the individual cannot be held responsible, do 
not fall under the present concept of fantasy, and so do not necessarily oppose or 
hinder attention (and cannot, therefore, be classed as instances of moral failure). 
Examples of the latter kind of distortion include many cases of what psychology 
calls ‘illusions’, both cognitive and perceptual, where the stimulus or the context, 
rather than the self, causes the alteration in perception or conception.175 When a 
stick appears bent in water, or when we see movement in a film instead of a 
succession of shots, we are not in the grip of fantasy. Nor does fantasy apply to 
cases when insufficient or misleading information leads to false belief, as in the 
case of believing that the person we see every morning walking with a child to 
school is the child’s parent, when they are not (unless one has a particular wish or 
interest for that to be the case). 176  Cases in which we are being deceived by 
someone else also fall within this category. 
1.1 The Self as the Only Source of Fantasy 
If the self is what creates fantasy, focusing on eliminating the self, rather than only 
fantasy, is to attempt to solve the problem at its roots. However, suppressing or 
expelling the cause of fantasy, as the idea of unselfing seems to require, rather than 
changing it, is only necessary if what causes fantasy necessarily and inevitab ly 
engages in fantasy-making, and never issues in truthful perception. Furthermore, 
even if that were the case, suppression of self may still only be a partial solution, 
since the possibility is still open that other sources of fantasy exist. External sources 
of fantasy, however, would have to be elements that the individual was responsible 
for in order for them to be morally important, for the reasons just given. 
                                                 
175 See Colman 2009: 365. 
176 Unless we are responsible for the lack of information, and in cases where we have reasons for 
gathering more. For example, failing to find out more about where one’s food comes from and, in 
the case of animal-derived food, failing to find out how it was produced, does not count as morally  
innocent lack of information. 
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The possibility of other sources of fantasy besides the self has been observed, 
among others, by Lawrence Blum (2012: 314-6), who laments Murdoch’s lack of 
appreciation of social or cultural sources of perceptual and intellectual distortions. 
The accusation is not entirely fair, given that one of Murdoch’s concerns in relation 
to the difficulty to attend is about the influence of convention on perception.177 It is 
true, however, that the battle for clear perception, even the one against the force of 
convention, in Murdoch always seems to be fought at the individual level, and 
Murdoch says little about how to foster forms of attention socially.  
However, the idea that the self is the main source of fantasy can be preserved 
even in combination with the existence of social and cultural distortions, such as 
stereotypes or conventions, by observing how, for example, their power depends 
on how deeply they are internalised. In these cases, the self or ego can work ardently 
to maintain the beliefs acquired, to prevent discomfort or disruption of one’s world -
view. Even external sources of fantasy, then, can be intimately linked to the 
working of the ego and to how they are individualised and internalised by the 
individual. This interrelation is clear, as Blum (2012) himself notes, in the M&D 
story, where M’s perception of D as unpolished and unrefined issues from a 
conventional understanding of class division and its significance and consequent 
disregard for the individual case, shaping expectations and offering a readily 
available and little-examined vocabulary of thick concepts, such as ‘vulgar’ and 
‘unrefined’.178 But these social factors would not have the influence they have, and 
more specifically they would not so strongly influence perception, if they had not 
been made part of M’s own way of thinking, the abandoning of which requires some 
sacrifice on the part of her ego (admitting her own mistakes, being open to new 
interpretations, threatening her self-image, etc.).  
While the difference between internal and external sources of fantasy is far 
from clear cut, there are still distinctions to be made in relation to the degree of 
control one has over them, and the consequent degree of responsibility: the 
possibility of changing one’s racial prejudice, for example, for a peasant living all 
her life in a small village in the early 20th Century and who has never interacted 
                                                 
177 ‘One may fail to see the individual … because we are ourselves sunk in a social whole which we 
allow uncritically to determine our reactions, or because we see each other exclusively as so 
determined’ (‘The Sublime and the Good’, EM 216). 
178 Cf. Holland (2012: 260). 
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with someone from a different country, is different from that of a modern day 
politician who has a party and a personal interest in maintaining racial prejudice; 
so is their responsibility different in degree.179 
These observations support the focus on the self as source of fantasy, given 
the pervasiveness of its role in distorting perception, but they do not settle the 
question of whether the self is the only source of distorted vision. For my present 
purpose, however, it is not necessary to prove this much. It is sufficient to observe 
that the self is the most common cause of perceptual and intellectual distortion, and 
that external causes can also be internalised. It is therefore necessary to elimina te 
the self’s influence in order to achieve clear vision. Moreover, if attention is not 
only instrumentally valuable but also inherently so, in other words if attention is 
important not only because it brings about moral perception, but also because in 
being attentive one needs to exercise virtues, then eliminating the distortions caused 
by the self is a necessary part of the process of the purification of consciousness 
which Murdoch connects with virtue.  
1.2 The Self Only as Source of Fantasy 
Besides the above challenge, what is even more problematic about the notion of 
unselfing is the first of the two reasons for eliminating the self mentioned earlier, 
namely that eliminating the self is necessary if the self produces nothing but 
fantasies. That seems impossible to justify, although it can appear attractive given 
Murdoch’s radically pessimistic view of the self, which leads her, in some passages, 
to present fantasy not just as something that may arise from the self in certain states, 
but as something constitutive of the self (here ‘psyche’): 
The psyche is a historically determined individual relentlessly looking after itself … 
It is reluctant to face unpleasant realities. Its consciousness is not normally a 
transparent glass through which it sees the world but a cloud of more or less fantastic 
reveries designed to protect the psyche from pain. It constantly seeks consolation, 
either through imagined inflation of self or through fictions of a theological nature. 
(SG 76)180 
                                                 
179 There are also clear differences in responsibility relating to the consequences of the actions of 
the two people in the example, but my focus here is on epistemic responsibility , which, while it is 
closely related to responsibility relation to action and consequences, is nonetheless distinct and 
comes before it. 
180 The metaphor of transparent glass can be misleading, appearing to suggest that it is desirable for 
the mind to be a neutral mirror of reality. That, as we shall see below, is the opposite of what 
Murdoch thinks. The metaphor fits better with Weil’s conception, whereby impersonality is the 
moral goal, and intelligence is the mirror of the necessity of the world (cf. Vetö 1994: 29-30). 
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This passage can be read as suggesting that the self can only produce fantasies; such 
a claim is deeply problematic: it amounts to the suggestion that we never perceive 
the world correctly and, more specifically, that attention itself is impossible. If the 
self were unable to perceive correctly, the idea of moral improvement through 
attention – which constitutes one of the two main aspects of the moral importance 
of attention – would lose any sense. Not only would attention be impossible, but 
there would be, as a consequence, no possibility for the individual self to improve 
morally through increasingly clear understanding and by developing a better 
‘quality of consciousness’.181  
Instead, at the heart of Murdoch’s thought is the necessity, for morality, of 
a concept of self as something in which moral improvement and change take place 
(see for ex. MGM 250): the increasing apprehension of what is real, through 
attention, leads to an improvement of one’s quality of consciousness, which 
(according to Murdoch) constitutes the self. The attentive individual is the one 
whose consciousness is shaped by such repeated acts of attention and who then 
develops the ability to attend more often, perceiving more widely and more clearly. 
If the self were to be entirely suppressed, or if it were constitutively unable to 
perceive clearly, this process of moral improvement would not be possible and the 
very idea of attention would lose meaning. Since the requirement, in attention, to 
‘suppress’, ‘silence’ and ‘expel’ the self cannot refer to the whole of the individua l 
self, what ‘self’ means – in the context of unselfing – has to be something different. 
The rest of the chapter is devoted to the discussion of this problem. The aim is to 
account for the positive role of the self, where the self is not only a fantasy maker, 
while maintaining the necessity to eliminate fantasy created by the self. The 
discussion will issue in a clarification of the meaning of ‘unselfing’. 
2 Unselfing and Impersonality  
Attention aims at and enables truthful and clear perception. This also means that 
what attention reveals must be objectively correct. While correct perception is not 
achieved outside of a human perspective, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 5, the role 
of the individual in perception is still under discussion. One way to understand the 
                                                 
181 A similar point is made by Samantha Vice (2007: 65), who observes that since for Murdoch the 
moral life is a matter of educating the self (or, in the context of my argument, of making the self 
more attentive and thus more truthful), if the self were only a fantasy mechanism, the attempt to 
become morally better would not get off the ground. 
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requirement of objectivity is to conceive of objective perception as free of the 
subject’s influence in perception. In other words, following Murdoch’s use of ‘self’ 
as ‘individual’, attention requires the self to be suppressed or expelled, insofar as 
states or specific features of the self (desires, beliefs, emotions, character traits, 
expectations, etc.) influence perception. If attention refers to perception without the 
influence of the self, then unselfing can be taken to signify elimination of the self 
insofar as it influences perception. On this picture, the goal would be an impersona l 
state of attention.  
Conversely, on this model fantasy would be understood as perception or 
cognition which depends on some state of mind or personal characteristic of the 
subject: Ada’s sexist convictions make her judge women as less capable than men 
in a job interview; Louise’s depression makes everything look dull or hopeless; 
Carla’s relentless optimism makes her believe that things will turn out well when 
there is no reason to suppose they will. In epistemology, the influence of the 
subject’s states of mind or character traits on perception and cognition is referred 
to as ‘cognitive penetration’. Susanna Siegel proposes to define cognit ive 
penetration (here limited to visual experience, but applicable to other kinds of 
experience, also beyond perception) in the following way: 
If visual experience is cognitively penetrable, then it is nomologically possible for 
two subjects (or for one subject in different counterfactual circumstances, or at 
different times) to have visual experiences with different contents while seeing and 
attending to the same distal stimuli under the same external conditions, as a result of 
differences in other cognitive (including affective) states. (Siegel 2012: 205-6)182 
Mental states or features that can penetrate or influence experience include ‘moods, 
beliefs, hypotheses, knowledge, desires, and traits’. Some of these are transitory 
(moods) and others can be said to be constitutive of the individual self (character 
traits), but in either case what matters is that the influence comes from the particular 
self who is perceiving. Cognitive penetration seems to be what takes place in 
fantasy, when something is understood or perceived in a way which depends on 
features specific to the subject; while the ‘realism’ of attention seems to require, 
conversely, that the subject is transparent to what she is presented with. This 
conception seems compatible with the overall idea, presented in Chapter 5, of moral 
perception as apprehension of features which are part of reality, where the concepts 
used to grasp it need to be tested against the object to which they refer. 
                                                 
182 Note that the concept of attention employed in the quote is not the same as the present one. 
168 
 
In Siegel’s example, Jill has the belief that Jack is angry with her; on 
subsequently meeting Jack, and seeing his face, she perceives it as an angry face, 
whereas in other circumstances (without the prior belief that Jack is angry), ex 
hypothesi, Jill would not see anger in Jack’s face. In this example, Jill’s belief 
determines her perception and by doing so leads her to a false or distorted 
perception (Siegel 2012). Following this line of thought, we can say that if Jill were 
to be attentive, she would have to give up any element contributed by her particular 
self to her perception, in this case the prior belief that Jack is angry and that he 
would be so when she met him, and instead approach Jack by being completely 
open to observe whatever she is presented with, trying as much as possible not to 
let her belief play any role. This description refers to an ideal situation: it is unlike ly 
to be completely possible for an individual to approach new situations having 
entirely shed prior beliefs and generally not allowing any subjective mental state to 
influence the present perception. This is not a fatal problem, however, because, as 
we have seen, attention is ‘perfectionistic’: what is required is to get progressive ly 
closer to the ideal, but the attempt is constantly renewed, and so is the measure of 
success. It follows that the attentive subject is the one who succeeds in 
progressively minimising the role of the self in perception. In the present case, Jill 
may remind herself that she believes Jack to be angry, for example, and, knowing 
that this may be a factor in her perception, be less inclined to credit her initia l 
spontaneous impressions.183 Attention seems to require the minimising of cognitive 
penetration.  
An exemplary passage which has been taken to support the idea of the 
impersonality of attention is the one where Murdoch seems to interrupt the MGM 
chapter ‘Consciousness and Thought – II’ to insert three quotations from Rilke 
about the process of artistic creation, to illustrate, as she calls it, the moral idea of 
‘pure consciousness’ or ‘perception without reverie’ (one of Weil’s definit ions of 
attention).184 In the passages, attention and unselfing are central. Rilke is praising 
Cezanne’s painting because of its ‘animal attentiveness’, for watching its subject 
with the ‘attention of a dog’ and with ‘humble objectiveness’, culminating in the 
                                                 
183  This example also highlights the importance of self-knowledge for attention, discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
184 ‘Pure consciousness’ or ‘pure cognition’ are the terms used by Zen thinker Katsuki Sekida to 
refer to consciousness or cognition undistorted by the empirical ego; see the discussion of Sekida’s 
Zen way in MGM 239-50. 
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prescription of an art that is ‘anonymous’, where even love has been excluded from 
the painting. The reproach to painters who fall short of excellence is voiced with 
the words: ‘they painted “I love this” instead of painting “Here it is”’ (MGM 246-
7). 
As Antonaccio (2000) suggests, one could easily read this passage as 
advancing the idea that self and reality are opposed to each other, so correct 
perception is wholly impersonal. This would mean that the unselfing required by 
truthfulness is an ‘extinction of self’, precisely in the sense of a ‘withdrawal of 
subjectivity’. Similarly, in her more recent work on Murdoch, Antonaccio 
concludes: 
The sharp distinction drawn here between the artist’s personal or subjective desire 
(‘I like it’) and the clear vision she struggles to achieve (‘There it is’) suggests that 
‘reality’ stands apart from the self as something wholly ‘impersonal.’ It is something 
that can be grasped only through the withdrawal of subjectivity – that is, through a 
complete renunciation of desire and an extinction of self. (Antonaccio 2012: 138)185 
On this reading, Rilke’s remarks suggest that subjectivity must be withdrawn in 
attentive perception, and that unselfing is just such withdrawal or elimination of 
subjectivity. Attention is impersonal, because the perceiving subject’s individua lity 
does not play a role in the perception of the object.  
2.1 Against Impersonality 
Although identifying unselfing with the suppression of any contribution of the self 
to perception seems to be an easy solution, because of the requirement of objectivity 
for attention, the picture of the perceiving agent that it entails is deeply problematic. 
If the unselfing required in attention involves the elimination, or rather attempted 
elimination, of any participation of the individual self in perception, this reduces 
the role of the attentive self to a mere impersonal spectator. Such a self is a ‘mirror’, 
reflecting what it perceives without adding anything personal. This self, as subject 
of perception, looks like an invisible point of pure agency, akin to the subject of 
existentialist theories, which Murdoch characterises as ‘thin as a needle’ (SG 53). 
The fact that Murdoch fiercely opposes this notion of self is a first reason for unease 
                                                 
185 Antonaccio is here referring to a similar passage to the one I quoted above, but from SG: ‘Rilke 
said of Cezanne that he did not paint “I like it”, he painted “There it is”’ (SG 59). While Antonaccio 
(2000), in her more recent work, sees this interpretation as capturing one element of Murdoch’s 
philosophy, in the earlier work from which I have quoted (Antonaccio 2000), she presents it as an 
interpretation that she considers misleading. 
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with this account of unselfing. More generally, as pointed out at the start, this 
suggestion does not square with Murdoch’s idea about the moral progress of the 
individual, which proceeds not by eliminating the self, but rather by achieving a 
better self through the ‘purification of consciousness’. While even the elimina tion 
of self requires a self to accomplish it, the goal also does not seem to be what 
Murdoch suggests for morality. 
One answer to this worry would be to maintain that unselfing does refer to 
the elimination of any role of the particular self in perception, and suggest that this 
points to a tension within Murdoch’s thought. This is the way chosen by Antonaccio 
(2012b) and Jordan (2008). Antonaccio, while stressing the importance of the 
individual in attention, takes ‘unselfing’ to be in tension with those ideas, 
identifying two currents in Murdoch’s thought: one is personal, creative and 
‘aesthetic’, which sees consciousness as engaged in a creative process in relation to 
reality, disclosing possibilities that are not available from an impersonal perspective 
or an empirical scientific method; the other, where unselfing is part of a ‘saintly’ 
ideal of ascetic self-negation, takes as its ideal an impersonal kind of objectivity 
where the individual qua individual has no role (Antonaccio 2012b: Chapter 6). 
Similarly, Jordan (2008) holds that one tendency in Murdoch’s thought, which 
includes her view of the ideal or ‘highest person’, is one where personal elements 
play no role. Going further than Antonaccio, Jordan suggests that Murdoch ‘offers 
a model where the suppression of the self (i.e., anything personal) is primary. In 
order to see the “real world”, as a consequence, one needs to rid oneself of his or 
her distinctive personality’ (2008: 235). Attention, in other words, is considered, at 
least partly, an impersonal endeavour. 
Contrary to this, I suggest that it is unnecessary to postulate two 
incompatible strands in Murdoch’s thought, and that the notion of unselfing can 
accommodate a different, not impersonal, interpretation. To interpret unselfing 
simply as ‘elimination of self’ fails to appreciate in what specific capacity the 
subjective element needs to be excluded in attention, unduly extending the 
exclusion to the perceiving subject in her wholeness. In other words, the 
misinterpretation arises when ‘self’ is considered as an indivisible entity.  
Let us take the Rilke passage above as an example. Firstly, it would be not 
only the sign of a different strand in the work, but plainly self-contradictory, for 
Murdoch to call for the suppression of self in the middle of a chapter advocating 
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the necessity of the self as continuity of consciousness for morality, and more 
specifically arguing for the importance of the individual in perception, both in terms 
of a self with a consciousness which is morally evaluable, and in terms of a self 
with a consciousness which is morally evaluating. Moreover, in SG Murdoch only 
uses the word ‘impersonality’ to refer to the ‘scientific’ conception of knowledge 
and truth she opposes, and similarly in MGM the concept is used mostly with 
suspicion, with reference to Kant’s philosophy and to characterise Plato’s Forms.186  
Murdoch’s philosophy contains a conception of objectivity and perception 
which can explain the requirement of unselfing in attention without appealing to 
impersonality. Murdoch believes that reality is not directly ‘mirrored’ by the human 
mind, but grasped through the exercise of the imagination, which is inherently 
evaluative. Each individual has a particular orientation to the Good and result ing 
understanding of and commitment to values, so that the imagination which presents 
reality to us is inescapably personal. Concepts, too, which are the tools with which 
we grasp the world, are evaluative instruments: which concepts we apply, and what 
we take those concepts to mean, reveal our evaluative grasp of the situation.187 
This does not mean, however, that ‘reality’ equates with each individua l’s 
grasp of it, or that each person can have a set of private concepts. As we saw in 
Chapter 5, the application of concepts to specific situations is subject to public rules, 
and the concepts themselves are not made up by the individuals, but learnt publicly 
with other people, within public contexts of use, in relation to specific objects or 
situations which are ‘there’ independently of the subject. But concepts, Murdoch 
argues, are not rigid and finite, but capable of development and ‘deepening’. The 
understanding of some concepts, like ‘courage’, ‘joy’, ‘repentance’, or ‘human 
being’, is, on the one hand, something that can be refined and deepened, potentially 
ad infinitum (this is Murdoch’s idea of perfectionism of knowledge and the 
‘transcendence’ of reality); on the other, importantly, such process takes place in 
the context of the individual’s life and experience (SG 25-6), as well as through the 
                                                 
186 In the case of the Forms, like in Murdoch’s idea of the Good, it is important to note that, while 
the Forms themselves are impersonal, the effort and desire to reach them is inescapably personal. 
187 Antonaccio (2012b) divides the argument for questioning the ‘ethics of impersonality’ between 
the idea that morality is an exercise of the imagination and the role of personality in moral perception. 
While I broadly agree with the content of her argument, I depart from her in two respects: first, I 
believe that Murdoch’s argument for the personal nature of perception and the role of the 
imagination are not restricted to what we consider ‘moral’; secondly, the role of personality in moral 
perception depends in part on the use of the imagination, so the two ideas a re better understood 
together. 
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individual’s faculties, her imagination, her character traits, her ability for empathy, 
her particular interests, etc.: 188 
The idea of ‘objective reality’, for instance, undergoes important modifications when 
it is to be understood, not in relation to ‘the world described by science’, but in 
relation to the progressive life of a person. (SG 26) 189 
This view of cognition and concepts, then, comes with a different view of 
objectivity, where the world is not the ‘impersonal world of facts: the hard objective 
world’ (SG 25), but a world understood and perceived by individuals through their 
imagination. On this view, there is not one single possible way of understanding or 
perceiving reality, but several compatible ways, depending on the individua l’s 
imaginative faculties. On the other hand, there are also ways of seeing reality which 
are not correct. This model accounts for the necessary limitation of individua ls, 
occupying a particular position and having limited faculties, and for the 
impossibility of occupying a perspective from nowhere. At the same time, the 
proposed model does not reject the notion of objectivity, but broadens it to include 
various compatible individual perspectives, as well as the evaluative process 
through which reality is apprehended.  
What makes the suppression of any contribution of the self in attention 
appear plausible, then, is not the requirement of objectivity itself, but a particular 
understanding of objectivity. 190 The interpretation of ‘unselfing’ as elimination of 
any personal factor in perception assumes precisely the ‘scientific’ view of 
objective knowledge that Murdoch criticises. Only if objective knowledge and 
correct perception are conceived as being completely independent of the perceiving 
subject or self is the elimination of the self both possible and desirable. But if 
Murdoch is correct that the individual is ineliminable in perception and that 
objectivity and truthfulness in fact involve a personal element, then the unselfing 
                                                 
188 The balance between public and private is discussed further in the next chapter with reference to 
Wittgenstein’s ‘private language argument’. 
189 Murdoch acknowledges that science itself does not necessarily rely on the idea of an impersonal 
and mind-independent reality that she is attacking: When she calls for ‘the liberation of morality , 
and of philosophy as a study of human nature, from the domination of science’, she adds: ‘or rather 
from the domination of inexact ideas of science’ (SG 27). Yet often ‘science’ in Murdoch appears 
almost like a straw man, useful as a clearly defined counter position for her argument. 
190 Cf. also SG 32-3 and ‘… it is perfectly obvious that goodness is connected with knowledge; not 
with impersonal quasi-scientific knowledge of the ordinary world, whatever that may be, but with a 
refined and honest perception of what is really the case…’ (EM 330, emphasis added). See also 
Antonaccio (2000: 139): ‘far from equating realism with the empiricist assumptions of the scientific 
gaze, Murdoch makes it clear that realism is always keyed to a personal vision … Yet moral 
objectivity or realism is not divorced from the perceiving subject; rather, these terms only make 
sense within the deeply personal field of human moral vision’. 
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of attention cannot require elimination of the self’s contribution to perception. 
World-revealing attention, in other words, is not impersonal.  
Therefore, the individual qualities and faculties of the subject are not a 
hindrance but an aid to clear perception. To return to the Rilke example, we can see 
that the necessity not to display one’s personality and get ‘beyond even love’ within 
the painting must be distinguished from the requirement for the artist to perceive 
(and paint) in an impersonal way, excluding the love she feels for her subjects. As 
Rilke writes, Cezanne did not paint ‘I love it’, but it was precisely by loving the 
object (by looking at it with the ‘just and loving gaze’ of attention) that he was able 
to communicate it so ‘purely’, without selfish distortion. ‘This consuming of love 
in anonymous work’ (MGM 247) requires the individual’s love to be there in the 
first place, and it is through the consuming of that love that the object is perceived 
truthfully, so that in the end, in the perceived object, the love, consumed, is not to 
be seen: ‘love becomes invisible (Cordelia), its activities and being are inward’ 
(MGM 247). The subjective element must be absent in what is perceived, absent 
from what one sees, but it need not (should not) be absent in the process of 
perception, as an integral part of the perceiving subject. In this sense, subjectivity 
is a ‘tool’ of perception, not the result – just like, for example, different people are 
able to reach the same location on foot, or cycling, or by car, etc.  
On this view, the notion of cognitive penetration introduced above, whereby 
the subject’s mental states or character traits influence perception, becomes not only 
harmless to attention, but a constitutive element of it. This is true, at least, in some 
of its manifestations: just as imagination can become fantasy, and an apparent 
orientation to the Good can be mistaken and produce false values, so cognit ive 
penetration and the contribution of the subject to perception can lead, as we have 
seen, to the opposite of clear and objective perception. But there are cases when the 
subject’s contribution can also be essential to knowledge. It is so in the case, to take 
another example from Siegel, of the moth expert who can, in the same situation, 
identify moths more easily than the non-expert, because of prior knowledge and 
expectations. Or, as in the example from Dancy in the previous chapter, the car 
mechanic can hear the malfunctioning of the water pump thanks to her knowledge, 
whereas lacking such knowledge the malfunctioning would be identified by a 
process of inference. Yet more relevant to our discussion, Siegel also mentions the 
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case of the influence of some character traits, which can aid rather than hinder the 
pursuit of truth: 
In some cases, cognitive penetration can be epistemically beneficial … If iris 
Murdoch and John McDowell are correct in thinking that having the right sort of 
character lets you see more moral facts than someone lacking that character sees 
when faced with the same situation, then there too, your perceptual experience 
becomes epistemically better, thanks to its being penetrated by your character. 
(Siegel 2012: 201) 
‘The right sort of character’ can include virtues such as honesty and humility, which 
aid truthful understanding. So we can see that perception influenced by the subject 
does not by itself qualify as fantasy, and unselfing does not amount to elimina tion 
of the influence of the self as a contributing factor in perception. Skills, knowledge 
and virtue are in fact part of the individual’s contribution to correct perception. 
Particular individual characteristics such as the above also contribute to achieving 
attention more easily, among which are honesty, selflessness and the ability to focus. 
This shows that there is no incompatibility, as Antonaccio (2012b) and 
Jordan (2008) claim, between the notion of unselfing and the importance of a rich 
consciousness and of a sense of continuous self for the individual, or between the 
‘ascetic’ ideal that Antonaccio identifies in Murdoch and a personal, imaginat ive 
understanding of the world. On the contrary, the two are interdependent. While 
Jordan is correct in claiming that ‘[Murdoch’s] critique of the personal standpoint 
is oriented toward the goal of ‘seeing the real’, such critique does not involve 
eliminating the personal perspective, and it certainly does not entail that ‘in order 
to see the “real world” one needs to rid oneself of his or her distinctive personality, 
which includes one’s personal loves’ (Jordan 2008: 235). Nor is there a contrast, as 
Antonaccio and Jordan identify it, between unselfing and the ‘reorientation’ of the 
self, a change of focus and of objects of concern which Murdoch frequently refers 
to as the means to moral improvement.191 Once again, the conflict would only exist 
if unselfing referred to the elimination of any role of the individual subject in correct 
perception and specifically in attention. But, as we have seen, the individua l’s 
contribution to perception is only harmful in some of its manifestations. Let us now 
look at what these are and how they come about. 
                                                 
191 See for ex.: ‘Murdoch’s characterisation of the good life here is notably different from her earlier 
suggestion that it is a reorientation of love toward a worthy object’ (Jordan 2008: 235) and ‘in  
contrast to the ‘detachment’ and near ‘extinction of self’ noted earlier, these passages [on M&D] 
suggest on the contrary that good vision has its own eros’ (Antonaccio 2000: 140). 
175 
 
3 Unselfing as Suppression of Self-Directed Concern 
If unselfing is not the suppression or elimination of the contribution of the 
individual self to perception and understanding, what is it? Since attention is 
opposed to fantasy, and since the self is the main creator of fantasy, we still need to 
understand what it is about the self (what particular way of understanding it, or what 
activity, or what configuration of it) that is involved in fantasy-making and that 
disappears if attention is exercised. Observing what it is in the subject’s 
involvement in perception that makes it beneficial rather than damaging to attention, 
together with the idea of reorientation just introduced and with some of Murdoch’s 
remarks about the nature of the self, can point towards a solution. 
3.1 Fantasy as Self-Directed Concern 
In defending the importance of the individual self in attention, I have remarked on 
how certain features or states of the self can be an aid rather than hindrance to 
correct perception. Evidently not all of the states or qualities of the self contribute 
positively to correct understanding, as is the case with Jill’s belief about Jack’s 
anger, which causes her to misperceive Jack’s facial expressions. Among the states 
or features of the self which do, on the other hand, help to broaden or improve one’s 
perception or understanding, I have mentioned certain cases of expertise (as with 
the moth expert who can identify moths where another person would see nothing) 
and virtues (the sympathetic person, for instance, is better able to identify the state 
of mind of others; patience allows for more details to become visible; love is 
connected with openness to see and accept what the object of love is really like). 
These features or states of the self share something which is relevant to attention: 
the fact that the agent’s consciousness, in its focus or concern, is turned to 
something external; so it appears that the virtues that aid attention are those which 
make the object most clearly and vividly present to the subject.192  
For instance, love, as we saw in Ch.4§3, is chief among the virtues or states 
of mind in being both personal and an occasion for clear vision. ‘Pure’ love, when 
devoid of possessiveness, brings about ‘a process of unselfing where the lover 
learns to see, and cherish and respect, what is not himself’ (MGM 17). So in the 
Rilke example above, love is at the same time something personal, specific to the 
                                                 
192 Cf. Mole (2007: 82-3) for a similar point. 
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individual, and something that ‘turns’ the individual away from herself to the object, 
in order to perceive it as it really is. More generally, examples of virtue show that, 
while the individual self remains an important factor in attention, its positive 
contribution consists in directing consciousness to something external to itself (let 
us think of generosity, kindness, humility, etc.) 193  The more consciousness is 
absorbed by an external object, the less room for distortion there is.  
Therefore, if attention is aided by the self in directing consciousness 
outward, then what opposes attention, and is eliminated in unselfing, is not the self 
as such, nor the self as a factor in perception in any of its manifestations, but the 
self as object of one’s consciousness.194 This also explains what Murdoch means 
by the frequent mention of ‘ego-centric’ ‘egotistical’ and ‘selfish’ concern, in her 
descriptions of ‘bad’, non attentive consciousness: all these terms refer to a 
direction of consciousness, from self back to self, rather than to an inevitab le 
distorting feature of the self. Most of Murdoch’s own examples of attention involve 
such re-direction away from the self and to something external. The kestrel outside 
one’s window, a breath-taking mountain landscape, a beautiful work of art are ways 
to improve or ‘purify’ consciousness because they are catalysts of attention, 
forcefully directing consciousness away from the self and to something external. 
So, too, love is considered as a component of attention for its ability to completely 
turn the individual ‘away’ from herself and focus her entirely on another person, 
perceiving them more truthfully. 
This way of understanding the self in attention also fits with another element 
of Murdoch’s conception of the self. In SG the self is described not in static terms, 
as an entity, but as a ‘system of energy’ (SG 54), a complex of attachments or states 
of mind always directed to some object. If the self is such a ‘system’, then it is not 
inherently bad or good. What makes the self good or bad, in this picture, depends 
on its objects. Part of what makes an object of consciousness good is that it captures 
or encourages attention (like art and nature), rather than being conducive to self-
                                                 
193 An objection to this point can be that, for Aristotle, there are virtues which are ‘self-regarding’. 
While Murdoch talks of virtue, she does not mention Aristotle, and holds that the best virtue is love, 
which is not part of Aristotle’s list. Love is also a primarily other-regarding virtue. One answer to 
this objection, then, can be that Murdoch has particular virtues in mind. Another possible answer is 
to suggest that self-regarding virtues can be considered not merely virtues of concern for the self, 
but virtues in which self-concern is also necessary for the well-being of the community and generally 
other people. 
194 The distinction between self as agent and self as object is also found in Vice (2007: 61). 
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involved fantasy (like ‘bad’ art, which shows things as we would like them to be). 
This means that the quality of what one is concerned with is directly related to one’s 
ability to attend. 
Speaking of attention (or lack thereof) as ‘direction of consciousness’ is 
suitably broad, encompassing all of the subject’s faculties, including intellectua l 
observation, emotional participation, imaginative engagement (cf. Ch.3§3.2). The 
self naturally directs consciousness back to itself, because it is the source of desires 
and because of our natural interest in ourselves. Because of the interested and 
desiring quality of the self, and because desire, understood broadly, is the main 
factor in the direction of consciousness, the direction of consciousness towards the 
self can also be called a ‘direction of concern’. Fantasy arises when consciousness 
is turned to the self, but this does not refer to a purely intellectual contemplation of 
the self, but rather to an engagement and concern with it. Simone Weil expresses 
this idea by claiming that giving up self-centredness has to be done ‘not only 
intellectually but in the imaginative part of our soul’; it is that act of the whole 
person, including her concerns and desires, that enables her, in attention, ‘to awaken 
to what is real and external’ (WG 115). 
If Murdoch, following Freud, is right to claim that the self is its own natural 
object of concern, this means that the individual takes herself to be of special 
importance. Simone Weil observes, before Murdoch, the nature of this self-centred 
tendency and its moral (as well as metaphysical) aspect. Like Murdoch, Weil thinks 
that it is a fact that the self tends forcefully towards self-concern and that this goes 
against truthful perception. In the following, Weilian scholar Miklós Vetö presents 
a clear and condensed exposition of Weil’s idea of the self, its de-realising and 
morally dangerous tendencies, and its relation to attention: 
The whole sphere of the self is maintained by a centripetal force greedily sucking in 
reality, and the more one nears the centre, the more powerful is the force. However, 
the centre is nothing in itself; it is only aspiration. The self is a violent contraction 
paralysing and crushing the beings and things it encounters. Such an attitude serves 
the purpose of destroying the world, leaving there a trace of the self; it never helps 
us to understand the world. Even at the most simple level, the faculty of attention is 
the opposite of a contraction. (Vetö 1994: 42; cf. WG 111)195 
                                                 
195 Murdoch figures prominently in the acknowledgments of the book which, the author writes, ‘took 
shape under the sympathetic eye of Iris Murdoch’ (Vetö 1994: xi); we can then perhaps assume that 
Vetö’s interpretation is not at odds with Murdoch’s own unders tanding of Weil. 
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Weil thinks that the natural tendency of each individual is to imagine herself to be, 
metaphysically and morally, at the centre of the universe. Her explanation for the 
inherent egocentricity of humankind is that the individual, perceiving herself to be 
at the centre of space and time, believes herself also to be a moral and metaphysica l 
centre. The passage also points at the reasons why this self-centredness is at the 
same time a source of fantasy.  
Firstly, there is a distortion about the self, about the place that one occupies 
in the world: instead of conceiving of oneself as occupying a point like any other 
in the universe, the individual lives and thinks as if she were at the centre, infla t ing 
her own importance and taking her point of view to have special relevance. The 
sense of centrality of the self leaves little room for anything else to truly matter. 
Secondly, distortion about the world follows from this: if self is taken to be central, 
the external world will be in a sense unseen, given that self fills the majority of the 
field of vision. The self can be, and naturally is, so inflated that all it sees is itself, 
even reflected in the world. This is why Weil claims that the self is the negation of 
the other (N 213), and that the self’s ‘violent contraction’ can only ‘crush’ what it 
encounters.196 This self-concerned illusion of centrality, and the relative inability to 
fully appreciate the independent existence of other things and people as they are, is 
for Weil at the root of crimes against other beings: ‘if murderers knew their victims 
really existed, they would not be able to thrust their knives into them. Not to see 
obstacles is the terrible secret of the carnage of the victorious warrior, and of the 
misdeed of the criminal’ (Vetö 1994: 21; cf. NB 109). This thought highlights, 
negatively, the relevance of the motivational internalism observed in the previous 
chapter: just as clear perception of, for instance, another human being, makes 
certain actions impossible because they violate what the other is, so lack of such 
perception makes anything possible. Like Murdoch, Weil believes that evil is not 
so much an effect of ill will, nor a deliberate choice, but rather an inability to see 
correctly, whereby reality is obscured by the self or ego – a lack of attention. Only 
those who do not recognise that others are autonomous beings like themselves can 
commit certain actions against them, ‘because their victims become shadows for 
                                                 
196 Weil characterises this state as the illusion of being God, whose presence fills everything leaving 
no room for anything else. So, like God had to withdraw to allow the world to exist in creation, Weil 
indicates that the right thing to do for human beings, who live in the illusion of centrality, is to 
withdraw, to destroy the part of themselves that constantly leads back to the self, obscuring the real. 
This is unselfing. 
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them’ (NB 109). Murdoch expresses the same idea in SG: ‘The more the 
separateness and differentness of other people is realised, and the fact that another 
man has needs and wishes as demanding as one’s own, the harder it becomes to 
treat a person as a thing’ (SG 66). Achieving clear perception through attention is, 
therefore, the first imperative.  
3.1.1 Direct Self-Concern 
Self-directed concern, or ‘self-concern’ for brevity, can take various forms, 
predominantly divisible into two kinds: it can take the world as its explicit object, 
while distorting it or obliterating parts of it out of self-concern (as in projections of 
one’s fears, or in obsessions for particular objects); or it can appear in conscious 
and explicit form, where the individual disregards aspects of reality or other people 
out of explicit concern for herself. I consider the latter kind first.  
In such cases, there is little interest in the world in its own right and little 
desire to do justice to things as they are, as long as they do not relate to the subject. 
A striking example of this is provided by Katherine Mansfield’s description of the 
experience of an egotistical artist in a café in Paris; the protagonist, brooding upon 
his ambitions and his situation, happens to read a sentence which gives him an 
intense aesthetic experience. The sentence itself is of little value, and even the 
experience it occasions is not objectively interesting to the protagonist; its value 
lies in the self-gratifying interpretation that it makes possible: 
But then, quite suddenly, at the bottom of the page, written in green ink, I fell on to 
that stupid, stale little phrase: Je ne parle pas francais.  
There! It had come – the moment – the geste! And although I was so ready, it caught 
me, it tumbled me over; I was simply overwhelmed. And the physical feeling was 
so curious, so particular … But, ah! The agony of that moment! How can I describe 
it? I didn't think of anything. I didn't even cry out to myself. Just for one moment I 
was not. I was Agony, Agony, Agony.  
Then it passed, and the very second after I was thinking: ‘Good God! Am I capable 
of feeling as strongly as that? But I was absolutely unconscious! I hadn't a phrase to 
meet it with! I was overcome! I was swept off my feet! I didn't even try, in the 
dimmest way, to put it down!’  
And up I puffed and puffed, blowing off finally with: ‘After all I must be first-rate. 
No second-rate mind could have experienced such an intensity of feeling so . . . 
purely. (Mansfield 1953: 87-8) 
The object of experience is not only refracted through the self, but it is entirely 
dependent on the gratification of the self.197 The story brings to life Murdoch’s 
remarks that ‘self is such a dazzling object that if one looks there one may see 
                                                 
197 Note, ironically, the mention of self-extinction in the text. 
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nothing else’ (SG 31), in contrast to an actual experience of beauty, where the self 
would recede to contemplate the independent existence of something external and 
real. 
3.1.2 Indirect Self-Concern  
More often, the self distorts perception in more subtle ways. In many cases, the 
world is the apparent object of one’s concern, but self-concern distorts it to suit the 
self’s wants and needs, primarily by projecting the self and its desires onto it. These 
cases are not clearly distinct from the first kind. In both, the self is its own object 
of concern and occupies, more or less explicitly, the subject’s field of perception. 
Most of the time, however, distortion and obliteration take place covertly and not  
consciously, making them more difficult to counter. Both Murdoch and Weil 
observe this, and both stress how surreptitiously self-gratification born of self-
centredness can manifest itself, even in apparent cases of selflessness. 
These cases include what Antonaccio (2012b) has defined as ‘paradoxes of 
askesis’, where the practises aimed at moral purification turn out to be corrupting. 
Specifically, ‘the very attempt to overcome one’s ego may itself become a form of 
egoism in another guise’ (2012b: 164). One form the paradox can take is moral 
hubris, where the individual feels pride at the thought that she has been able to 
overcome her ego. Similar to this, but not identical, are cases when moral reflection 
aimed at truth and goodness becomes entangled in self-interest. So, for instance, 
Weil warns how easily ‘affliction’, which is potentially a way to unself by realising 
one’s own nothingness, is transformed into ‘mere’ suffering, which is full of 
consolatory illusions.198 In a different context, serious reflection upon the morality 
of one’s actions can, in a matter of seconds, tilt over into excessive interest in 
oneself, while the situation being considered, the true object of attention, becomes 
secondary to the morality of one’s own behaviour.199  Or, as Bernard Williams 
                                                 
198 .Murdoch comments: ‘we console ourselves with fantasies … instead … we must hold on to what 
has really happened’ (MGM 503). 
199 For instance: a friend asks for help looking after their children for an afternoon. You have a 
previous engagement and refuse. Afterwards you realise the friend’s need for help was more 
important than keeping the engagement. You spend some time wondering why you did otherwise 
and what features of your personality got in the way of understanding the appropriate thing to do. 
This may seem morally commendable and appropriately self-critical. Yet all the while, worries about 
your moral character overshadow considerations about the difficulty the friend had to face because 
of your actions. This is an example of what Murdoch means by remarking that ‘one's self is 
interesting, so one's motives are interesting, and the unworthiness of one's motives is interesting’ 
(SG 68). 
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(1981a) has observed, the refusal to perform a particular action because it is morally 
wrong, while knowing that if we don’t do it, it will be performed by someone else, 
can be a matter of ‘moral self-indulgence’. Philosophical theories themselves, 
according to Murdoch, with their ‘calming orderliness’, or even the formal unity of 
stories and art, can function as self-protective and illusory consolation in the human 
search for order and meaning in life. 
The second paradox of askesis that Antonaccio considers is ‘self deception’, 
where one overestimates one’s ability to renounce selfishness, and then is 
humiliated when failing to live up to the task. These cases serve to illustrate how, 
even in scenarios of genuine moral effort, fantasy generated out of self-directed 
concern is extremely widespread, in more or less subtle ways, making attention 
both so rare and so difficult: ‘we are not used to looking at the real world at all’ 
(EM 352). 
A famous story of romantic illusion can serve as an extreme example of the 
self-centred fantasy that is the opposite of attention, and that operates in various 
degrees in virtually everybody. Flaubert’s character Madame Bovary has become 
the epitome of the daydreamer, whose fantasies lead to destructive actions and a 
tragic end. 200 By living in a dream world motivated by self-gratification, Emma 
Bovary embodies lack of attention and corresponding distortion of reality, a failure 
to do justice to things and people around her.201 Although apparently concerned 
with her surroundings and desperately attached to her lover, Emma only wishes for 
things to be different from what they are, in order to conform to the idealised life 
she has constructed for herself out of reading sentimental novels.202  Differently 
from the previous example from Mansfield, Emma is not overtly thinking only 
about herself, yet her perceptions are in the same way determined by her attempts 
to gratify her self by picturing a reality which satisfies her romantic ideals. 
Uninterested in ‘the great and surprising variety of the world’ (SG 66) discoverable 
                                                 
200  Andrea Dworkin also notes the connection with Murdoch’s idea of fantasy as morally  
problematic in her reading of Madame Bovary (1987: 134). 
201 Turning a stale metaphor into a real practise, it is said that Flaubert took inspiration in writing 
Madame Bovary by looking at landscapes through pieces of coloured glass (Sodré 1999: 52). 
202 The negative influence of bad literature is not, I believe, the central question here. Emma does 
tend to read poor quality books (i.e. books that lack imagination and realism, aimed at satisfying 
specific desires in the readers, themselves lacking in the moral quality of attention to reality on t he 
part of the authors), but even more important is the attitude of the reader, who only focuses on what 
gratifies her in the fiction and fails to learn what she could from it; the books are not read attentively 
but, as Ignès Sodré notes (1999: 50) they are themselves props for her fantasies. 
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through attention, Emma indulges in daydreams which are dull and repetitive, 
lacking in imagination, because entirely geared towards satisfying the same 
unfulfilled desires. Even the men she claims to love are nothing but tools in 
fulfilling her romantic longings, something which is evident from her preference 
for daydreaming about her lover Rodolphe rather than spending time with him.  
In psychoanalytic terminology, Murdochian fantasy, i.e. fantasy born out of 
self-defence, is called a ‘defence mechanism’.203 In a psychoanalytic reading of 
Madame Bovary, Ignès Sodré explains how Emma’s daydreams are defence 
mechanisms aiming ‘to cure empty and depressed states of mind’ and thus represent 
an avoidance of reality (Sodré 1999: 49). Murdoch also often turns to 
psychoanalytic language to describe the interference of the self in correct 
perception. One of the main obstacles to attention that Murdoch identifies is 
‘neurosis’, a concept she derives from Freud but which she also seems to employ 
rather loosely to refer to anxious and egoistic states of mind.204 For Murdoch, in 
neurosis ‘we may fail to see the individual because we are completely enclosed in 
a fantasy world of our own into which we try to draw things from outside, not 
grasping their reality and independence, making them into dream objects of our 
own’ (EM 216).  
While it may be easy to recognise these distorting operations of the self in 
Flaubert’s heroine, it may be less straightforward to spot them in the smaller details 
of our lives, and especially in ourselves. The M&D example in SG provides a more 
low-key instance of a self-centred concern that distorts reality: protectiveness of her 
son and attachment to class prejudice inform M’s perception so that, for instance, 
she can continue to think that her son is superior to his wife and that he really 
belongs to his mother, or so that she does not need to disrupt her self-image by 
                                                 
203 The theory of defence mechanisms was developed by Anna Freud (1992). She identifies the 
following: repression, regression, reaction formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, 
turning against one’s own person, reversal, sublimation or displacement. All these are opposites of 
attention. 
204  Margaret Holland (2012) explores Murdoch’s conception of neurosis, noting how for Freud 
fantasy serves as compensation and protection for the psyche (See Freud 1924). Holland also refers 
to David Shapiro (1965), who explains how in some kinds of obsessive-compulsive neurosis the 
element of avoidance of reality is motivated by a conservative anxiety to avoid novelty, surprise or 
anything that may not chime with the world-view of the subject. Similarly to what Murdoch often 
remarks in relation to the self as anxious creator of familiar and false unities, the neurotic person 
rejects uncertainties and is ‘actively inattentive’ to new ideas. This is the exact opposite of the 
‘empty’, open and receptive attitude of the attentive subject as described by Weil and Murdoch, 
where the ability to be unsettled and surprised is essential. 
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admitting her prejudices about social hierarchy. Murdoch’s observations about the 
difficulty of attention are aimed at making the reader reflect on how easily and 
forcefully egoistic concerns drive not only action but perception too: ‘the ego is 
indeed unbridled. Continuous control is required’ (MGM 260). 
3.2 The Invisible Self 
If it is the tendency to be concerned with the self that generates fantasy and opposes 
attention, then the concept of unselfing can indeed be understood as the vanishing 
or elimination of the self, but in a different and more limited sense: not as the self 
tout court, as perceiving subject or as individual consciousness, but as the self as 
an object of focus or concern to itself. If we take the perspective of the individua l 
who is trying to improve herself morally and to attend, her task of unselfing takes 
the form of being concerned with, and thus attentive to, objects outside of the self. 
There is, in this sense, no self to be seen or perceived for the attentive subject. In 
other words, unselfing requires the vanishing of the self from the field of vision.  
This makes sense of some of Murdoch’s rather obscure formulations, such as that 
‘goodness is connected with the attempt to see the unself’ (SG 93, emphasis added): 
goodness means to see, rather than to be, no self. And it makes sense of the 
requirement, not that we should have no ‘I’, but that in unselfing ‘we should have 
no idea of an I’: not that self should vanish, but that in attention the ‘mind is … 
emptied of self’ (MGM 245).  
Another way of formulating the same idea would be to say that something 
about the self has to be eliminated, and that something is the ‘mechanism’ or 
configuration of the self that plays the role of satisfying the self’s demands. This is 
what Murdoch calls ‘ego’.205 Indeed, although her usage is not consistent, it is the 
ego, more often than the self, which is accused of being ‘the enemy’ of the moral 
life and which she urges should be destroyed or suppressed. The ego is a part of the 
self, or rather the name of a specific direction of the self’s concern: it is the 
‘centripetal force’ that continuously works to sustain the illusion of centrality and 
                                                 
205 Despite the fact that Murdoch is strongly influenced by Freud in her psychology, her concept of 
‘ego’ differs from Freud’s in some important respects. For Freud, the ego does more than protect 
itself by fantasising. It mediates between the demands of the id, the superego and the world. Often 
the ego prioritises the reality principle, which means that in  fact it has a positive role in relation to 
the perception of the world, silencing the demands of the id in favour of reality (Freud 1923: 12-66). 
In short, Freud’s conception shares with Murdoch’s the idea that the ego has the primary task of 
looking after the self, but not the fact that it always or mostly creates distortions. 
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that fabricates fantasies in order to project itself outward and satisfy its own 
demands. 206 If the ‘un-’ of unselfing referred to the elimination of some unit, then 
it would be more correct to talk of ‘unegoing’. 
Having identified the task of unselfing with the suppression of self-directed 
concern, a last cautionary consideration seems in order. While attention represents 
the aim of the individual in search of goodness, it is, as we have seen, a perfectionist 
concept, whereby the state of perfect attention is never achieved, but constant 
improvements are possible and indeed achievable through effort and practise (as 
well as ‘luck’ in having a virtuous attentive temperament). Therefore, although 
attention can appear to be unbearably demanding, it also accounts for the fact that 
it will inevitably fall short of the ideal, and mould itself to the limitations of human 
individuals and human life. It is to signal this point that Murdoch frequently 
remarks on the sheer difficulty of pursuing a good life. It is not possible to be either 
constantly or perfectly attentive, avoiding all fantasy and therefore all reality-
distorting defence mechanisms.207 In fact a few fantasies (as Freud makes clear) 
may be necessary to a healthy human life.208 
                                                 
206 An interesting difference between Weil and Murdoch is that for Weil ‘imagination’ is a faculty 
generating illusions. For Weil, it is through imagination that we fancy ourselves the moral and 
metaphysical centre of the universe. Imagination fills the void and rushes to supply the self with lies, 
when the self is threatened by reality (see NB 199). While the use of words is different, it seems that 
with ‘imagination’ Weil means exactly what Murdoch means by ‘fantasy’. 
207 Moreover, not all defence mechanisms result in fantasy about the external world: in many cases 
what is perceived in a distorted manner are one’s desires or drives in relation to the world, not the 
world itself. 
208 Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello (2004) provides two complex examples of a difficulty or inability 
to attend which may be necessary both for the individual’s sanity and for their morality. In ‘The 
Problem of Evil’, the protagonist finds herself horrified by and yet drawn into a novel describing in 
detail the hanging the group of men who conspired against Hitler. The portrayal of extreme cruelty, 
indeed of evil, makes Elizabeth wonder whether, contrary to what she used to think and to liberal 
discourse, it may not be morally wrong for evil to be described and offered to the public’s attentio n. 
These thoughts echo and seem to oppose the passages in another chapter of the book, ‘The 
Philosophers and the Animals’, where Costello introduces the case of the villagers who lived near 
Treblinka and who went on with their lives ignoring the smoke coming from the camp, avoiding to 
think about what may be happening there. The villagers were probably aware of the horrors of 
Treblinka, but refused to admit or think about them, denied them, or in Coetzee’s words they ‘knew 
and yet didn’t know’ about what was being done to other human beings at a short distance from 
them: ‘The people who lived in the countryside around Treblinka … said that, while in a sense they 
might have known, in another sense they did not know, could not afford to know, for their own sake’ 
(Coetzee 2004: 63-4). They could not afford to know. The suggestion is that knowledge of evil can 
damage the psyche to such extent that sanity requires the suppression of attention in such cases. This 
is exactly what Costello claims for herself and as a general requirement in the case of the description 
of Hitler’s hangman. Knowledge of evil can be dangerous, in the first case, because it manifests the 
possibility of certain actions; as Weil writes, ‘even to dwell in imagination on certain things as 
possible … is to commit ourselves to them already’ (GG 77); on the other, presumably, because it 
can demolish one’s faith in humanity and thus in one’s ability to be good. 
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Conclusions 
With these qualifications in mind, whether unselfing is understood as elimina ting 
the ego, or as eliminating the self from one’s field of vision, what has to be given 
up in attention, as Murdoch and Weil suggest, is an ‘illusory position’, that of 
centrality, fostered by a misdirection of the self’s psychic energy (a ‘contraction’ 
on itself). This means that unselfing is more akin to dispelling an illusion than to 
eliminating something real. On Murdoch’s understanding, the ego is not a necessary 
part of the individual, only a particular, albeit completely natural and very strong, 
tendency of the self, and can therefore be suppressed or eliminated without 
eliminating the individual self. The self, as a psychological unity and continuity of 
consciousness, is not an illusion, but it gives rise to illusions when, doubled back 
on itself, it becomes ‘ego’. As Weil puts it, ‘the ego is only the shadow projected 
by sin and error which blocks God’s light and which I take for a being’ (N 419).209 
In Weil, as in Murdoch, unselfing appears as a negation, not of the individuality of 
the person, but of the obsessive self-concern that causes the subject to perceive the 
world through the filter of the self’s demands and desires.210 
While the self as subject can contribute positively to correct perception and 
thus to attention, the direction of concern back onto the self generates fantasy. If 
self-concern generates fantasy, and attention is the attempt to perceive correctly (by 
definition, without fantasy), then it is constitutive of attention that the individua l’s 
concern be directed outward, i.e. not to the self. Murdoch’s claim that ‘the direction 
of attention is, contrary to nature, outward, away from self’ (SG 66), echoed by 
Weil’s statement that ‘attention must always be directed toward the object … never 
toward the self’ (N 128), becomes understandable if what goes against attention is 
                                                 
209  As an aside, we can note an interesting similarity between unselfing or décreation and the 
Buddhist notion of anatta or not-self, which culminates in Nirvana, where the substantial self faces 
extinction by being recognised as nothing. In Buddhist studies, too, there is a debate on whether 
anatta is to be understood as total extinction of self, or as extinction of the illusory notion of self 
considered as a permanent reified entity, while keeping the notion of empirical self or mind -
continuity (citta-saṃtāna) (see Rahula 1962, Ch.6). While in Murdoch the concept of self is more 
substantial than in Buddhism, the requirement to unself, as well as the practises of attention and 
mindfulness involves, are strikingly similar. 
210 This solution, however, cannot be uncontroversially attributed to Weil. There  is in her thought 
another strand which seems to support a different conception of unselfing, more akin to the total 
annihilation of self considered above (‘the only way to truth is through one’s own annihilation’, HP 
27). The conception of creation by which God withdraws also supports the idea that the individual 
creature should become as close to nothing as possible, so that God can be manifest again, filling 
the space that the creature (the self) was taking up as result of creation. Thus the very fact of existing  
implies the absence of God and sin: ‘That which is creation from the point of view of God is sin 
from the point of view of the creature’ (FLN 211). 
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not the self as perceiving subject, but the direction of concern of the subject to the 
self.  
Unselfing, then, means eliminating the self insofar as it is an object of 
concern for the subject, or eliminating the ego understood as such a mechanism. On 
this understanding, unselfing refers to a direction of focus and concern, rather than 
an active suppression of something. If self-concern is eliminated precisely by 
directing one’s concern to something external, then the effort to unself is not 
primarily a negative one, but it is an effort to be focused on and concerned with 
reality.211 
Antonaccio offers a similar comment, after referring to Murdoch’s example 
of consciousness being drawn away from selfish preoccupations by the sudden 
appearance of a kestrel outside the window:  
In the precise moment that one attends to the kestrel, ‘self’ (i.e., brooding, self-
absorbed, hurt vanity) vanishes from consciousness. This movement is ‘automatic’: 
attention to the new object is at one and the same time an extinction or suppression 
of self, since ‘seeing’ redirects psychic energy from self to kestrel. (Antonaccio 2000: 
135-6, emphasis added)’212  
As Weil would put it, giving up one’s imaginary position at the centre already is 
attending, because giving up self-centredness means turning towards the outside.213 
It follows that attention (which also includes eros) and unselfing are two sides of 
the same coin. When attention is in place, concern is turned to reality and the self 
is not part of one’s vision; conversely, when preoccupied with the self, the subject 
is not attending. This is precisely what Murdoch indicates in one of the quotes at 
the start of this chapter, which now becomes more understandable: ’the realism 
(ability to perceive reality) required for goodness is a kind of intellectual ability to 
perceive what is true, which is automatically at the same time a suppression of self’ 
(SG 66). Self-centred concern, being the source of fantasy, cannot coexist with 
                                                 
211 A similar suggestion is made by Holland (2012) in relation to moral freedom, where the ‘negative 
freedom’ of being liberated from fantasy is primarily geared at enabling the ‘positive freedom’ of 
attending to reality.  
212 As far as this claim goes, I agree with Antonaccio. However, right after these observations she 
introduces her trademark ‘reflexive’ movement back to the self, whereby the purified consciousness 
is able to see the self more clearly (Antonaccio 2000: 136). In the context of Murdoch’s attention, 
this second movement appears both unnecessary and potentially dangerous. (See Ch.7 on the 
dangers of self-reflection). 
213 Vetö: ‘attention is … an operation making us turn toward the outside while emptying our mind 
of the self’s own goals’ (Vetö 1994: 43, emphasis added) and Weil: ‘we live in a world of unreality 
and dreams. To give up our imaginary position at the centre, to renounce it, not only intellectually  
but in the imaginative part of our soul, that means to awaken to what is real and external, to see the 
true light and hear the true silence’ (WG 115). 
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attention, which on the contrary enables us to perceive reality. Fantasies are 
dispelled, not by focusing on them and trying to suppress them (hence, also, 
Murdoch’s suspicion of psycho-analysis), but rather by attending.214 Attention is 
about seeing the truth, and contemplating truth means not contemplating one’s 
desires and demands on the world (yet this, as we shall see in the next Chapter, does 
not prevent the possibility of self-knowledge). Unselfishness, objectivity, and 
realism come together in the concept of attention.  
The analysis of unselfing has provided a way to account for the role, in 
achieving correct perception, not just of the imaginative and evaluative faculties of 
the mind, explored in the previous chapters, but also of the way in which these 
faculties are manifested in the individual self. Attention, therefore, emerges as a 
personal endeavour geared at perceiving an objective reality. It now remains to 
account for something that has been implicitly important all along, i.e. the self-
knowledge that appears to be necessary in order to identify the self-concerned 
fantasies which need to be eliminated. In the following chapter, therefore, I shall 
consider how self-knowledge can be accommodated in the framework so far 
delineated, and particularly within the account of unselfing offered here. 
  
                                                 
214 This is another point of close similarity with Buddhist meditation practises. 
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Chapter 7 
Attention and Self-Knowledge 
Introduction 
The importance of attention in Murdoch’s ethics depends on the ability of the 
attentive subject to see the world clearly and justly, by eliminating distortions 
coming from the self. In the previous chapter I argued that it is neither necessary 
nor consistent with Murdoch’s thought that distortions coming from the self should 
be avoided by adopting an impersonal stance, whereby attention reveals facts 
entirely independent of the observer. Instead, I proposed that we understand the 
unselfing which is part of attention as the elimination not of the self but of self-
directed focus or concern. The self can contribute either positively to attention, 
through virtues, experience, knowledge, etc. or negatively, through self-concern, 
which is the cause of self-gratifying fantasy. It is only the latter that needs to be 
eliminated through unselfing. 
If the self interferes with attention only when it is concerned with itself, then, 
unselfing means turning focus and concern away from the self and onto the world. 
‘Looking outward’ allows the individual to contribute to correct perception while 
avoiding the distorting influence of the self, which comes about when the self 
becomes the object of one’s consciousness. In this way, the account I suggest makes 
room for the moral aspect of consciousness and the consequent importance of the 
subject in perception, while at the same time and without tension eliminates the 
distorting aspect of the self which leads to fantasy and lack of attention. 
While this view makes sense of the great importance that Murdoch places 
on individuality in the moral life, the characterisation of attention (and thus of 
unselfing) as involving a direction of focus ‘outward, away from the self’ (SG 66), 
suffers both from certain difficulties in relation to general moral concerns, and from 
tensions internal both to the conception of attention and to Murdoch’s philosophy. 
The main difficulty involves accounting for the role of the self in morality in those 
instances where a certain degree of self-directedness appears to be either necessary 
or beneficial to moral understanding. The above account risks denying any role to 
self-knowledge in morality, and indeed risks prohibiting it, insofar as self-
knowledge seems to require the direction of focus onto the self. Far from the 
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Socratic ‘know thyself’, a view of morality that revolves around attention appears 
to make the imperative to know oneself morally problematic. Yet the importance 
of self-knowledge is supported, on the one hand, by Murdoch’s explicit and 
sustained defence of a substantial and observable inner life; and on the other, it is 
required by the very accounts of attention and unselfing: knowing when the self is 
contributing to clear perception, and where conversely the self is distorting ‘vision’ 
by directing concern back to itself, requires the possession of some kind of self-
knowledge. In other words, in order to attend properly to what is outer one needs 
to know whether one’s self is interfering with the task – whether for instance one is 
being biased, anxious, or careless, etc.  
The concern to eliminate any focus on the self, however, makes self-
knowledge problematic only if it is assumed that it can only be acquired by directing 
one’s focus inward, i.e. through introspection. For Murdoch, knowing the self 
equates to a large extent to knowing the inner life.215 While Murdoch explicit ly 
rejects the Cartesian view of the self, some of the ideas she presents appear to be 
flirting with the idea of introspection, as we shall see.  
A model of self-knowledge that might accommodate the prohibition of 
focusing on the self is behaviourism. According to this theory, knowledge about an 
individual's inner states can be obtained by observing her behaviour. Self-
knowledge, then, can be obtained by observing one’s own behaviour, by seeing 
oneself ‘from the outside’, as an object of observation among others. No special 
relationship to oneself is involved, and no self-directed focus or concern either. In 
this case, too, however, although some of Murdoch's remarks can be taken to 
support such a model (‘the good (better) man is liberated from selfish fantasy, can 
see himself as others see him’, MGM 331) in MGM she argues at length against 
behaviourism.  
Neither introspection nor behaviourism, therefore, seems to fit Murdoch’s 
philosophy or the concept of attention. While behaviourism denies the importance 
of a ‘private’ inner life that does not issue in behaviour, which Murdoch forcibly 
                                                 
215 Although self and inner life are not identical, in MGM Murdoch discusses both concepts together 
(where the inner life is also called ‘consciousness’) as the ‘fundamental mode of being’ of the 
individual; the self is defined as ‘the place where we live’ (SG 93), and consciousness is ‘that place, 
where we are at home’ (MGM 260). Consciousness is also called ‘self-being’, or the mode of being 
of the self. So it seems safe to assume that, according to Murdoch, understanding one’s inner life 
also amounts understanding something about the self, and that self-knowledge can be obtained 
through knowledge of one’s inner life or consciousness. 
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defends, introspection involves a direction of consciousness that is contrary to the 
one operating in attention. In what follows, I examine Murdoch's engagement with 
introspection and behaviourism. It will turn out that neither model of self-
knowledge is adequate for her purposes and, as a result, a third possibility is offered, 
drawing on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. 
1 What Is Wrong with the Self? 
Two attempts at resolving the tension between the outward focus of attention and 
the importance of self-knowledge have been made by Samantha Vice (2007) and 
Christopher Mole (2007). Vice reads Murdoch as having a limited view of the self 
(as merely a centre of egoistic – and thus illusory – desires), so that a different 
account of the self can make room for self-understanding, which in turn is required 
for attention. In the previous chapter, I have given reasons against taking Murdoch’s 
concept of the self in such a way. Mole’s suggestion, instead, is not that thinking 
about the self is in fact permissible, but to reject the introspection model by pointing 
out that the ‘morally important states of mind’, which he equates with character 
traits, are not to be understood as ‘inner occurrences’ at all; therefore, understand ing 
one’s states of mind, as required for attention, does not involve self-directed 
focus.216  Self-knowledge, according to Mole, is rather to be conceived of as a 
relation, where self-knowledge is achieved by reflecting on the object of one’s 
states of mind. My discussion, to anticipate, will reach the same kind of conclusion. 
Differently from Mole, however, this chapter engages with self-knowledge more 
generally, rather than limited exclusively to character traits, because any 
information about the self is potentially helpful in attention, so states of mind 
cannot, in principle, be divided between those that are ‘morally important’ and 
those that are not. Secondly, I shall offer a more detailed exploration of how to 
understand self-knowledge in terms of looking outward.  
Let us start by briefly recapitulating those ideas presented in Chapter 6 
which are relevant for the present argument. As we saw, Murdoch’s warning against 
self-directed concern derives from her ideas about fantasy as being both a form and 
a cause of moral failure, and about the self as being the primary source of fantasy. 
                                                 
216 Mole (2007) includes character traits in the notion of states of mind. His account takes attention 
as a virtue, and claims that self-understanding is necessary for virtue: to know if we are acting as 
the virtuous agent would we need to know our states of mind (which aspects of our character we’re 
exercising). 
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Human beings, in her view, are ‘naturally selfish’ and the tendency of every 
individual is toward self-gratification, which, in turn, involves the creation of 
fantasies, since ‘consciousness is … a cloud or more or less fantastic reverie 
designed to protect the psyche from pain. It constantly seeks consolation, either 
through imagined inflation of self or through fictions of a theological nature’ (SG 
76). As a consequence, the direction of attention ‘away from self’ is, instead, 
‘contrary to nature’, yet it is also the path to moral improvement: ‘what counteracts 
the system’, i.e. the self’s tendency to fantasise, is ‘attention to reality’ (SG 67). If 
self and reality stand at opposite ends of the moral spectrum, then it would appear 
that goodness is achieved through suppression of self. Yet, as concluded in Chapter 
6, what is to be suppressed cannot be the self qua subject or perceiver, or there 
would be no virtuous states of mind and no moral improvement. What needs to be 
avoided is, rather, the self’s natural tendency towards self-directedness: what 
generates fantasies, and is therefore morally corrupting, is not the self as a whole, 
but the self when focused on itself (‘ego’) as opposed to the external world. 
On this model, self-knowledge acquired by looking inward or introspect ing 
would be part of such fantasy-making self-directedness, and must therefore be 
avoided. One solution to the tension between introspection and attention is to claim 
that introspection is not conducive to distortion or fantasy. Murdoch’s moral 
psychology does not support this possibility. For Murdoch, the self is extremely 
difficult (almost impossible) to see clearly, for various reasons. The general reason 
is that the self has a natural tendency to create fantasies. This is apparent in two 
ways: firstly, we are very much interested in our selves, so that we may forget about 
the relevance of other things: ‘the self is such a dazzling object that if one looks 
there one may see nothing else’ (SG 31); secondly, and importantly, the self can get 
in the way of clear perception even when one is not consciously thinking about 
oneself at all. In these cases, the self acts as a distorting filter in the subject’s 
thoughts and perceptions. When, for instance, in the story of the mother in law (SG 
17-23), M looks at D and sees her as juvenile, she is also, at the same time, allowing 
her own snobbishness to become part of her perception; when she is thinking of her 
son as having married beneath himself, her jealousy is also part of the picture. This 
kind of activity of the self, rather than its overt musings about itself, is what 
Murdoch most often focuses on as the antagonist of morality.  
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These are some of the reasons behind Murdoch’s claim that goodness 
involves focusing outward, that is, attending. Introspection, for Murdoch, even 
when moved by honest desire to understand oneself truthfully, rarely yields 
knowledge, and on the contrary is likely to foster illusions, not only about the world, 
but also about the self: 
In such a picture sincerity and self-knowledge, those popular merits, seem less 
important. It is an attachment to what lies outside the fantasy mechanism, and not a 
scrutiny of the mechanism itself, that liberates. Close scrutiny often merely 
strengthens its power. ‘Self-knowledge’, in the sense of a minute understanding of 
one’s own machinery, seems to me, except at a fairly simple level, usually a delusion. 
(SG 67) 
Close scrutiny of the self, according to Murdoch, not only does not issue in 
knowledge about the self, but also strengthens its fantasy-making, derealising 
power. A similar thought, unsurprisingly, can be found in Simone Weil, who also 
spells out her reasons for that claim: 
Introspection is a particular psychological state, incompatible with other 
psychological states. 
1. With thinking about the world … 
2. With action, at least with voluntary action … 
3. With a very strong emotion … 
To sum up, thought, action, emotion exclude examination of oneself. Whenever, in 
life, one is actively involved in something, or one suffers violently, one cannot think 
about oneself. 
Conclusion: since almost everything escapes self-observation, one cannot draw 
general conclusions from introspection … By the very fact that one keeps a watch 
on oneself, one changes; and the change is for the worse since we prevent that which 
is of greatest value in us from playing its part.  
(Weil 1995: 27-28) 
Weil reinforces the idea that thought about the world, constitutive of attention, is 
incompatible with introspection. Also, for Weil, ‘introspection defeats its own 
object’, since all it can reveal is the present act of introspecting, and when applied 
to past states of mind, it is equally unsuccessful, because one can be mistaken about 
one’s past inner life, especially in the light of more recent experiences (Weil 1995: 
28). Moreover, one’s states of mind are changed by the act of introspecting, and the 
change is for the worse, since we are preventing consciousness from being enriched 
by knowledge of reality. This is another reason to reject introspection as a way to 
achieve self-knowledge and moral progress. The problem of introspection in 
Murdoch, however, is not yet settled, as we shall see. 
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2 The Importance of Self-Knowledge 
Despite the difficulties of accounting for self-knowledge, the solution cannot lie in 
denying its importance. Since, on the model proposed, what interferes with 
attention is self-gratifying fantasy, the moral subject needs to be aware of her self 
in order to know that distortion may be taking place at all, and then in order to 
control the self to prevent it from continuing on the path of illusion.217 Since moral 
progress takes place through liberation from fantasy, some degree of self-
knowledge is not only helpful but necessary for moral progress.218  
As many have noted, the very story of M and D, designed to make a case 
for the moral importance of the inner life conceived of independently of any 
outward action or manifestation, is also an instance of self-reflection as conducive 
to moral improvement.219 M’s activity is an example of attention; at the same time, 
coming to the decision to ‘look again’, the mother in law, who is said to be ‘capable 
of self-criticism’, reflects on herself and on the biases that may have led her to judge 
D too harshly. If M did not wonder whether she may be snobbish or suspect that 
she may be jealous, there would be no progress in attention: the suspicion of some 
bias in herself acts both as spur and as guidance in the act of attention. To become 
aware both of the need to attend to D, and to make sure that, to the extent that it is 
possible, the act of attention is being successful, M needs some degree of self-
knowledge. 
What has been said above does not deny the possibility of an exceptiona lly 
virtuous subject, attending to reality without any self-directed distortions, and 
without any awareness of herself. But this individual (what Murdoch sometimes 
refers to as the ‘virtuous peasant’) appears accidentally virtuous and unknowingly 
so. Her selflessness and ability to attend are spontaneous and natural, but because 
they are so, there is no room for conscious effort for improvement, nor, importantly, 
for the individual to know whether they are being good or not. Allowing for this 
happy accident, and for the possibility of being good ‘unknowingly’, still leaves the 
necessity, for the majority of us, to struggle for moral improvement in ways that, 
involving attention, also seem to involve self-knowledge. Murdoch’s claims about 
                                                 
217 ‘The ego is indeed “unbridled”. Continuous control is required’ (MGM 260). 
218 I say ‘some degree’, because not all self-knowledge is important for attention, but only insofar 
as it helps to avoid fantasy. 
219 This point has been observed by Mole (2007: 75), Vice (2007: 63), Antonaccio (2000: 87) and 
Nussbaum (1990:46). 
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natural selfishness and the tendency to be concerned with oneself are not meant as 
metaphysical claims; they are, rather, reminders of what people tend to be like and 
that attention is not spontaneous for them.220 
We are left with what appears to be a paradox: attention, as the activity 
fundamental to morality, requires outward directedness; but in order to know 
whether one is really attending, one needs to direct one’s focus inward, to obtain 
knowledge about oneself. To avoid this paradox it would be necessary provide an 
account of self-knowledge which does not consist in a gaze directed ‘inward’. 
While behaviourism can provide just this kind of account, Murdoch’s insistence on 
the importance of an observable inner life – observable, as with M&D, in the 
absence of any external sign – prevents us from adopting this solution. Examining 
how Murdoch understands the inner life will help to clarify her reasons for rejecting 
both introspection and behaviourism, and to suggest a third kind of account of self-
knowledge that she could endorse.  
3 The Importance of the Inner Life: Murdoch Vs. Wittgenstein 
Murdoch understands the ‘inner life’ or ‘consciousness’ as the observable aspect or 
manifestation of the self. The individual self is defined as the ‘moral centre or 
substance’ (MGM 153) and consciousness is the ‘value-bearing continuum’ (MGM 
148) upon which the morality of the individual depends. Murdoch suggests a view 
of the inner life as ‘rich and observable’: on this view, it is not just possible, but 
desirable, to observe and thus come to know oneself. 221 
Murdoch develops her notion of inner life as something observable and 
‘private’ in opposition to ‘behaviourist Wittgensteinian’ theories which seem to 
deny it any substance. What she means by ‘private’ is crucial to understanding her 
view of the inner, and will become clearer later. The ‘Wittgensteinian’ theories of 
the mind she is referring to are mainly those proposed by Hampshire (1959, 1963) 
and Ryle (1949, 1951), which, in her view, effectively remove the inner life from 
consideration. If all that can be understood and assessed is behaviour, or what is 
public, then what is ordinarily conceived as a ‘private inner entity’ is either not 
                                                 
220 Her remarks about ‘original sin’, connected with Freudian ideas about the psyche as egocentric 
and not entirely under one’s control, suggest a view of human beings as ‘fallen’ precisely because 
of their natural self-directedness. This does not exclude, however, instances of salvation or ‘grace’, 
as a ‘reward’ for efforts of attention. Cf. SG 47, 51. 
221 Cf. for ex. MGM 153, 234, 259, 265, 282, 292. 
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existent or unnecessary (see SG 10-11). The point of these observations, in SG, is 
moral: if inner states cannot be observed in their own right, what matters morally is 
only action and the moral agent is evaluated according to what she does, not 
according to her thoughts or states of mind. 
Although Murdoch acknowledges that those theories were only inspired, 
but not endorsed, by Wittgenstein himself, the latter is still to an extent considered 
answerable for having deprived the inner life of ‘substance’. In the chapter on 
Wittgenstein in MGM (Chapter 9: ‘Wittgenstein and the Inner Life’) the criticism 
is sharpened: Wittgenstein is seen to threaten the legitimacy of the concepts of 
‘experience’ and ‘privacy’, which Murdoch wants to defend. In doing so, she seems 
to support the necessity of an introspective inward gaze, which her own claims 
about attention and outward-direction deny. Looking in more detail at her criticism 
of Wittgenstein, however, can clarify why this is not the case. 
The general worry that Murdoch expresses in relation to Wittgenstein is 
that, with his account of language and his remarks about inner states, something 
important about the inner life is lost. Wittgenstein is mentioned in different places 
in association with a ‘sense of loss’ directed at the inner: ‘what we “lose” in the 
Investigations is some sort of inner thing’ (MGM 49). Yet it is not part of the 
criticism that Wittgenstein’s view excludes the inner itself, or renders it irrelevant. 
So what exactly is the problem? Wittgenstein is introduced in the context of the 
critique of the Cartesian inner datum, as effecting a welcome removal of 
‘metaphysical entities’. Yet immediately a worry sets in: isn’t the critique of a 
certain picture of the inner going too far in the opposite direction? Can the rejection 
of the notion of ‘private object’ render what is experienced as inner and private 
meaningless, when not publicly accessible in some way?  
Murdoch’s discussion of Wittgenstein on the inner life revolves around two 
related issues: on the one hand, the possibility of words and concepts having a 
personal aspect above and beyond their public use (which includes the experience s 
that accompany them);222 on the other, the status of the inner life and the possibility 
of conceiving any inner state independent of its relation to the outer. Both the 
personal aspect of concepts, and the reality and identifiability of the inner life, are 
important for Murdoch in order to ground her ideas about morality: if morality is 
                                                 
222 These ideas are particularly prominent in the earlier essays, such as NP and TL. 
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equated with a consciousness that is oriented to the Good and attentive to the real, 
then the observability of consciousness is central to the argument. The view also 
hinges on there being a personal element to knowledge and perception, which 
explains the existence of different yet equally correct takes on a situation, and how 
one’s moral being is expressed in how one sees the world. 
Wittgenstein is presented in MGM as having helpfully dealt with a 
philosophical mistake (the ‘inner thought outer thing dualism’, MGM 270) by 
questioning the idea that concepts about inner states must have an inner referent 
accessible only to the subject. However, reading the remarks about the man who 
writes ‘S’ on his calendar whenever he has a particular sensation, Murdoch feels 
that something more than a mistaken philosophical picture is being attacked. 
Wittgenstein’s recurrent questioning of the possibility of identifying a sensation, 
conceived as something only the subject has access to, hinges on the notion of 
criteria for sense. And criteria must be public: otherwise the process of checking 
the identity of a sensation becomes like an idle exercise with no standard of 
correctness. ‘An inner state stands in need of outward criteria’ (PI 580): ‘S man’ 
(as she calls him) cannot meaningfully refer to his sensation because there are no 
criteria of correctness for the names he chooses on his own: nothing can determine 
whether he is using the name correctly each time he believes he has the sensation, 
and nothing but his memory testifies to the identity of the sensation. 
S-man can talk of his sensation only using a language which is public, or 
outer. Murdoch worries: the example seems to her construed to show ‘the emptiness 
of the inner when not evidently connected with the outer.’ (MGM 273) The inner 
life, she acknowledges, is not eliminated by these remarks, but becomes secondary: 
‘the vast concept of experience subsists as something inward … but dependent 
upon, situated by, a public outer’ (MGM 276). What Murdoch sees Wittgenstein as 
threatening is ‘the very general idea of processes as stream of consciousness, inner 
reflection, imagery, in fact our experience as inner (unspoken, undemonstra ted) 
being’ (MGM 273). Her concern is to maintain a sense of inner life conceived as at 
least partly independent of the outer: the stream of consciousness as observable 
without reference to a public domain. (‘Example of moral activity: inhibit ing 
malicious thoughts’, MGM 153). 
It is not, as Murdoch herself admits, the logically private inner that she 
wants to defend. Rather, something much more ‘mundane’, and contingent: the 
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possibility for the individual to think about the inner life without any outward 
criterion for the meaning of her observations. This is one, less problematic, 
understanding of the ‘privacy’ that Murdoch wants to preserve: the privacy to which 
she is committed is that of M and D, where something morally relevant is 
happening, yet no one but M may ever know about it. This is Murdoch’s general 
idea: that states of mind can matter morally without having to be connected with 
any outward activity. As she puts it:  
When, for instance, I feel that I am morally responsible for having had a particular 
thought, what I am concerned with here is one such self-contained event. Or if I 
suddenly make a decision … though I were to die the next moment it would still be 
true. (NP 46)  
None of these ideas are threatened, contrary to Murdoch’s worries, by the private 
language argument, which can account for M’s activity by reminding us that she is 
using words of the public language to analyse and describe her inner state. Yet 
Murdoch also objects to this thought: what about experiences that do not seem 
amenable to framing into concepts and words, and yet are felt to be there, as part of 
consciousness? Wittgenstein leaves this open. Yet Murdoch insists that, as our 
experience testifies, there is a lot that occurs ‘inwardly’ that exceeds language or 
other forms of public exposition. In TL she classifies inner experience on a 
spectrum of communicability: there are fully verbalised thoughts, but there are also 
thoughts that present themselves as confused, floating images, and both should be 
acknowledged. Language and concepts play a ‘crystallising role’ with respect to the 
inner, but such crystallisation does not always occur or is not always possible; yet 
the inner exists even when unconceptualised.223 Thus, Wittgenstein is accused both 
of curtailing the ‘vastness’ of the inner and of denying the personal aspect of 
thinking and language, the individual experience. This is the second sense of 
‘privacy’ that Murdoch requires for the inner life: the possibility for each individua l 
to have their own understanding of words and concepts, as well as particular 
experiences connected with them and unconceptualised experiences. Murdoch does 
not deny that concepts are fundamentally shared, nor is she claiming that experience 
should determine meaning, as in PI 273; but she wants to make room, also, for 
personal or idiosyncratic experience in relation to language: ‘of course, in a general 
                                                 
223 ‘Our whole busy moral-aesthetic intellectual creativity abounds in private insoluble difficulties, 
mysterious half understood mental configurations. A great part of our thinking is the retention of 
such entities’ (MGM 280). 
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sense, language must have rules. But it is also the property of individuals whose 
inner private consciousness, seething with arcane imagery and shadowy intuitions, 
occupies the greater part of their being’ (MGM 275). 
It is a central aspect of Murdoch’s view of morality that the moral life ‘takes 
place’ in the inner life or consciousness of the individual, and is defined by the 
individual’s particularity. The inner life is a complex, held together by the 
individual self it ‘belongs’ to; its structure or ‘orientation’, experiences and 
thoughts, are personal, peculiar to the subject: ‘the concept of the individua l 
depends on a moral sense of the value and status of privacy and the inner life’ (294). 
If, on the other hand, the inner life were secondary to the public life, the whole 
sense of moral life would become impersonal, rather than an expression of the 
individual; morality would be played out on the public stage of action and purely 
inner states would have no moral relevance. Murdoch’s rejection of behaviour ism 
is clear. 
4 Rejecting the Introspection Model  
Neither Murdoch’s insistence on the privacy of the inner life, nor her views about 
the personal and idiosyncratic aspect of it, on the other hand, commits her to a 
Cartesian view of the self, as might be suspected at first. Although for Murdoch 
self-awareness consists in the awareness of an ‘inner life’ which may not be 
manifest in behaviour nor entirely expressible in (public) language, that does not 
need to be conceived as an ‘inward glance’ or as logically independent of the outer, 
public world. Murdoch’s view of the inner life, important for morality, is not in fact 
at odds with Wittgenstein’s remarks; her criticism, as she acknowledges, mainly 
concerns the possible consequences of his view. In what follows, I shall suggest 
that, far from being discordant, some of Wittgenstein’s thoughts can help to 
construe a picture of self-knowledge that accommodates Murdoch’s requirements 
about the inner, while, crucially, not being achieved by looking inward, and so can 
be part of the requirement of attention as an outward look. 
Despite seeing them as harmful influences on moral philosophy, Murdoch 
acknowledges that Wittgenstein and the philosophers inspired by him have done a 
service to philosophy in the removal of the Cartesian ‘inner datum’ (see SG 15). 
Even though Murdoch sets the critique quickly to the side, and in fact continues by 
pointing out its dangers, it is important to consider her approval a little further. The 
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defence of the inner life as something ‘private’ and independent of the public/outer 
sphere, in the context of the criticism of Wittgenstein, can look dangerously akin to 
a nostalgic nod to the inner datum. After all, Murdoch is keen to remind us, 
concerning the inner/outer division, that ‘a sense of that separation is one of our 
deepest experiences’ (MGM 282). But the italics should give us pause, and the same 
passage continues to disclose the motive for the reminder: ‘Is not some denial or 
obfuscation of this picture a move in the direction of behaviourism?’ (MGM 282). 
The desired aim, then, is to find not so much a middle ground but rather a third 
picture, between behaviourism and Cartesianism (‘the choice must be rejected 
between behaviourism and private theatre’, TL 38), which makes room for the 
individual and her personal inner life without collapsing the inner into the outer nor 
sealing one off from the other. 
Together with the private inner datum, the related introspective conception 
of self-knowledge is also discarded. Murdoch accepts that Wittgenstein and 
‘Wittgensteinians’ have been helpful ‘by destroying the misleading image of the 
infallible inner eye’ (SG 15). They presented a radical critique of the idea that self-
knowledge can be obtained by introspection, classically understood on the 
‘perceptual model’ of the ‘inner theatre’, where one’s mind can be observed in the 
same way as one observes objects in the world, with the difference that the ‘objects’ 
of introspection are private to the subject. However, the positive part of such a 
critique suggests an understanding of self-knowledge that relies entirely on public 
observable facts. Ryle’s suggestion, for example, is that we understand ourselves 
in the same way as others, based on behaviour, which includes language and 
‘unstudied utterances’ (1949: Chapter vi). So there are criteria for identifying the 
inner, and they are a matter of behaviour. 
This is precisely what Murdoch fears Wittgenstein’s remarks may lead to. 
But Wittgenstein’s rejection of the perceptual model does not have the consequence 
that, if there seem to be no criteria for identifying certain sensations (PI 258), then 
we need to move the object of our enquiry from the hazy inner to the observable 
outer. Wittgenstein is in fact questioning the whole idea of seeking a relation of 
reference in the case of sensations (PI 244). That is the meaning of the ‘beetle in 
the box’ example: if a sensation is pictured as something that only the subject has  
access to, it becomes impossible to talk about it, because there is no way to know 
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whether one’s use of the same word refer to the same ‘thing’ as others have; so, if 
this picture is used, the inner state itself becomes irrelevant.  
Had the force of that ‘if’ been more strongly felt by Murdoch, she might 
have taken those remarks as helpful in her own project of rejecting the ‘inner object’ 
model for inner states. In TL and NP (two essays from the early 50s, so before the 
publication of PI), Murdoch herself comes to grips with the question of the status 
of inner experiences and their expression. After giving voice to a natural inclina t ion 
to think of experience as something the subject alone can inspect and verify, she 
rejects both that view and its alternative, the ‘verificationist’ approach, which finds 
justification for claims about the inner in behaviour. Both views, although opposed, 
rely on an ‘ontological approach, which seeks for an identifiable inner stuff and 
either asserts or denies its existence’ (TL 38), which she rejects. The temptation to 
think in those terms is just what Wittgenstein addresses with examples such as the 
‘beetle’, and then replies: ‘the sensation itself … – It is not a something, but not a 
nothing either!’ (PI 304).224  
The second part of Murdoch’s TL is an attempt to suggest ways in which 
we can examine our inner life and describe it, without appeal to behaviour:  
It is pointless, when faced with the behaviourist-existentialist picture of the mind, to 
go on endlessly fretting about the identification of particular inner events … by 
producing, as it were, a series of indubitably objective little things. ‘Not a report’ 
need not entail ‘not an activity’ … we need a ‘change of key’. (TL 23-4) 
A change of key is what Wittgenstein offers in PI. While Murdoch’s different key 
stresses the importance of individual and contextual understanding, Wittgenste in’s 
remarks work more closely on dispelling the misleading picture. Even if he does 
not show at length how we do examine and understand our inner states – except 
through reminders of how we do not do it – the picture that he suggests is one which 
can support Murdoch’s own.  
5 Self-Knowledge as Looking Outward 
Wittgenstein’s alternative suggestion divides self-knowledge into different kinds, 
depending on the kind of inner state involved. In the case of inner states like 
                                                 
224 This point is explained clearly by Wright (1998): ‘the Investigations repeatedly counsels against 
construing understanding, hoping, fearing, intending, etc. as mental states or processes. 
Wittgenstein’s idea was not, of course, that there are no such things, strictly, as mental processes, or 
the states that would constitute their end-points, so to speak, but only that understanding, etc. will 
be misunderstood if assimilated to them – some are attitudinal avowals, the others are phenomenal 
ones’ (Wright 1998: 21). 
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sensations, for example pain, Wittgenstein rejects the application of the concept of 
knowledge at all, because knowledge requires the possibility of doubt and 
verification, which is absent when it comes to sensations: the subject cannot doubt 
whether she is in pain, and she cannot verify it by appealing to anything external to 
the sensation. Thus, with sensations, instead of knowing them, Wittgenste in 
suggests, we just have them (PI 246). Instead of thinking of the pain as an inner 
‘thing’ which we observe introspectively and then name, pain is seen as a sensation 
with natural expressions. The word ‘pain’ is a replacement for such expressions. 
Learning to replace the expression with the word is a public activity, depending on 
interaction with others, on observing when other people use the word, as a child 
hears it uttered by the parents when she cries, for instance.225 Self-awareness (rather 
than self-knowledge), in the case of sensations like pain, is not a matter of looking 
inward, but simply of having the sensation. But how the subject talks about the 
sensation depends on the contexts or ‘language games’ in which the sensation finds 
its place. This is a first reason, limited to sensations, to believe that an inward gaze 
does not provide self-knowledge. 
Not all self-ascriptions work on the model of sensations. While with 
sensations Wittgenstein rejects the notion of ‘knowledge’ because there is no place 
for uncertainty or doubt, other inner states, like happiness or jealousy, call for 
different considerations and include the possibility of doubt. Before discussing 
those states, it must be noted that Wittgenstein also provides considerations that 
apply to all inner states: the idea that concepts about inner states, like ‘jealousy’ or 
‘pain’, are not best thought of as inner ‘things’ or data, and that they are learned in 
a public sphere. We learn concepts about the inner in social interaction because 
concepts are to a large extent public. This is not to deny, to answer Murdoch’s worry 
in MGM, that they are concepts about inner states. The concept ‘pain’ refers to 
pain, not to pain behaviour, and pain behaviour is not the same as pain (‘what 
greater difference could there be?’ – PI 304). On Wittgenstein’s suggestion, 
learning what ‘deciding’ means is not, as Murdoch fears (in SG 13), merely a matter 
of watching what someone who says ‘I have decided’ does, as if the behaviour 
                                                 
225  See PI 244: ‘Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, 
expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then 
adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain -
behaviour’. Mulhall (2007), reading Wittgenstein, sees the ability to articulate one’s inner life as an 
‘internalisation of otherness’, because it comes from interaction with others (2007: 112). 
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pattern exhausted the concept. At the same time, understanding a concept or a word 
involves public interaction. Knowing what ‘pain’ or ‘jealousy’ mean requires 
knowing what people do with them.  
This idea is, in fact, endorsed by Murdoch. Even when defending the 
‘personal’ use of language, she starts by admitting, for instance: ‘Of course 
language depends very generally upon areas of “agreement”’ (MGM 281); in SG, 
the man who is thinking about repentance is said to make a ‘personal use’ of the 
concept; yet, ‘of course he derives the concept initially from his surroundings’ (SG 
25-6). At the same time as she is arguing for the idiosyncrasy of language, Murdoch 
also emphasises its public aspect in terms of ‘shared attention’: ‘we learn through 
attending to contexts, vocabulary develops through close attention to objects … use 
of words by persons grouped round a common object is a central and vital human 
activity’ (SG 32). Language depends on contexts, attending to the object of one’s 
language can increase its poignancy, and the developing of language and concepts 
is an activity that takes place with others.  
The rejection of the inner datum and the considerations about the public 
nature of concepts provide a second reason to claim that introspection does not 
provide self-knowledge, and a first reason to claim, instead, that self-knowledge 
can be obtained through a focus directed outward. As the above discussion of the 
inner life in Wittgenstein shows, the concepts we use in self-understanding are not 
‘private’ concepts, but are, qua concepts, public. If the meaning of ‘jealousy’, for 
instance, depends on how we use the word, in what contexts, for what purposes, in 
relation to what reports about their inner states, and also how people who are said 
to be jealous behave, in order to become clear about whether one is jealous one 
needs also to pay attention to the context of use of the word. Context and inner state 
are correlate, and one does not provide meaning without the other. 
Knowing about one’s jealousy is not merely a matter of looking inward and 
seeing, independently of other people’s use of the word, what it is that one ‘finds’ 
there. Murdoch seems to agree with this Wittgensteinian point in a remark against 
Husserl and Descartes: ‘the identification of the inner involves a variety of concepts 
… whose meaning is established, and whose use in such a context is justified, in 
the external world remote from the deep position taken by the cogito and the 
phenomenological reduction’ (MGM 234). This idea does not deny the possibility 
of a personal understanding of the concept, depending for example on one’s life 
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experience, which Murdoch is keen to defend. But it shows that the concept cannot 
be ‘made up’ by the individual, and the personal understanding is a development 
grounded on the contexts in which the concept is learned. If concepts, includ ing 
concepts about the inner, depend to an extent on their public use, and if inner states 
are not something the subject can become aware of merely by introspection, the 
dualism between inner and outer begins to vacillate, and self-understanding begins 
to look less like a matter of introspection or looking inward.  
There is a third consideration, introduced by Wittgenstein, which is quite 
helpful for solving the tension between self-knowledge and outward focus, and thus 
to explain M’s self-critical activity in a way that is compatible with the requirements 
of attention. Here Wittgenstein presents a typical case of self-examination, where 
it is possible to doubt one’s inner states. Someone ask themselves:  
‘Do I really love her or am I only pretending to myself?’ and the process of 
introspection is the calling up of memories; of imagined possible situations, and of 
the feelings that one would have if… (PI 587) 
What is here called ‘the process of introspection’ is not the standard meaning of 
‘introspection’, as I have been referring to it, understood as looking inward. It 
refers, rather, to the process of understanding one’s inner state, which revolves, 
instead, around thoughts about the object of one’s emotions – so self-examina tion 
appears not to be (in my sense) a matter of introspection at all. In the cases of inner 
states which go beyond immediate sensation, and where the possibility of doubt and 
knowledge applies, as the example shows, self-knowledge is achieved by 
examining the object of the inner state, rather than the state itself. If one tries to 
understand it in isolation, the inner state (the jealousy, the love, the resentment) in 
fact loses its identity as a state about something or someone, and is no longer that 
of which knowledge can be obtained.  
To return to Weil’s remarks quoted in §1, introspection does not yield self-
knowledge, but in fact distorts that about which it tries to acquire knowledge. The 
object of introspection is an inner state (or indeed a character trait), but inner states 
are essentially about something in the world. In Murdoch’s model, the self 
(including consciousness) is a ‘system of energy’, which depends on the objects to 
which energy is directed. Therefore, to understand one’s love or one’s prejudices, 
one needs to direct attention to the objects of those states, not inwardly to the self. 
This idea is helpfully developed by Richard Moran (2001) in his exploration 
of ‘relations of transparency’. Moran quotes Gareth Evans, who comments on 
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Wittgenstein’s remark against the idea of self-knowledge as involving an ‘inward 
glance’:  
In making a self ascription of belief, one’s eyes are directed outward – upon the 
world. If someone asks me ‘Do you think there is going to be a Third World War?’ 
I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I 
would attend to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’ 
(Evans 1982: 225, quoted in Moran 2001: 61) 
In the example, the belief about war is ‘transparent’ because its nature is discovered 
by looking, not at the belief, but at the object of such belief – in this case, by 
thinking about the possibility of another world war. (Transparency only works in 
the first-person perspective: to know about someone else’s states of mind, 
examining their objects is not sufficient.) The case of transparency presented above, 
however, concerns belief, where the answer to the question ‘Do I believe that P’ is 
equivalent to the answer to ‘Is P true?’. Moran acknowledges that not all inner states 
work in this way.  
Can all self-knowledge be construed in this way – including knowledge of 
one’s jealousy, love, resentment? Wittgenstein’s and Weil’s remarks above suggest 
a positive answer. Moran adds a consideration about the importance of the 
intentions or attitudes involved in self-knowledge, suggesting two possible attitudes 
to self-knowledge applicable to such cases: a ‘theoretical’ and a ‘deliberat ive’ 
attitude. With inner states other than beliefs, the relation of transparency holds when 
the theoretical attitude (a contemplative attitude with a psychological interest about 
one’s inner states) is deferred to the deliberative one (which questions what the 
appropriate inner state is) (Moran 2001: 63). The theoretical approach to self-
knowledge is described as a kind of self-indulgence, common in sentimenta l 
literature, where the scrutiny of one’s inner life is ‘a contemplative one, separate 
from questions about the world that those states of his are presumably directed 
upon’ (Moran 2001: 58). Separate from the object of one’s inner state, it is 
questionable whether the enquiry can constitute self-knowledge, and indeed Moran 
comments that the inner state in question ‘is likely to be inapt or fixated’. It is in 
cases like these that the attempt to gain self-knowledge takes the form of ‘looking 
inward’, which Murdoch warns against. Understood thus, ‘in the sense of a minute 
understanding of one’s own machinery’, Murdoch has reasons to claim that ‘“self-
knowledge” seems to me … usually a delusion’ (SG 67).  
But the self-knowledge involved in attention is not of the ‘theoretical’ kind. 
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On the contrary, attention includes specific attitudes and intentions, and central to 
these is the intention to see clearly and justly. So, in Moran’s framework, the self-
knowledge required by attention cannot be ‘theoretical’, but it is rather 
‘deliberative’, because it involves a concern which is directed not to the self, but to 
the object of one’s inner states, including a concern to discover which response the 
object merits. The primary question addressed to the self in attention is: ‘Am I being 
just to x?’, where knowledge of the self (whether one is being just) is dependent on 
a grasp of the object. Moran associates this attitude with the moral notion of 
responsibility. Returning to the M&D example, M’s interest, in asking herself 
whether she is jealous, is not to contemplate her inner life; it is, rather, to understand 
whether her jealousy may have become a part of her view of D, distorting her 
perception. As in deliberative self-knowledge, M is concerned with her inner states 
in terms of their relation to truth (because attention is aimed at truth): ‘Is my attitude 
warranted, or is my perception of D mistaken?’ In cases such as these, the self-
understanding required is obtained by looking outward rather than inward, ‘away 
from the self’ as Murdoch recommends. It is, indeed, through the attempt to attend 
to the object, that one’s consciousness becomes properly present to oneself, 
avoiding the distortions created by directing attention to the inner life conceived 
independently of the outer. In this way, as Murdoch claims, ‘“inner” can … fuse 
with “outer” and not be lost’ (MGM 280). 
This model does not account for all kinds of self-knowledge, but only for 
the self-knowledge involved in attention and which is related to the possibility of 
achieving correct perception of reality. It also becomes evident that, contrary to the 
initial presentation of self-knowledge as being required prior to the act of attention, 
self-knowledge is rather concomitant to the act of attention: because inner states 
depend on their object, it is not until one tries to perceive the object attentively tha t 
awareness of the impediments to such perception begins to emerge. In turn, such 
awareness is instrumental to the removal of such impediments, and thus to the 
successful completion of the act of attention.226 
Conclusions 
This chapter concludes the examination of the role of the self in attention. Chapter 
                                                 
226 On this model, as in perception of reality discussed in Chapter 5, knowledge of the  self is also 
non-inferential, as well as determined by the moral quality of the subject. 
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6 offered a justification for the participation of the self in attention as a contributing 
element to clear and correct perception (through knowledge, virtue, etc.). That 
involved the definition of unselfing as uprooting, not the self as a whole, but the 
self’s tendency toward self-concern (‘ego’) and the consequent direction of the gaze 
inward, toward the self. While that account had the merit of accommodating the 
objectivity of attention with Murdoch’s general stress on the importance of the 
individual and her consciousness in morality, the claim that attention must be 
directed outward seemed to threaten the possibility of self-knowledge, if conceived 
as introspection or inner-directed gaze. On the other hand, the behaviourist ic 
account of self-knowledge, while consistent with an outward focus, clashed with 
Murdoch’s idea that states of mind (such as attention) are morally relevant by 
themselves, independently of any outward manifestation. 
Nevertheless, it was crucial to find an account of self-knowledge that could 
fit the requirements of attention, because attention involves precisely the 
elimination of distortions coming from the self, and without self-knowledge it 
would be impossible to identify the interference of the self, or to know whether one 
is being attentive at all. In order to find such an account, Murdoch’s view of the 
inner life has been analysed, and her rejection of both behaviourism and 
introspection spelt out. What has emerged is a third way, derived from 
Wittgenstein, which is compatible with Murdoch’s framework. The third way 
consists in presenting a model of self-knowledge whereby inner states are revealed 
by an outward directed look. Firstly, in the cases of sensations, the knowledge is 
immediate and no introspection is needed; secondly, in relation to all inner states, 
the concepts required to identify them are public, which means that to learn them 
and improve one’s understanding of them it is necessary to observe their use in 
contexts and by other people, which again means looking at the world and not at 
the self; thirdly and most importantly, the inner states relevant to attention, which 
need to be known in order to understand if one is being truthful and just, are 
‘transparent’ to their objects, which means that the object determines the inner state: 
in order to understand one’s inner state, it is necessary to attend to the object, and 
not to the self.  
It can therefore be seen that attention and self-knowledge do not need to be 
at odds: in order to attend one needs to know whether one’s self is interfering, but 
such knowledge is not gained by an inward gaze but by the very process of trying 
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to attend to the world. As Murdoch herself writes, ‘much of our self-awareness is 
other awareness’ (MGM 495). Self-knowledge, then, need not be introspective, in 
the sense of observing an inner object, detached from the outer world. Nor does it 
need to privilege the outer at the expense of the inner. Instead, a genuine 
understanding of one’s self is achieved through attention to the world. 
Self-knowledge, therefore, is concomitant with the attempt to attend, 
because it is only when one is trying to look at the object justly that one’s inner 
states in relation to that object become clearer, and in turn, such awareness 
contributes to the possibility to attend. Thus the process of attention, besides 
providing knowledge about the world and about oneself at the same time, also 
occasions a change in one’s inner being, connected with the moral progress that the 
exercise of attention brings about. In the words of Rilke, quoted by Murdoch:  
Looking … we are turned absolutely toward the outside, but when we are most of 
all so, things happen in us that have waited longingly to be observed, and while they 
reach completion in us … without our aid, – their significance grows up in the object 
outside. (NP 56) 
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Conclusions 
 
This thesis has been an exploration of the idea that particular cognitive attitudes and 
the exercise of particular faculties can be instrumental to, and in some cases even 
sufficient for, moral understanding and moral perception. The idea has been 
explored through an analysis of Iris Murdoch’s work. According to Murdoch, 
attention, which she conceptualises as involving the exercise of the imaginat ion, 
emotional engagement, a desire for the Good and the truth, and a selfless attitude, 
is what can enable the individual to apprehend moral reality. Such apprehension is 
both intellectual and perceptual, because intellectual faculties and attitudes are, 
according to Murdoch, inherent in perception. Therefore, Murdoch argues, 
attention makes possible moral understanding as well as moral perception. On this 
view, the main burden of morality lies, not so much in what we do, but what or how 
we are (cf. Taylor 1989:3), and more specifically what and how we see and know. 
In this thesis I have sought to make a case for the importance of attention in 
morality as based on Murdoch’s thought. The exploration of Murdoch’s philosophy 
has been fruitful, because Murdoch provides a comprehensive – although not 
exhaustive – picture of morality, from metaphysics, through epistemology to moral 
psychology. Her philosophical work is attracting a growing scholarship (includ ing 
recently Antonaccio 2000 and 2012b, Lovibond 2011, Broackes 2012, Forsberg 
2013) as well as proving influential in contemporary debates on moral perception 
(Blum 1994), moral cognitivism (McDowell 2001), and her idea of attention is 
among the key concepts in the ethics of care (Baier 1994, Ruddick 1989) and in 
recent philosophy of love (Larson 2009, Jollimore 2011, Milligan, 2013 and 2014). 
Murdoch’s concept of attention is central to her moral philosophy, and draws 
together the main areas of her thought. Exploring attention, therefore, has meant 
exploring the underlying commitments which, Murdoch holds, allow for the 
possibility to claim that morality depends, to a large extent, on how we ‘see’ reality.  
There is little agreement, in Murdoch’s philosophical scholarship, on the 
meaning of some of her key ideas, in particular on the kind of realism and 
cognitivism that she presents, on which the meaning of attention depends. 
Therefore, in order to clarify the meaning and role of attention in morality, as 
Murdoch understands it, my method has consisted, first of all, in a critical 
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examination of the central aspects of Murdoch’s thought. It has been necessary, as 
a background, to present an overall picture of it, in order to then focus on the 
elements that contribute to understanding attention and to making a case for its 
importance. My method has two main aspects. Firstly and mainly, it involves a 
close reading of Murdoch’s work. In relation to it, I have discussed her 
commentators, where they helpfully clarify a point (for example, Diamond (2010, 
2014) on the meaning of ‘experience’ in Chapter 1), or where they contribute to 
forming what I consider a misleading picture of Murdoch’s thought (for example, 
Antonaccio’s (2000, 2012b) ‘reflexive realism’ in Chapter 2). Secondly, I have used 
the work of philosophers who do not comment on Murdoch, but whose thought can 
bring out certain aspects of her ideas in a clearer and more poignant manner than 
Murdoch herself does: primarily, Simone Weil, and secondarily, John McDowell 
and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Weil occupies a prominent position in this work because 
she developed, before Murdoch, an idea of attention that includes most of the 
elements that I have highlighted as allowing us to consider attention as important 
in morality, and because Murdoch herself is deeply inspired by Weil, although the 
debt is not always fully acknowledged. Part of my task has been to make the debt 
clearer, and to point out where Murdoch’s ideas can benefit from a more explic it 
contribution from Weil. 
Through reading Murdoch, her commentators, and other philosophers, I 
have sought to offer, on the one hand, a picture of her moral thought which, while 
it does not claim to be a detailed account of her whole philosophy, nevertheless 
captures its overall thrust and spirit. Murdoch’s own method consists of critiquing 
action-based views of morality, and of building up, by assembling observations, an 
alternative picture that the reader may be expected to recognise as capturing her 
experience of the moral life. However, perhaps because of their intuitive appeal, 
some aspects of her thought do not appear to be fully spelled out, while some ideas 
seem to be in tension with others she presents. For these reasons, part of my task 
has been to spell out some of Murdoch’s concepts (not only attention, but also love, 
self, the Good, reality, truth, transcendence, the transcendental, perception, 
knowledge), and to find a possible solution between apparently conflicting ideas, 
principally the concepts and the ideas around which the importance of attention 
revolves. 
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The central tension that I have identified in Murdoch’s thought, and that 
needed to be addressed in order to explain the importance of attention in morality, 
was the tension between the claims about the reality of the Good and of value, and 
their transcendental nature. Good and value appear to be both part of reality and 
part of the structures with which the mind grasps reality. Both ideas, however, are 
used to justify the value of attention: on the one hand, attention is what enables to 
apprehend a moral reality, which is objectively there; on the other, attention is 
important because it is a virtuous state of mind, where thought and perception are 
informed by the right values.  
My suggestion has been to consider the evaluative states of mind, when 
correct or good, as being driven by the value that is in reality. While thought can be 
structured by what one takes to be good, particular values can be objects of 
perception, but only if the perceiver is in the appropriately virtuous mental state to 
observe them. In this way, it can be claimed that attention is a virtuous attitude, or 
the exercise of a complex of faculties, which enable the apprehension of a moral 
reality that does not depend on the subject, although its apprehension does (Chapter 
2). This also lends dual value to the idea of moral perception, which I present after 
the four chapters discussing the two apparently conflicting ideas (Chapters 1-4): the 
dual value of moral perception comes from considering it as morally laden 
perception of a moral reality. Chapter 5 (‘Moral Perception’) is, therefore, where 
the discussion of the metaphysical and moral psychological background to attention 
culminates. Specifically, having suggested one way to understand Murdoch’s 
commitment to the reality of value in Chapter 2, and why the individual’s facult ies 
and attitudes involved in attention can be instrumental to objectivity (in Murdoch’s 
sense) in Chapters 3 and 4, in Chapter 5 I discuss how attention can be understood 
as the virtuous state of mind that enables the perception of the value that is part of 
reality. If attention can play this role, its moral importance is justified. The practise 
of attention and the role of the self in it are the subject matter of the last two 
chapters, where I suggest ways to make sense of Murdoch’s notion of unselfing 
without denying the importance of the self and its contribution to perception 
(Chapter 6), and where I discuss how to attain self-knowledge while attending to 
the reality that lies outside the subject (Chapter 7).  
What has emerged is a picture of the moral life where the emphasis is shifted 
from action onto modes of thinking and perceiving. This picture lies on two 
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fundamental assumptions. The first is the assumption that what we see and thus 
know, in short what we perceive, depends to an extent on us, and thus is something 
we can be responsible for. This assumption can be understood in a less controversia l 
way, which is that one can be responsible for finding out about some things, and 
for not ignoring relevant information. But it can also, more controversially, mean 
that the kind of information we are presented with depends on our epistemic 
attitudes: the values, desires, character traits, previous knowledge and expectations 
that form the background of the individual’s consciousness play a role in 
determining what the facts perceived are, including their significance and the 
salience of their component parts. In this sense, correct perception is morally 
valuable both because of what it reveals and in itself. My interpretation of Murdoch 
includes both senses of individual responsibility in creating and shaping cognition 
all the way down to perception. 
The second assumption is that what and how we perceive is the basis on 
which moral judgment and action rest. This assumption, too, can be divided into a 
more and a less ambitious meaning. In a less ambitious sense, perceiving correctly 
and being aware of the relevant facts is fundamental to any view of morality. 
Perhaps because of its obvious nature, this observation is not often stressed in moral 
theory, with the possible exception of virtue ethics, in which phronesis or practical 
wisdom includes the ability to correctly perceive a situation in terms of its moral 
features. But the burden of phronesis lies in its link with the possibility of action, 
while the claim Murdoch makes is more basic, concerning perception itself. 
Nonetheless, no moral theory denies the importance of correct perception, with the 
differences lying in what use is made of it, and to what extent correct perception is 
itself considered a moral achievement. The correct application of principles, in 
every case, depends on the correct perception of the situation or facts the princip les 
are applied to. Hence, correct perception of the relevant facts is the bedrock of 
morality. 
More ambitiously, Murdoch claims that perception also determines the 
perceiver’s responses. This is, broadly defined, the meaning of moral perception 
presented. On this view, perception can, in ideal conditions, do all the moral work: 
it determines what the situation is, it discloses its moral features, and it provides the 
reasons as well as the motivations for action (that is, it does so where appropriate: 
action may not always be the fitting response). This claim is grounded on an 
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understanding of perception as operating through concepts, which link the mind 
and the world. If concepts are considered as part of human lives, which involve 
patterns of desires and concerns, then it is possible to claim that some concepts are 
inherently connected with certain responses: as, for instance, what is threatening 
calls for avoidance, so what is cruel calls for reproach, or the attempt to stop it, etc. 
These patterns and responses cannot, however, be generalised into rules: moral 
responses depend on the application of concepts in perception, where concepts are 
applied differently depending on the concrete situation, and with different aspects 
being salient each time. For this reason, my interpretation of Murdoch supports 
moral particularism. 
The main contention that emerges from my analysis of Murdoch is that 
correct perception, in the demanding senses of being both a moral achievement and 
something that elicits the appropriate responses, is made possible by the exercise of 
attention. Attention involves, potentially, all the faculties and is motivated by the 
desire to perceive its object truthfully and justly, while at the same time attempting 
to remove bias and distortions that come from self-protection and self-gratificat ion. 
If a situation is approached attentively, the subject will be in the best position to 
perceive its moral features, including the possibilities for action, and thus to respond 
accordingly 
 To claim that attention is central to morality does not, crucially, exclude 
other considerations and other methods to achieve moral understanding and to 
secure right action. On the one hand, the least demanding aspects of this picture, as 
I have just sketched it, are compatible with other views of morality and moral 
theories. On the other, in its more ambitious aspects, the argument for the 
importance of attention is intended to suggest that being attentive can put the 
subject, in the right circumstances, in the best possible position to perceive moral 
reality and to respond appropriately. It is not claimed, however, that attention is 
always successful, nor that it is always the only moral requirement. First, while 
attention mainly depends on the subject, there can be limitations to it that are to an 
extent outside the subject’s control (for example, some deep-seated bias pervading 
the society one grows up in may, in some cases, be extremely hard to identify and 
overcome; or internal limitations, like mental disorders, may prevent attention); in 
those cases, it is helpful to be able to rely on other forms of moral reasoning, 
appealing for example to logic and universal principles. Secondly, because attention 
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depends on the faculties and character traits of the individual, which are developed 
and sharpened over time, it is helpful to be able to test one’s perceptions by moving 
beyond attention. In both these cases, judgment and deliberation come to the aid of 
an imperfect ability to attend. Thirdly, it is also possible that some moral difficult ies 
encompass so many problems and contexts that, while the exercise of attention in 
each of them in crucial, the overall understanding will need to rely on other ways 
to evaluate the various aspects against each other. 
What has been offered, therefore, is not a theory of morality, in the shape of 
an exhaustive picture of what the correct moral attitude is. Murdoch is clear about 
the dangers of totalising theories, as well as about the importance of other forms of 
moral thinking, like utilitarian considerations and the concept of duty. Rather, what 
I have offered, drawing on Murdoch, is, firstly, a reminder of what lies at the basis 
of various kinds of moral thinking, and secondly, an account of how much moral 
work can be done by being in a maximally receptive state of mind and so letting 
the object or situation fully strike one. 
Because it focuses on clarifying an important idea of Murdoch’s and 
examining some of its implications, I consider this work to be making a dual 
contribution, to Murdoch studies and to moral philosophy more broadly. 
Murdochian scholarship has been dominated by Maria Antonaccio’s monographs 
(2000, 2012), which, however excellent, at times read more like a description of 
Murdoch’s thought than an attempt to grapple with it. This also appears to be the 
case with Antonaccio’s interpretation of Murdoch as a ‘reflexive realist’. While this 
definition, whereby the reality of the Good is captured by the mind as it reflects on 
itself, is meant to reconcile the two apparently jarring aspects of Murdoch’s thought 
I have discussed, i.e. the realism about value and the transcendental nature of value, 
it does so at the expense of Murdoch’s commitment to a moral reality outside the 
self, and thus does not properly account for attention being, in Murdoch’s own 
description, ‘directed outward, away from the self’ (SG 66). Because Antonaccio’s 
first book (2000) was the first monograph on Murdoch’s philosophy, and because 
of its comprehensive nature, it has been taken as standard (e.g. Widdows 2006), 
although the view it presents has recently been criticised (cf. Robjant 2011a). In 
Chapter 2, I have explained the reasons for rejecting reflexive realism and offered 
a different way to understand the two aspects of Murdoch’s metaphysics, which can 
be more faithful to Murdoch’s moral realism. Therefore, this work offers an 
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alternative picture of Murdoch’s metaphysics, which can be included in future 
debates. A second contribution to Murdoch scholarship is the analysis of Murdoch’s 
moral psychology, in particular in relation to her central concept of attention. There, 
too, some suggestions were made to either fill in the gaps that Murdoch leaves open 
or spell out what she does not fully specify. The suggestions I made relate to two 
main ideas: first, the reasons for considering attention as a moral concept, in 
Chapters 3 and 4; second, the way in which the selfless or ‘unselfing’ nature of 
attention can be accommodated within a view of morality centred around the 
individual, which also involves specifying how one is to practise attention, in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
 If the picture that I have developed from Murdoch's framework is correct, 
some of its key aspects, such as her non-standard type of moral realism, and her 
views about the conceptual and evaluative nature of thought and perception, will 
help to identify an alternative (but not exclusive) epistemological and metaphysica l 
picture, and as such can contribute to moral philosophy more broadly. This is a 
picture which is being increasingly influential in its various ramifications: see 
Williams (1985) on thick concepts; McDowell (2001) on thick concepts and the 
objectivity of value; Putnam (1992) on a non-metaphysical realism, Taylor (1989) 
on the importance of the self; Diamond (2001) on the scope of moral thought and 
the practise of moral philosophy; and Nussbaum (1990) on the role of virtue in 
perception and understanding. A second contribution to moral philosophica l 
debates concerns more specifically the central idea of the thesis, i.e. the suggestion 
that particular states of minds and the exercise of certain faculties may result in a 
change of moral understanding and moral responses, and that the exercise of 
attention, as defined in this thesis, can occasion better moral understanding and 
responses. In moral disagreement, the suggestion is that besides giving reasons and 
applying principles, what needs to be attempted is to change someone’s perception 
of the situation, by encouraging attention, which includes highlighting certain 
aspects, questioning possible bias or self-protective desires, encouraging emotiona l 
presence, as well as imaginative identification where appropriate. Moreover, the 
picture on which the notion of attention rests has good explanatory power. It can 
explain radical moral disagreement, where rational argument and reason giving 
does not seem to resolve the difficulty; and it can also explain how one can change 
one’s mind about a moral situation after undergoing certain experiences, which may 
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encourage or demand one’s attention, or draw it to different aspects, so that the 
situation presents itself in a new light. 
 Since my focus has been on clarifying and developing Murdoch's position, 
I have therefore not sought to evaluate her moral framework against prominent and 
fundamentally different competitors. Nevertheless, it is worth touching on three 
common criticisms because, on analysis, these can be seen to be based on a 
misunderstanding of Murdoch's model. The first, often addressed to Murdoch (for 
ex. Clarke (2012) and Blum (2012)), is that her model is too individualistic, placing 
the whole burden of moral improvement and moral error on the individual’s inner 
life. While it is true that the emphasis for moral change is laid on the individual, the 
process also benefits from triangulating one’s perceptions with other people’s, as 
well as from analysing the impact that social factors, such as particular narratives, 
may have on one’s consciousness, informing one’s perceptions (I address this worry 
briefly in Chapters 5 and 6); for these reasons, individual change does not exclude 
sharing and participating into a broader moral awareness. Moreover, attention, as I 
have stressed, is not exhaustive, and accommodates other, less individualistic, paths 
to moral change. 
The second objection is that of over-demandingness: the scope of inner 
states, knowledge and attitudes is much broader than the scope of action, so if the 
burden of morality is moved back to consciousness, the scope of personal 
responsibility is significantly broadened. In other words, on this view, one is 
morally responsible not only for what one does or fails to do, but for how and what 
one thinks and perceives, or fails to. In addition, it is very difficult to delimit which 
states of minds, perceptions and thoughts are morally relevant, because on this view 
it cannot be specified in principle, and consciousness is seen as a coherent whole 
with interconnected parts (‘“But are you saying that every single second has a moral 
tag?” Yes, roughly’ (MGM 495)). If one’s moral quality depends on one’s inner 
life, and if the inner life or consciousness is shaped by the ‘daily, hourly, minute ly’ 
(MGM 193) direction of attention, as Murdoch claims, it follows that there are no 
resting places for the moral life. Yet, while it is true that the focus on attention 
makes morality more demanding than a morality centred on action, the kind of 
demand involved is different, consisting more of small but constant shifts of focus 
and self-examination, rather than more active exertions of will (although at times it 
is that too); as Simone Weil defines it, attention is a passive activity. 
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Lastly, the claims about the place of the concepts used in perception within 
a community of concept-users can call up the threat of relativism. Although I 
presented these claims as being about the human community, it is true that some 
concepts are inescapably relative to a smaller community or culture. My suggestion 
(in Chapter 5) has been that we understand these concepts as having a kernel that is 
driven by reality, and then adapted in different ways according to context. There is, 
however, no infallible test to prove conclusively that concepts are driven by reality 
rather than top-down from the interests of the community. While I do not claim to 
have avoided the possibility of relativism, the role of attention itself, as the maximal 
receptivity and ‘unselfing’ which puts the individual in the best possible position to 
perceive clearly, can be claimed to be universal. Attention itself, independently of 
the culture and the difficulties derived from it, can work in all individuals as the 
prerequisite for correct moral perception and understanding, providing the 
possibility for it, but not guaranteeing it. 
 In closing, I wish to mention a number of potential avenues for future 
research that are suggested by this thesis. Some of these arise from questions that I 
have not been able to address in as much detail as I would have liked. First among 
these is the idea of ‘necessity’ which, for Murdoch and Weil, springs from a 
maximally attentive apprehension of an object or situation. The motivationa l 
internalism that is part of the idea of attention finds its highest expression in the 
experience of being forced by reality to respond in a particular way. This seems to 
be created by a complete investment of thought and emotion in the object of 
attention, so that the whole individual is ‘pulled’ by the reality it sees. This 
experience is individual: in an empirical sense, and from an outsider’s perspective, 
it is obvious that there are other possibilities open. The necessity involved includes 
the exercise of the will, which however appears bound in one direction. Weil 
expresses this through her notion of ‘obedience’, where the will conforms to the 
only choice it has, to obey the order of the world. Harry Frankfurt (1988, 1999) has 
explored a very similar idea through his notion of ‘volitional necessity’. A 
comparison with Murdoch and Weil may reveal new dimension of this difficult 
idea.  
 Questions relating to the proper use of the will in attention, together with 
the difficulty of placing the role of the self and with the requirement to be selfless, 
link Murdoch with Eastern philosophical thought and particularly with Buddhist 
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traditions. While Murdoch once calls herself a ‘Buddhist Christian’ (MGM 419), 
care must be taken not to draw too close a parallel and be mindful of the different 
contexts. However, the related ideas of attention and unselfing are also, strikingly, 
at the heart of Buddhist teachings, where the practise of meditation (which Murdoch 
recommended should be taught in schools) consists in selfless attention to an 
external reality. The connections are also reinforced by Murdoch’s appreciation of 
Schopenhauer, in relation to his emphasis on justice and compassion being the best 
virtues, and the importance of contemplation in the face of a destructive will (see 
MGM Chapter 3). Weil’s own thoughts about attention and the self were also 
nourished by close readings of the Bhagavad Gita. The parallels as well as 
differences between Murdoch’s idea of attention and Buddhism can constitute a 
fruitful avenue of exploration. Peter Conradi’s (2004) account of his conversion to 
Buddhism in connection with his friendship with Murdoch can be a helpful starting 
point. 
 Because this thesis offers an exploration of a particular way to think about 
morality in general, in the form of attitudes and faculties of moral perception and 
understanding, the overall picture can be used to examine particular questions in 
morality. In this way, it can constitute a basis for explorations in applied ethics. For 
example, questions in animal ethics, which have been implicitly in the back of my 
mind while writing this work, can be asked again while urging a different approach 
to non-human animals, which is not based on the identification of their capacities 
and of criteria for moral considerability, but based on the kinds of perceptions and 
responses that follow the exercise of attention as described here. This kind of 
approach is starting to raise interest thanks to the work of Cora Diamond (2001d, 
2008), Cavell (2008), Wolfe (2008), J.M. Coetzee (1999) and, more recently and 
more explicitly, Elisa Aaltola (2012), the latter stressing the importance of 
intersubjectivity and empathy in thinking morally about non-human animals, and 
suggesting that moral concern for non-human animals changes depending on how 
closely we come into contact with them. 
 A great part of my exploration of attention belongs to moral psychology. 
Differently from much work in moral psychology, Murdoch’s approach includes 
little empirical scientific evidence. However, the study of attention as a moral 
concept could be buttressed by empirical psychological experiments. For instance, 
the claim that exercising attention, in the sense defined here, changes one’s moral 
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understanding and moral responses, can be tested through empirical experiments. 
Empirical psychological evidence could also help to justify Murdoch’s claims about 
the role of the self and of the ego in directing consciousness and desire, and in 
particular the claim, central for Murdoch’s argument, that most of the distortions 
that occur in perception and understanding are caused, directly or indirectly, by 
self-directed focus, which creates fantasy through projection. 
 These possible avenues indicate that this thesis can be taken as an initia l 
exploration of the role of attention in morality, grounded in Murdoch’s thought and 
developed from it. Because this work is an overview of the idea of attention in its 
various aspects, many of the ideas presented can be expanded and developed. What 
I hope to have provided, however, is a perspicuous presentation and development 
of Murdoch’s concept of attention, and some reasons derived from it to regard 
attention as important in morality. 
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